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ABSTRACT 
The identity of the Western state has been traditionally tied to sovereignty and (national) 
security. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union changed this. In 
the 1990s the concept of security widened beyond military-political and state failure emerged 
as a new threat to the U.S. The concept was coined by Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. 
Ratner with the article ‘Saving Failed States’, in 1992. However, the concept remained 
elusive and the threats related to it in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), localized.  
 
The terrorist attacks of September 11
th
 2001 transformed failing states from a regional 
problem into a global (strategic) threat. Therefore, how the official discourse of the U.S. 
created threats had significant effect on its foreign policy. The aim of this research was to 
analyze the securitization of failing states as part of the U.S. national security discourse. This 
was done by looking at how the failing state discourse entered into the NSS, as well as how it 
was framed. The NSS documents and the primary source material on state failure provided 
information on why failing states were seen as a threat. Primary material was analyzed using 
Securitization theory and Discourse analysis methodology.  
 
The conceptual base of the failing states discourse was located in the Western definition of 
state, sovereignty and security. State failure was defined and described in reference to a 
strong (Western) state. The existential threats needed for the securitization of failing states 
drew from the definition and identity of the Western state. Failing states were gradually 
created a threat in the NSS documents with the widening of security in the 1990s. During this 
process intersubjective and intertextual links formed between different threats. These threats 
were externalized to the policy documents as security discourses. Failing states discourse 
evolved from the security discourses of WMD’s, regional conflicts and terrorism.  
 
These discourses were objectified and developed an existence of their own with consecutive 
administrations. The securitization of failing states happened gradually through the different 
discourses. A regional instability issue associated with Third World ultimately received 
existential qualities. After 9/11 all state failure was defined as a strategic threat equal to 
former Soviet Union. In the NSS of 2002 failing states were completely securitized. It drew 
under it all the dominant security discourses. The following NSS documents kept up this 
securitization by retaining the intersubjective and intertextual links. The securitization of 
failing states begun in the 1990s was completed in 2002, and remained effective to 2010. 
These results showed how the NSS created threats through securitizing failing states. 
KEY WORDS: Failing states, discourse analysis, securitization, national security, U.S. 
  
TIIVISTELMÄ 
Länsimaisen valtion identiteetti on ollut perinteisesti sidoksissa suvereniteettiin ja 
kansalliseen turvallisuuteen. Kylmän sodan päättyminen ja sitä seurannut Neuvostoliiton 
hajoaminen muuttivat tämän asetelman. 1990–luvulla turvallisuus laajeni käsittämään 
muutakin kuin poliittisen ja sotilaallisen sektorin. Samanaikaisesti valtioiden hajoaminen 
nousi uudeksi uhkaksi Yhdysvalloille. Hajoavien valtioiden käsite ilmestyi vuonna 1992 
Gerald B. Helmanin ja Steven R. Ratnerin ‘Saving Failed States’ -artikkelin myötä. Käsite 
jäi häilyväksi. Samalla siihen liittyvät uhkat Yhdysvaltojen kansallisessa turvallissuustrategia 
asiakirjassa (NSS) jäivät luonteeltaan alueellisiksi. 
 
Vuonna 2001 syyskuun 11. päivän terrori-iskut muuttivat hajoavat valtiot alueellisesta 
uhkasta maailmanlaajuiseksi ja strategiseksi. Tapa millä Yhdysvaltain virallinen diskurssi 
muodostaa uhkia on vaikuttanut merkittävästi sen ulkopolitiikkaan. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena 
oli analysoida hajoavien valtioiden turvallistamista Yhdysvaltain kansallisessa 
turvallisuusdiskurssissa. Tämä toteutettiin tarkastelemalla kuinka hajoavien valtioiden 
diskurssi ilmestyi NSS -asiakirjaan, sekä miten se asemoitiin osaksi tekstiä. Tutkimuksen 
primääriaineiston perusteella oli mahdollista selvittää, miksi hajoavat valtiot nähtiin 
Yhdysvalloissa uhkana. Primääriaineisto käsitti NSS -asiakirjat, sekä valtioiden hajoamista 
käsittelevän kirjallisuuden. Aineisto analysoitiin käyttämällä turvallistamisen teoriaa ja 
diskurssianalyysiä. 
 
Hajoavien valtioiden diskurssin käsitteellinen alkuperä sijoittui länsimaisiin määritelmiin 
valtiosta, suvereniteetista ja turvallisuudesta. Valtioiden hajoamisen määritelmän ja 
kuvaamisen perustana oli vahva länsimainen valtio. Hajoavien valtioiden turvallistamiseen 
tarvittavat eksistentiaaliset uhkat perustuivat länsimaisen valtion määritelmään, sekä valtion 
identiteettiin. Hajoavat valtiot turvallistettiin vähitellen NSS -asiakirjoissa osana 1990–
luvulla tapahtunutta turvallisuuden käsitteen laajentumista. Tämän prosessin aikana 
muodostui intersubjektiivisia ja intertekstuaalisia yhteyksiä eri uhkien välille. Nämä 
muodostivat turvallisuusdiskursseja NSS -asiakirjoihin. Hajoavien valtioiden diskurssi 
muodostui ja kehittyi kolmesta pääasiallisesta diskurssista jotka olivat joukkotuhoaseet, 
alueelliset konfliktit ja terrorismi. Nämä kolme diskurssia samaistuivat osaksi NSS -
asiakirjoja ja alkoivat elää omaa elämäänsä.  
 
Hajoavien valtioiden turvallistaminen tapahtui vähitellen näiden kolmen eri diskurssin 
kautta. Hajoavat valtiot oli alun perin yhdistetty alueelliseen epävakauteen. Käsite sai lopulta 
eksistentiaalisen uhkan mittasuhteet. 9/11 terrori–iskujen jälkeen kaikki hajoavat valtiot 
assosioitiin Neuvostoliittoon verrattavana strategisena uhkana. Vuoden 2002 NSS -
asiakirjassa hajoavien valtiot turvallistettiin lopullisesti. Käsite veti alleen kaikki muut 
pääasialliset diskurssit. Seuraavat NSS -asiakirjat vahvistivat turvallistettua diskurssia. Tämä 
tapahtui ylläpitämällä intersubjektiivisia ja intertekstuaalisia yhteyksiä eri uhkien välillä. 
Hajoavien valtioiden turvallistaminen sai alkunsa 1990–luvulla, toteutui vuonna 2002 ja 
säilyi vuoden 2010 asiakirjoihin asti. Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittivat miten NSS -asiakirjat 
loivat uhkia hajoavia valtioita turvallistamalla. 
AVAINSANAT: Hajoavat valtiot, diskurssianalyysi, turvallistaminen, kansallinen 
turvallisuus, Yhdysvallat. 
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SECURITIZING OF FAILING STATES IN THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
“The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does 
an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to 
make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? If by 
means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing 
actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound 
by, we are witnessing a case of securitization.” 
 
Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998),  p. 25. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
–Cave ab homine unius libri 
 
1.1 Why Failing States matter? 
 
States are commonly seen as unchangeable and eternal structures which provide the basic 
necessities for society to function both internally and internationally. The possibility and 
concrete reality of state failure has forced the system of states to evaluate the consequences of 
collapsing polities
1
. This has led to re–evaluate the stand on questions such as security, 
sovereignty and intervention. Historically empires, civilizations, and kingdoms have come 
and gone.
2
  
                                                 
1
 Robert I. Rotberg (2004), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, p. 1. Disintegration of states threatens 
the very foundation of the states–system because states constitute the building blocks of the world order. 
2
 Joseph A. Tainter (1988), The Collapse of Complex Societies, pp. 5–21.  
2 
 
Regardless of these recurring themes the contemporary international system has to take note 
when parts that comprise it are disintegrating. During the Cold War the bipolar structure of 
the competing superpowers stabilized the international system.
3
 The international system 
weakened after the Cold War and this was seen throughout the world as the old ideological 
competitors decreased and withdrew their support from their proxies. This contributed in part 
to the re–structuring of the prevailing system of states.4 Ideology and geostrategy were partly 
replaced in the West by human rights and humanitarian concerns.
5
 The battle over ideological, 
political and military levels had greatly constituted to the conflicts around the globe. 
However, in many cases it was not necessarily the initiating factor since majority of the 
problems of troubled states have roots in their internal dysfunction and history of 
colonization, or both.
6
  
 
Why failing states
7
 matter? If the problem of state failure is localized, what concern does this 
have to the Western industrialized democracies?
8
 A localized problem in a far–away continent 
does not create a major security concern for superpowers, such as the United States 
(henceforth U.S). However, the dominant discourse on security and the portrayal of threats in 
policy documents give a reason to examine the discourses on failing states more closely.
9
  
 
The most obvious answer to the problem of failing states (from here on referred to as FS) 
would be to look into the causes, mechanisms, indications and direct consequences of state 
failure. Therefore, the causal explanations and indications of state failure (and collapse) have 
been the focus in the majority of academic research. This has included policy frameworks and 
documents of state construction as well as and statistical analysis.
10
  
                                                 
3
 John J. Mearsheimer (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 45. Mearsheimer argues that bipolarity as 
a power configuration produces the least amount of fear. Therefore, due to rough balance of power the fear is 
less acute. Kenneth Waltz (2008), Realism and International Politics, pp. 61–61. 
4
 For an in depth discussion on the effects of the superpowers to their proxies to the problem of state collapse, 
see for example, William I. Zartman (ed.) (1995), Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of 
Legitimate Authority, and Mohammed Ayoob (1995), The Third World Security Predicament. 
5
 Barry Buzan (1991), People, States & Fear (2
nd
 ed.): An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post–
Cold War Era, p. 49. Human rights rose to international prominence during 1970s and 1980s. This established 
individual security as an international issue.  
6
 Robert H. Bates (2008), When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late–Century Africa, p. 85, Ayoob (1995). 
7
 ‘Failing states’ are referred to as ‘FS’ from here on. This is done interchangeably with the full version.  
8
 Francis Fukuyama (2004), State–Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty–First Century, pp. 
125–126. Failing are states presented as a far reaching security problem. 
9
 Thierry Balzacq (2005), “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context”, 
European Journal of International Relations 11/ 2005, p. 171. Discourses have ‘become an important aspect of 
security analysis.’ 
10
 For different approaches on state and peace building as well as state failure, see for example, Zartman (1995), 
Fukuayma (2004), Rotberg (ed.) (2004)  and Charles T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth (eds.) (2008), Building States 
to Build Peace. 
3 
 
The problem is that most of the research done does not to take into account some of the more 
abstract ways of how state failure is being created, amplified, or modified by prevailing and 
ongoing discourses and discursive changes. Here the purpose is to look for how the 
intersubjective and intertextual links create the state failure discourse and how it is 
securitized. Changes in policy and wider debate on FS are constantly being re–formulated. 
Security discourse is a self–referential process11 and the language choices have an effect on 
how the concept is integrated into the official foreign policy. The discursive choices have an 
effect inside the structures of policymaking. As a result, discursive shifts can impact policy as 
Somalia’s 1993 Mogadishu incident and the death of several U.S. servicemen showed.12  
 
Therefore, when a discursive concept is implemented by a powerful actor such as the U.S. 
after September 11
th
 2001 it pre–structures its use in the wider discursive realm. The 
discursive approach can make it possible to understand the phenomenon of state failure in a 
wider context. This gives a different perspective instead of just examining flows of money, 
number of refugees, or the effective area of control by the state in danger of failing. The 
interpretation of language by Discourse analysis (from here on referred to as DA)
13
, helps to 
understand how language constructs reality. This allows us to see deeper into the realm of 
foreign policy.  
 
There are numerous ways to look into the question of FS. However, ultimately it is about 
security and how threats impact policy implementation. Therefore, the process of 
securitization is the key element when we are looking at how official policy documents create 
threats of failing states. With the act of securitization something is made an existential 
threat.
14
 Subsequently, when FS are securitized as a threat to the only superpower
15
 in the 
world, it cannot be without an effect to wider debate on state failure.
16
 Furthermore, this 
process gives important information how discursive changes in the U.S. official foreign policy 
affect the various administrations security discourse.  
                                                 
11
 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (1998), Security: A New Framework for Analysis, p. 24. 
Designating something as a security issue makes it so through self–referential practice. 
12
 Hussein M. Adam, “Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born”, in Zartman (1995), p. 85, Ayoob (1995), p. 
119, 130. Michael O’Hanlon, (2012), “Obama’s Weak and Failing States Agenda”, The Washington Quarterly 
35:4, Fall 2012, p. 71. 
13
 Methodologies will be written with a capital letter throughout the study. Therefore Discourse analysis is 
written with a capital ‘D’, and the abbreviation ‘DA’ is used interchangeably with the full version. 
14
 Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 21–22.  
15
 Ayoob (1995), p. 119. The U.S. is the only major power that defines its interests (political & economic) in 
global terms and has the will to project power to defend those interests.  
16
 Edward Newman (2009), “Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post–Westphalian World” 
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.30, No.3 (December 2009), p. 424. 
4 
 
1.2 Framing the problem and the research questions 
 
In the previous section the phenomena of FS was given a brief historical introduction focusing 
on the period from Cold War to the terrorist attacks of the September 11
th
 2001 (from here on 
referred to as 9/11). This was done to give temporal perspective and to look how FS can be 
perceived as a relevant research subject. The first section also opened the discussion on the 
importance of researching state failure by using Discourse analytical methodology. It iterated 
the meaning security and securitization have when language is defining foreign policy 
through discourses.  
 
This second section deals with formulation of the research problem and the adjacent research 
questions. This is done in an effort to view how FS have been researched and what the 
previous research accounts for. Moreover, the goal of this problematization is to combine FS, 
security and securitization. This is done in order to
17
 present a research problem from where 
the research questions can be drawn. This will lay the basis for the conceptual framework and 
research design of the study. 
 
State failure is a source of for numerous discourses. It has been argued that by understanding 
the nature of this phenomenon it is possible to establish criteria distinguishing collapse and 
failure from general weakness.
18
 This understanding can be then used to halt or reverse 
apparent failure that might threaten the stability of the international system.
19
 However, this 
view presents a traditional look into the phenomenon of state failure and it does not take into 
account the discursive effect of language. Moreover, many of the earlier studies on falling 
states focused on Africa and similar Third World
20
 locations. This created a distinct 
development discourse tied with ‘regional problem’ stamp.21  
                                                 
17
 From here on ‘in order to’ is referred to as ‘IOT’. 
18
 Rothberg, (2004), p. 2. 
19
 Hans–Henrik Holm (1998), ”The Responsibility That Will Not Go Away: Weak States in the International 
System”, Failed States and International Security: Causes, Prospects, and Consequences, p. 1, 12. International 
system is interlinked and the ‘security and welfare’ of the system is co–dependent’.  Ayoob (1995), p. 5, pp. 
174–176. Acceleration of state failure can lead to spilling of anarchy which is a threat to regional and 
international security. 
20
 Ayoob (1995), p. 12. According to Ayoob, Third World is defined as ‘underdeveloped and poor’. For him, it 
comprises of the weak states of Asia, Africa and Latin America’. 
21
 Ibid., pp. 56–65. Region is used in the context where states constitute regional subsystems and security 
complexes. For a detailed discussion on regions and subsystems, see for example, Buzan (1991) and Buzan et al. 
(1998). 
5 
 
Studies were tuned so that depending on the research focus and funding, they were either very 
general or very narrow in focus.
22
  After 9/11 a new focus was brought to forefront of the 
policy debate. The U.S. tendency in regard to the issue weak and FS changed from regional 
towards security related issues.
23
 The focus has since been on the threat created (or perceived) 
by the failure and collapse of the nation–state.24 In the West the perception of these issues was 
different before 9/11, than after it. This distinction is crucial in understanding the discourses 
that surround state failure.
25
 Therefore, Securitization theory, DA methodology and temporal 
span from the 1990s to 2010 give the basis for analysis. This is also why these are chosen as 
the framework of this study.
26
  
 
A number of studies with different focus have been done on state failure.  Qualitative and 
quantitative methods have been applied with different theoretical and methodological 
frameworks. Furthermore, there is a trend for specific causal explanation of why states fail 
and what constitutes failure.
27
 This is done in an effort to explain how the process can be 
stopped or reversed.
28
 This has led to an endless search from numerous experiments.
29
 This 
type of research is widely regarded as a terrain of peacebuilding and state–making. It was 
created in the context of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath.
30
  
                                                 
22
 Caty Clément (2007), The Nuts and Bolts of State Collapse: What to do when States Fail? A QCA Analysis of 
Lebanon, Somalia and former–Yugoslavia, pp. 1–3. Oliver Nay (2013), “Fragile and failed states: Critical 
perspectives on conceptual hybrids”, International Political Science Review 34, p. 328. 
23
 Nay (2013), p. 330. 
24
 Jarno Limnéll & Jyri Raitasalo (2008), Georgian sota uhkakuvien näkökulmasta, pp. 6–8. Buzan et al. (1998), 
pp. 41–42, 44–45. Buzan et al. argue that the paradox of securitization is magnified by the fact that the actor (the 
state) is also the object of the securitization.  
25
 James A. Piazza (2008), ”Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational 
Terrorism?” International Studies Quarterly 52, p. 469. According to Piazza after 9/11 U.S. officials, academics 
and many others saw failed and failing states as international security threats that could not be ignored. 
26
 As a temporal baseline for the debate, see Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner (1992/93), ”Saving Failed 
States” Foreign Policy Issue 89. For comparison see, Stefan Mair (2008), “A New Approach: The Need to Focus 
on Failing States”, Harvard International Review, Winter 2008, pp. 52–55. For a global critical view see, Sonali 
Huria (2008), “Failing and Failed States: The Global Discourse”, New Delhi Institute of Peace and Conflict 
Studies (IPCS), IPCS Issue Brief No. 75. 
27
 A discussion on the challenges of an empirical approach and difficulties of causality when dealing with failing 
states, see for example, Newman (2009), pp. 425–429, and Clément pp. 3–7. 
28
 Zartman (1995), p. 5, Branwen Gruffydd Jones (2013), “‘Good governance’ and ‘state failure’: genealogies 
of imperial discourse”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2013 Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 63. Zartman refers to 
broader questions behind case examples as a focus for academic studies trying to establish causes and 
characteristics of state collapse, whereas Jones argues that the failed state discourse is typically articulated 
through various tables, rankings and indexes. See for example, Robert H. Jackson (1990), Quasi–states: 
sovereignty, international relations and the Third World, Zartman (1995), Fukuyama (2004), Rotberg (2004) and 
Call and Wyeth (2008) on the problematization of the different concepts of state failure. 
29
 Nay (2013), p. 328–329. Nay draws together the various approaches academic studies of fragile and failed 
states and highlights its problematic nature. 
30
 Ibid., p. 327. The concept of ‘failed state’ is tied to the context of the Cold War and was ‘introduced to foreign 
policy analysts’ in the first half of the 1990s. 
6 
 
Hence, there are academic journals, articles and books, as well as an occasional policy 
document focused on the subject.
31
 Moreover, based on indicators gathered from empiric (and 
other) results, a list or a pattern as well as occasional policy document have been produced to 
combat state failure. A clear goal can be seen for universal explanation which then could be 
applied to a multitude of different situations. However, there are number of problems that rise 
from this universalism and positivism.
32
  
 
First, the acquisition of reliable data from areas in turmoil is impossibility in itself. It is 
nominal at best and a little more than hear–say at worst.33 Hence, the results of the analysis 
based on data like this would be at risk and highly vulnerable to criticism. Second, there 
would still be issues even if there were a reliable and acceptable way to collect data from 
instable areas. Specific circumstances would render the results to account for a highly 
localized solution.  Therefore, it would be a case–study of the state or area in question. This 
would not account for an overarching solution for all cases of state failure.
34
  
 
Third, there is an ongoing debate as to what are the wider consequences of state failure. The 
phenomenon is seen by some a local or regional problem
35
 and by others as an international 
issue threatening the security and stability of the system. This point juxtaposition blurs the 
situation even more than the previous two. It creates highly politicized arguments because of 
the nature of the security aspect. Finally, this search for an overarching theory has resulted in 
inconclusive results.
36
 These results have been a series of recommendations with a chart or a 
map weighed with indicator colors. This is because there are far too many variables to 
account for every kind of situation.
37
  
 
                                                 
31
 Different National Security Strategies of the U.S. have no mention of failing states before 1997.  
32
 Positivism is here connected to rationalism and to the traditional natural science which prefers cause–effect 
type of research. For a summed up account of rationalist, constitutive and postmodern theories in the strategic 
studies, see Joonas Sipilä, “Sota tutkimuksen kohteena” in Pekka Sivonen (ed.) (2013), Suomalaisia näkökulmia 
strategian tutkimukseen, pp. 72–75. For a debate on the nature of positivism, see Pertti Töttö (2000), Pirullisen 
positivismin paluu: Laadullisen ja määrällisen tarkastelua. 
33
 This subject has been repeatedly raised as an issue by writers such as, Rothberg, (2004), Zartman (1995), 
Fukuyama (2004), and Clément (2007), to name a few. 
34
 Tainter (1988), p. 3. According to Tainter, explanations of a collapse are usually more or less ‘ad hoc’ and the 
general understanding is elusive. Rotberg (2004), p. 25. Rotberg argues that research on failed states is 
insufficient. This is because by its nature and structure it cannot provide exact information, or a ‘tipping point’ of 
when states fail. 
35
 Zartman (1995), p. 9, Ayoob (1995), p. 5. 
36
 Bates (2008), pp. 133–136. 
37
 Rotberg (2004), p. 20. Surveys and the data they produce as they cannot predict future failure and collapse. 
7 
 
However, this is not to say that these studies are useless but to reiterate the importance of 
context and subjectivity as well as to point out the myriad conditions prevailing in each 
separate case.
38
 Furthermore, the security aspect has linked state failure and security studies in 
different ways. This has happened on both sides of the Atlantic and created a boon of studies. 
As a result, a counter–discourse has risen in other parts of the world in response to this 
Western lead march of policy and academic discussion. Africa and Asia have felt that the 
discourse on FS and their security implications is motivated by Western neo–imperialism and 
geopolitical or geoeconomical interests.
39
 This topic would require itself a separate study and 
therefore it isn’t the focus here. Nevertheless, for the sake of objectivity these countering 
views and the discourses they represent cannot be completely excluded or ignored.   
 
Moreover, it is reasonable to limit the scope of the research to the less studied part of the FS 
phenomenon. To narrow down the field there are two points that need to be taken into 
consideration. First, the positivist way of cause and effect has yielded valuable information.
40
 
In the field of state–building there are few successes of reversing state failure as well as many 
failures. These in their own right can provide basis for policy makers to formulate foreign 
policy on FS when put in to context. Second, there are dozens of studies done on security, 
securitization, intertextuality, and discourse. However, these address specific subjects such as 
terrorism, organized crime, refugees, or humanitarian crisis. These specific subjects can be 
seen as looking into the effects or internal dynamics of failing states.
41
 Hence, they are still in 
the same area as those of state–building.42 In the Finnish military there is one master thesis 
study conducted in the Finnish National Defence University Department of Strategic and 
                                                 
38
 Newman (2009), pp. 428–429, By Newman’s estimation, there is an indication for a partial consensus (in 
some cases). However, in his mind comparison of the different studies measuring attributes, indicators, etc. 
reveal many discrepancies. He also stipulates that the main message of the academic literature on the subject of 
different indexes is cautious. For reference, see Global Peace Index (GPI), 
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/indexes/global-peace-index referred to 3.8.2015, 11:10 hrs, and Failed 
State Index (FSI), http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi14-overview, referred to 3.8.2015, 11:30 hrs.   
39
 Ayoob (1995), pp. 125–130. Nay (2013), pp. 330–333. 
40
 Piazza (2008), pp. 483–484. In his study Piazza shows empirical evidence that ‘failed and failing states pose a 
threat to international community in terms of transnational terrorism’. 
41
 Mechanisms of the state failure and collapse are extensively discussed in various studies, for reference see for 
example, Jackson (1990), Ayoob (1995), Zartman (ed.) (1995), Rotberg (ed.) (2004), Fukuyama (2004), William 
I. Zartman (2005), Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State Collapse,  Call 
and Wyeth (eds.) (2008), Bates (2008), to name just a few. 
42
 For examples of combining Discourse analysis and security studies, see for example Lene Hansen (2006), 
Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, Holger Stritzel (2012), Securitization, power, 
intertextuality: Discourse theory and the translations of organized crime, Leif C. Jensen (2012), Seduced and 
surrounded by security: A post–structuralist take on Norwegian High North securitizing discourses. 
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Defence Studies. This study looks at the use of the failed state concept in the U.S. security 
policy.
43
 The concept is analyzed through the Failed State Index (henceforth FSI).
44
  
 
Furthermore, both the FSI and Global Peace Index (henceforth GPI) can be argued to present 
a highly politicized picture of the global situation. Therefore, the usability of these indexes as 
primary material is contestable. These indexes do not account for cultural, historical or 
normative issues. This means that the reference base of the index is narrow and cannot 
provide an overarching definition for the concept of state failure. These aforementioned 
studies leave room for a research where DA methodology is used in a framework of 
Securitization theory to study how failing states are securitized in the official discourses of the 
United States.
45
  
 
This study will fill some of that gap. Furthermore, this study will look if securitizing is shown 
throughout the policy documents of different administrations regardless of the change in 
policymakers. A post–positivist standpoint is chosen as the philosophical grounds from which 
the rest of the ontological, epistemological and methodological choices cascade. However, 
these choices as such do not exclude the possibility for methodological or epistemological 
variance. The theoretical framework presented in Appendix 1 simplifies the relations of the 
aforementioned parts and visualizes their interdependencies accordingly.
46
  
 
Hence, it positions the research in relation to other studies.
47
 For this research the theoretical 
framework will consist of Constructivism and Post–structuralism as the constitutive relative 
theories in the world of International Relations (henceforth IR). Moreover, these will be 
combined with Securitization theory and DA methodology to create the framework of the 
study. This is done IOT best accommodate the needs of the researcher and in an effort not to 
be tied down by specific interpretation of IR theories. Ontological, epistemological and 
methodological limitations and choices are addressed in detail in chapter two.  
 
                                                 
43
 Pekka Korhonen (2014), Failed state –käsitteen hyväksikäyttö Yhdysvaltojen turvallisuuspolitiikassa. 
44
 Failed State Index (FSI), http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi14-overview, page visited 5.8.2015 10.20 am. 
45
 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (2009), The Evolution of International Security Studies, p. 35. “The process 
through which threats are identified and given meaning is...better understood through an analysis of identity 
building and institutional transformation that does not lend itself to causality or quantification”. 
46
 See Appendix 2, picture 1, for the theoretical framework of this study. 
47
 Saaranen–Kauppinen & Puusniekka (2006), http://www.fsd.uta.fi/menetelmaopetus/kvali/L2_2.html, visited 
and referred to 26.11.2014, 11:17 hrs. See also, Huhtinen (2002), p. 16, for a discussion on the possibilities of 
theoretical framework as a way to circumvent some harsh theoretical limitations. Huhtinen also iterates that 
theoretical framework is a rather loose starting point for a research compared to theory and paradigm. 
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Based on the need for further study of the discursive effects on the foreign policy, the research 
problem is framed thusly: 
 
The aim of this research is to analyze the securitization of failing states as part of the U.S. 
national security discourse. This is done by looking at how the failing state discourse entered 
into the “The National Security Strategy of the United States of the America” (henceforth 
NSS)
48
, as well as how it is framed. The NSS documents (the official discourse) and the 
source material on state failure provide the information on why FS are seen as a threat. 
Primary material is analyzed using Securitization theory and DA methodology.  
 
The act of attaching a distinct meaning (of a threat) to failing states might contribute to the 
discourse.  Hence, it is possibly responsible for constitutive securitization of the concept in 
the NSS. I argue that intersubjective links between threats and intertextual interaction between 
various NSS documents presents itself through securitization. Therefore, the effect of 
securitizing is shown throughout the policy documents of different administrations regardless 
of the change in policymakers. 
 
Based on the research problem the primary research question is formulated thusly: 
 
How official discourse of the United States creates threats through securitizing failing states? 
 
Secondly, the research aims to look into the complex nature of the failing state concept. This 
serves as a foundation for the analysis of the NSS documents by providing temporal and 
logical point of departure. It will also show the difficulties pertained in defining the concept 
of state failure and the discourses stemming thereof.  Hence, a secondary research question is 
formulated thusly:  
 
How state failure is conceptualized in the academic literature? 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 This form is used in the general meaning of the ’National Security Strategy’ document and all its analogies, as 
the form varies slightly from administration to administration. For detailed names, see reference. 
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Thirdly, this research will bring the Securitization theory and the discourses on FS together 
with the conceptual basis to establish why failing states are seen as a threat by the U.S. 
Consequently, through the principles and limitations of the theory and DA methodology an 
intersubjective picture of threats is created. Hence, the tertiary research question is formulated 
thusly: 
 
Why are failing states securitized as a threat to The United States of America? 
 
Finally, the two main chapters (three and four) are combined in synthesis in chapter five for 
the purpose of answering the primary research question. Conclusions and criticism as well as 
the need for further study are presented. 
 
1.3 Conceptual framework and research design 
 
The previous section looked into the research done on failing states and continued on the 
problematization of the subject.  It ended in formulation of the research problem and adjacent 
research questions. Moreover, the research questions formed the basis for the definition of the 
conceptual framework and research design. This section continues that process and defines 
the conceptual framework and research design of the study. It gives a glimpse of the 
theoretical–methodological choices which will be further presented in chapter 2. 
 
Conceptual framework and research design are the bones that form the ‘skeletal’ structure of 
the research. They outline the specific means and methods by which the study is conducted. 
Therefore, the structure of the study is formed in logical sequence building outwards using the 
‘skeleton’ as a starting point. First, chapter 2 lays out the ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological grounds of this research. It also combines these with research questions as 
well as theoretical considerations and limitations that are relevant to the research. The aim of 
the chapter is to lay out the theoretical and methodological framework. It presents thesis, 
antithesis and such objectivity and validity as is possible.  
 
Second, chapter 3 tackles with the phenomenon of state failure and the paradigm of failing 
states discourse. It searches for conceptual history of FS through the jungle of definitions and 
the history of the state. The purpose is to provide the ground work for analyzing the 
securitization of FS in chapter 4. 
 
11 
 
Third, chapter 4 searches for reasons why failing states are seen as a security threat to the U.S. 
It is logically reasonable to focus on the NSS as the prevalent document as the theoretical 
foundation is in the Securitization theory. This is conscious effort by the researcher to limit 
the scope of the research and create a focus for it. It is not to say there aren’t any other 
feasible documents where official foreign policy is dictated.
49
  
 
The aim of chapter 4 is to pull together the different intersubjective discourses of 
securitization failing states within the NSS by using chapter three as a conceptual and logical 
point of departure. Furthermore, the analysis will look for intertextual links between the NSS 
documents that affect the FS discourse. This forms a multilevel picture of the kind of 
existential threat FS are being perceived as by the official U.S. foreign policy.  
 
Finally, chapters 3 and 4 are combined in a synthesis in chapter five where the conclusions of 
the research will be shown. Consequently, chapter five is designed as a platform for 
discussion on the conclusions as well as how objectivity and limitations brought by 
theoretical and methodological choices might affect the results (criticism). Lastly, a part of the 
chapter is reserved for problematization for further research. 
 
The design and framework
50
 of this research are heavily theory laden. Hence, the emphasis of 
this research is to show how a chosen theoretical lens can be applied with DA tool to find 
specific intersubjective and intertextual dependence between discourses. Moreover, the 
theoretical part of the study will consist of theoretical debate both between the chosen IR–
school as well as within the Securitization theory.  
 
For this purpose, chapters two and three are quite extensive as they aspire to create sufficient 
thesis and antithesis for the purposes of analyzing primary material as objectively as possible. 
Therefore, it can give a fresh way to look at and study FS and state failure. Consequently it 
leads this research away from the more common case study and causal logic in an effort not to 
see why states fail, but to see how the failure can be successfully securitized. 
 
 
 
                                                 
49
 Discourse analysis ranges from popular culture to academic literature, fiction and official documents 
(including speeches by heads of state and declarations by governments and parliaments). Therefore it is 
reasonable to formulate some limitations. Methodological issues and limitation will be presented in chapter two. 
50
 See Appendix 2, pictures 1 and 2, for the conceptualization of research design and framework. 
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2  FROM ONTOLOGY TO METHOD 
 
–Ad augusta per angusta 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to lay out the ontological and epistemological choices of this 
study as well as the theoretical and methodological ones stemming thereof. The chapter 
positions the researcher and the subject of the research within the ocean of theories. It starts 
from the basic tenets of how scientific research is done ending with the methodological 
choices and limitations of the DA.  
 
Moreover, it presents counter arguments in an effort to find the holes in the chosen framework 
to aspire for such objectivity as is possible. How the researcher sees reality is what affects the 
results and the discussion surrounding it. Therefore, theoretical choices and limitations he or 
she accepts and how analysis is done is how reality is interpreted. Objectivity is always 
something ephemeral. It is tied down with chosen theories, philosophies, and the cultural as 
well as socio–economical background of the researcher. Consequently, all of this makes the 
theory chapter immensely important. Theory is what lays the foundation upon which all other 
chapters of this research are built. 
 
2.1 Ontology and Epistemology as a foundation 
 
Scientific research is founded on the philosophy of science. It takes form in the ontological 
and epistemological choices and related theories. These choices and theories define how the 
researcher views the world and the reality. Through those issues it affects how he or she deals 
with the empiricism it presents.
51
 Hence, one way would be to argue that ‘all theoretical 
positions are dependent upon particular assumptions of ontology, epistemology and 
methodology.’52 The philosophy of science can be seen to study the theory and foundations of 
science. It can also be defined to mean the application of philosophical method into science, 
research and results thereof.
53
  
                                                 
51
 Torsti Sirén (2009), State Agent, Identity and the ”New World Order” – Reconstructing Polish Defence 
Identity after the Cold War Era, p. 23. As Sirén argues that, “a researcher always needs to clarify his or hers 
ontological and epistemological assumptions before it is possible to justify and rationalize the relevance of any 
chosen theory vis–á–vis the research problem(s).” 
52
 Milja Kurki and Colin Wight in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steven Smith (eds.) (2010), International 
Relations Theories: Disciple and Diversity, 2
nd
 edition, p. 15. 
53
 Ilkka Niiniluoto (1999), Johdatus tieteenfilosofiaan, p. 21. Niiniluoto puts the philosophy of science to also 
mean a segment which studies, in general, the process of scientific research. 
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Theories are formed to test hypothesis and to make sense of the perceived reality and 
moreover, they are created to be proven false.
54
 This is done by theories being subjected to 
harsh scientific evaluation and re–evaluation. A theory can be seen as a point of view, an 
aspect on the nature of reality, or a compressed perspective to a specific phenomenon that 
gives it understandable form.
55
 Theory and the concepts of ontology and epistemology are 
intimately tied to the notion of philosophy of science. They create the framework of how a 
specific study or research situates itself in the overall field of science.  
 
Ontology can be thought of in many ways but it can be defined to mean ‘the study or nature, 
of existence’. It studies the concepts of ’what it is to exist’ and ‘what is existence’.56 Ontology 
also studies the fundamental nature of existence and it is sometimes called ‘the common 
metaphysics.’57 Epistemology strives to look into what can be known and how knowledge can 
be formed to test theories and hypothesis. Thus, epistemology can be seen as the ‘science of 
knowledge’. Therefore, ontology is about what kind of things we are able to study. 
Epistemology points towards the relationship between the researcher and his or hers object of 
research.  Hence, it is linked to what we are able to know about things.
58
  These concepts and 
their respective philosophies affect the foundations of scientific research. Together with 
theories they form the guidelines on how we understand the world to be and how we think 
knowledge can be attained from it.
59
 
 
Theory is the lens through which methodology is used. It defines and limits one’s choices of 
looking at a specific object(s) of research.
60
 Theories generate hypothesis which are prediction 
of events or ‘educated guesses’ of what will happen. True to their nature as scientific method, 
theories should also be potentially falsifiable. The Securitization theory used in this research 
is just one among many others. The purpose of it is to put together as well as interpret 
                                                 
54
 Aki–Mauri Huhtinen (2002), ”Sotilasjohtamisen tutkimus”, in Sotilasjohtamisen tutkimuksen tieteenfilosofiset 
perusteet ja menetelmät (ed.) Aki–Mauri Huhtinen), p. 13. 
55
 Anita Saaranen–Kauppinen & Anna Puusniekka (2006) KvaliMOTV–Menetelmäopetuksen tietovaranto 
[verkkojulkaisu], http://www.fsd.uta.fi/menetelmaopetus/kvali/L2_2.html, visited and referred to 3.8.2015 09:15 
hrs. 
56
 On discussion of ontology and reality, see for example, Sirén (2009), pp. 24–25. 
57
 Ibid.  
58
 Huhtinen (2002), p. 23. Huhtinen presents ontology as a way to look and theorize existence which is beyond 
the perception of (and the definition of) human thought. Addition to the common metaphysics he presents 
specific metaphysics (e.g. theology) which has delineated in various ways to specific areas. These are nature 
(natural science), soul/spirit (psychology, cognitive sciences) and God (systematic theology). Therefore, 
metaphysics is what everything else is built on and hence so called ‘first philosophy’. See also, Jari 
Metsämuuronen (2000), Laadullisen tutkimuksen perusteet, pp. 10–11, for further definition of ontology and 
epistemology. 
59
 Joonas Sipilä & Tommi Koivula (2013), Kuinka strategiaa tutkitaan, p. 15.  
60
 See, Sirén (2009), pp. 23–24, for further discussion on the relationship of ontology and epistemology. 
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information drawn from various sources IOT tie it as a comprehensive framework for study 
and analysis. Since theories take different forms depending on their disciples as well as 
ontological and epistemological orientation, they center on specific areas of interest. The 
theory for this research is chosen for the specific purpose of seeking how the use of language 
creates threats and through that affects foreign policy.
61
 Thus, the theories of Constructivism, 
Poststructuralism
62
 and Securitization are a logical choice.
63
 This theoretical choice can be 
seen as a specialization, like a choice between a telescope and a binocular. For example, in IR 
this would be a choice between the systemic structure theory of Neorealism and emancipatory 
theory of Feminism.  
 
Theories also draw together and systemize previously accumulated research data (as in the 
case of Securitization theory). They are frequently used to present generalized perceptions 
achieved by intellectual and rational functions.
64
 Furthermore, even though theories are a 
form of specialization they may not be suitable for a research as ‘they are’, but need to be 
examined and thought of in a way that they would best serve the study in question. Hence, a 
composite structure might be needed IOT best allocate the needs of the research. 
 
It should be noted that theories do not exist in some outside realm beyond. They should have 
concrete ramifications for the object of the research. We sometimes think theories as the 
opposite of practical reality but they nevertheless have a valid place as the ‘glue that binds’ 
everything together. Therefore, one way of conceptualizing how theory works is the use of 
theoretical framework (paradigm)
65
 and research design. These are created for the purpose of 
giving form to the research. Consequently, theoretical framework lay out the how theory (or 
theories), methodology (or methodologies) and objects of the research line up, and how they 
relate to each other.  
                                                 
61
 Wæver (2011), p. 469. According to Wæver, Securitization theory has ‘political’ effects. 
62
 Poststructuralism is used in as much as it affects the DA. Specifics of methodological choices and limitations 
are addressed in section 2.4. 
63
 IR theories are written with a capital letter to distinguish them from philosophies of science. Therefore, 
Constructivism with a capital ‘C’ is an IR theory and constructivism is a philosophy of science. All IR theories 
will be presented with a capital letter for this study. 
64
 Ilkka Niiniluoto (1999), Johdatus tieteenfilosofiaan, p. 23, pp. 193–194.  Niiniluoto stipulates that a theory can 
cover entire field of science, such as information theory.  Theories are, on the one hand key elements in 
explaining and understanding different phenomenon, and on the other hand they are tools for prediction and 
manipulation. He emphasizes the difference of ‘theory’ as used in scientific language, to ‘theory’ used in 
common analogy in speech to represent something that has no basis in reality.  
65
 Ibid., pp. 247–248. Theory, framework, and theoretical framework are sometimes used interchangeably with 
the word paradigm. According to Niiniluoto, paradigm is drawn from the philosophy of science by Thomas 
Kuhn. Kuhn refers to paradigm as a collection of principles, beliefs and riddles inside the scientific community. 
For Kuhn paradigm meant established ways of procedure in science and that science evolves through changes of 
paradigms, not as much as changes in theories. 
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The general ontology and epistemology of this research will be drawn from Constructivism 
and Poststructuralism. It will be used with the Securitization theory as ‘the glue’ that binds 
together the methodological process of DA and the various empiricisms from primary and 
secondary material. Therefore, the role of the theory is pivotal for analytical purposes as well 
as for the discussion on the conclusions. Without theoretical lens to give a specific analytical 
perspective
66
 this research would be utterly shallow. It would be more of a report or a literary 
view in nature.
67
 Securitization theory and its limitations regarding this study will be 
discussed in the specific section allocated for it. The conceptual framework of the research 
draws upon the DA methodology which in turn is used through the Securitization theory. 
These are the main tools for conducting the research. However, the ontological positioning of 
the Securitization theory is how the use of language socially constructs reality. Hence, it 
locates the meta–theoretical positioning of this research into the reflectivist side of the 
relativist–reflectivist debate.  
 
2.2 Thesis and Antithesis 
 
The previous section looked upon the general ways in how philosophy of science affects the 
theories and methodologies. The purpose of this section is to present the theories chosen for 
this research as well as look into some of the arguments presented by conflicting, or opposite 
theories. Unfortunately it is not possible to go into a detailed account on the all the theories of 
IR since it is beyond the scope of this research. Hence, this section also subjects the theory of 
the research to criticism, and thus follows a good scientific procedure.  
 
The arguments and efforts to ‘shake the foundations’ of this study will be presented as the 
mainstream of the theories in question. They will not dive deeply into the abyss that is the 
philosophical–epistemological ocean of IR theories and subsequent ontologies related thereof. 
Nevertheless, the opposing arguments give perspective to the chosen theoretical framework of 
Constructivist–Poststructuralist constellation and the Securitization theory. The previous 
section dealt with the general analogies and conceptual definitions of ontology and 
epistemology. The aim of this section is to specify and narrow these generic terms. The 
section will also form a juxtaposition of competing views of how reality is interpreted and 
how information is acquired according to respective sides of the debate.  
                                                 
66
 Pertti Alasuutari (1993), Laadullinen tutkimus, p. 61. 
67
 Sipilä & Koivula (2013), p. 21. 
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This juxtaposition is required as to establish how theories themselves are constituted based on 
the wider philosophical universe and how they draw their epistemologies. Moreover, by 
looking beyond chosen standpoint a more comprehensive objectivity becomes possible. This 
first part is reserved for the definition of the theoretical framework and limitations of the 
study. The second part will consist of positivist (rationalist or realist)
68
 and the post–positivist 
views. Finally, the third part will narrow down the general views on reality to the Realist and 
Constructivist frame of thought. 
 
2.2.1 Defining the theoretical framework 
 
The overall ontological side the research is a reflectivist one. It is situated in the 
constructivist–poststructuralist axel of the reflectivist field. This presents an epistemological 
challenge. The challenge is that the rationalist view thinks social theory cannot create 
falsifiable hypothesis. Therefore, it is considered not being able present enough 
epistemological rigor.
69
 The positivist side looks at the world through observables gained 
through empirical means.
70
 It is thus ‘characterized by faith in empiricism, objectivism, and 
quantitative–behavioral methods’.71 This makes a valid argument against post–positivism.72  
 
However, social theory claims that constitutive theories are theories nevertheless. Constitutive 
theories can create hypothesis. These should be tested even if this might be difficult to 
accomplish.
73
 There are many ways to arrive to the ‘truth’ and therefore the problem is mostly 
for the positivists who need a common reference and universal truths for their theories to be 
comparable.
74
 The methodological choice for this research is Discourse analysis. Its name 
implies the study of language and thus a constitutive theoretical standpoint for this study is 
valid.  
                                                 
68
 For reference and clarification, realist and realism in this context is meant to be about philosophy of science 
(realist ontology) and about the traditional scientific cause–relation (as in natural sciences). Realism (with a 
capital ‘R’) is an IR theory in this research. 
69
 Hansen (2006), p. 17. Hansen presents a firm argument on the debate between rationalist and post–positivist, 
such as Constructivists and Poststructuralists. She comments on the nature of epistemological differences and 
argues that knowledge is historically and politically situated. Therefore, causal epistemology is just a particular 
discourse of knowledge. 
70
 Töttö (2000), pp. 20–22. Töttö criticizes this simplistic definition. For him, it is just one side of positivism.  
71
 Raitasalo (2005), p. 53. 
72
 Ibid. 
73
 Alexander Wendt (1999), Social Theory of International Politics, p. 87. For Wendt, constitutive theories 
involve inference. The inference (either inductive or abductive) does not make the data to speak for itself. 
Therefore, constitutive claims concern about how social things are formed rather than the causal relation 
between independent and dependent variables.  For him, it makes constitutive theories no less theory than other 
theories. 
74
 Raitasalo (2005), p. 55. 
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These preferences define more or less the general layout of the research design and there are 
few points that should be emphasized.  Firstly, the empiricism of the research is two–fold: 
Conceptual definition and related discourses before analysis of securitization of FS. 
Conceptual definition of FS is methodologically close to conceptual analysis but DA is the 
main method. DA will be the theoretical lens as well as the main driving force for analyzing 
the second part of the empiricism which is the NSS. Secondly, the empiricism of the research 
is qualitative. However, references in support or criticism of the research are also taken from 
quantitative side, as necessary.
75
 The empiricism consists of primary and secondary material. 
These will be read and re–read to formulate conceptual and analytical base of the research.  
 
Primary material consists of academic and scientific literature on states and failing states (and 
its acronyms), as well as the official foreign policy document of the U.S. (the NSS) from 1990 
through 2010 temporal span. Secondary material consists of academic and scientific articles 
dealing with the issues of state failure, either directly or indirectly. Secondary material is not 
limited to only security related issues or discursive methodology. Other (general) material will 
be the academic and scientific literature and articles about Constructivism, Poststructuralism, 
Securitization theory, research methodology (including ontology and epistemology) and other 
relevant sources. This provides enough material from where to search for the supportive or 
critical empiricism.  
 
The position of the secondary material is not to see how failing states discourse of the NSS 
documents reflects to elsewhere into the academic domain. Rather, the secondary material is 
used to either support or criticize the theory and hypothesis of this research. The aim of the 
research is not the analysis of wider consequences of a successful securitization within the 
academic domain.  
 
Finally, an abductive process is used to analyze the empiricism with an intertextual and 
intersubjective DA. This is done to find the underlying discursive structures of the threats and 
to locate when they entered the security discourse in the NSS. This way a picture of the 
securitization of FS can be formulated. I will further limit the scope of the research by 
conceptual limitations. I will make the state as the unit in this analysis and the structure of 
international system as the chosen level. Therefore, I will discard domestic policy in its many 
forms as well as non–state actors.  
                                                 
75
 Nay (2013), p. 334. According to Nay there is a lack of ‘in–depth case studies’ that could provide empirical 
evidence on fragile states. 
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Conceptually, I will position myself with Alexander Wendt in that ‘states are the dominant 
form of subjectivity in contemporary world politics’. Therefore stares are ‘the primary 
medium through which the effects of other actors on the regulation of violence are channeled 
into the world system.’76 I acknowledge the effect of non–state actors but limit them to the 
role of academic source material and not consider them as an actor. Furthermore, I’ll lean 
onto Wendt for his definition of states as actors and agents who constitute themselves through 
their decision–makers.77  
 
The main reason for choosing the Constructivist theory as the background theory lies in two 
factors. First, as Wendt puts it ‘theories that treat states as autistic cannot explain structures of 
interaction’. Second, because according to Wendt the international system is ‘a social rather 
than material phenomenon’.78 Thus, it is not because I don’t believe in the structural theory of 
Neorealism, but because like Wendt I think it is under socialized and should take more into 
account shared ideas in the constitution of the structure.
79
 However, I will delineate from 
Wendt in that I will not use positivist epistemology even though I accept the general layout of 
his theory. Instead I will draw upon a post–positivist and reflectivist pool and use 
Poststructuralism as needed through DA. This is done to find answers to the question of how 
official discourse of the U.S creates threats through securitizing failing states.
80
  
 
Hence, I position myself philosophically as relativist–reflectivist as to Wendt’s realist. Jyri 
Raitasalo argues that ‘scientification of Realism and the quantifiable material variables’ 
present just one of many different ways of study.
81
 According to Raitasalo, Constructivism 
sees differently the end of the Cold War than the Realist or Liberalist theories. His argument 
is that ‘states were challenged to understand the new rules of the international system in the 
post–Cold War era’, and this new understanding was ‘constructed’.82 Therefore, 
Constructivism looks at states through social dialect. Discourses reflect and mold the beliefs 
and interests of policy makers and producing acceptable norms.  
                                                 
76
 Wendt (1999), p. 9. 
77
 Ibid., p. 10. 
78
 Ibid., pp. 20–21. 
79
 Ibid., p. 184. 
80
 See Appendix 4, picture 4, for epistemological concepts of security. Securitization theory is part of the 
discursive approach because of the speech act theory and self–referential practice. See also, Buzan et al. (1998) 
p. 21, 24, for further reference. 
81
 Jyri Raitasalo (2005), Constructing War and Military Power After the Cold War: The Role of the United States 
in the Shared Western Understandings of War and Military Power in the Post–Cold War Era, p. 44. 
82
 Ibid., pp. 4–5. See also, Ayoob (1995), p. 117. Ayoob presents an interesting argument that ‘a number of 
analysts’ are describing dominant relationships with just one dimension of a multidimensional global balance of 
power, and so, have changed Cold War strategic determinism for an economic one. 
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This can be seen concretely in the example presented in the first chapter. The Mogadishu 
incident showed that discursive changes can have the power to define policy.
83
 Moreover, it 
highlighted some of the key points which were also visible after the 9/11 incident. This makes 
the Mogadishu example an excellent prologue for this study. Consequently, Constructivism is 
particularly useful in researching failing state discourse in the NSS because of the flexibility 
and the process–like nature of the theory. Hence, I will discard positivism and embrace 
postmodern epistemology and relativism. This means I will ‘discard the notions of 
empiricism, objectivism, naturalism, and behaviorism and focus on language and 
discourses’.84 
 
2.2.2 Positivists and post–positivists 
 
In this sub–section there will be a brief introduction into the general frame of mind of the 
positivist and post–positivists camp. This will be followed by the main IR theories which are 
traditionally seen as situated in the positivist or post–positivist side of the debate. A realist 
philosophy of science is often used in conjunction with the positivist
85
 label. This is done to 
differentiate the more conventional scientific school of thought from the post–positivists, or 
relativists
86
 who stand juxtaposed to them. Subsequently, theoretical traditions can be broadly 
divided into rationalist and constitutive categories.
87
 Rationalism, realism and positivism 
build their hypothesis in a way that they can be proven either true or false. This can be done 
by accumulation and analysis of empirical data. This data will formulate results which are 
then tested against the theory and hypothesis of the research.  
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Moreover, Aki–Mauri Huhtinen argues that the realist view of reality can be seen as being 
built on ‘an idea of information’.88 For any one question there are ‘a number of facts, true and 
false’.89 This has been the leading idea of Western scientific thought for centuries and remains 
as the foundation of traditional natural sciences.
90
 Hence, majority of quantitative research has 
been based on realist school of thought. This is because realism favors hard data over more 
equivocal alternatives. Therefore, it can be said that realism and positivism intertwine to form 
a view and orientation that guide the research.
91
 However, for relativists the positivist side 
‘makes too much noise’ on the causal epistemology as the ultimate means to attain 
knowledge.
92
 There are also those who think that the influence of positivism is somewhat ‘ill–
suited and rudimentary’, if not down–right discredited.93 This view is present in the 
contemporary philosophy of science regardless of the general acceptance of advocates and 
critics alike.
94
  
 
Furthermore, as Hakovirta puts it ‘the realist side does consider social reality as a factor’ but 
still regards it to be independent from the mind and ideas of the observer.
95
 One of the 
arguments from the positivist side has been directed especially toward social science theories 
that favor relativist views. These arguments have accused social science of creating 
hypothesis which cannot be proven false.
96
 However, I argue that the problem here is not 
about whether something can be proven true or false. Rather, there exist numerous 
phenomena to study where causality is near impossibility due to the number variables. State 
failure is one such phenomenon. In that there is nigh impossible to create an analytical 
framework which can take into account all the different variables.  
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The concept of constructivism is generally thought of as one broadly located philosophical 
school of science where knowledge is considered to be formed in a process. With scientific 
realism and relativism the reference is on the philosophy of science and how those consider 
the reality to be constituted. Thus, realism and relativism are different conceptions of social 
reality and how it can be perceived.
97
 Moreover, constructivism is both a philosophy of 
science as well as an IR theory
98
. It delineates itself from positivism and critical theories due 
to the relational look on reality. This, according to Metsämuuronen makes ‘constructivism 
think of reality through individuals as relatively created by each of them personally’, even 
though parts of reality might be shared with other individuals.
99
  
 
Consequently, the views of positivists and post–positivist are roughly divided into the 
rationalist and constitutive ones and further broken down with in each school respectively. 
This is not an absolute thing, but it does create the basic starting point for the next part of this 
section which goes deeper into the IR theories themselves.  There the effort is to raise some 
key tenets and in doing so point out the strengths and weaknesses of the theories. In the 
school of IR there are many great debates which have shaped the disciple over the years. 
These have usually centered either between opposite ends of the spectrum, like Realist and 
Idealist
100
 or the more recent debate on what the disciple should study.
101
  
 
However, the Realist side deserves special attention due to its long history and significant 
effect on IR. Furthermore, Sipilä and Koivunen stipulate that Constructivism as an IR theory 
is distinctly different from the other theories. This is because its philosophy of science differs 
from the other major IR theories of Realism and Liberalism.
102
 This is mostly because of how 
Constructivism sees reality as being socially constructed. It puts Constructivism on the 
relativist side of realist–relativist fence hence making it a good opposite for Realism. 
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2.2.3 Realism and Constructivism 
 
The previous part dealt with the dichotomy of positivism and post–positivism. It located 
realism and constructivism as the broader schools of scientific though. Therefore, it also 
started to look into how IR theories are situated within the philosophy of science as well as 
how the epistemology of each side is drawn together. This part presents the two IR theories of 
Realism and Constructivism in an effort to create thesis–antithesis of this research.  
 
Realism has its roots in the centuries old tradition dating back to Thucydides and the writings 
on Peloponnesian Wars. It draws from the famous ‘Prince’ by Niccoló Machiavelli and 
stretches all the way to Carl von Clausewitz’s ‘Vom Kriege’ and Hans Morgenthau’s ‘Politics 
among Nations’.103 Moreover, the basis of Realism lies in those old accounts of diplomatic 
statesmanship and warfare. There is a continuum of theme all the way to contemporary days. 
In Realism human nature leads to an endless (tragic) struggle for power and to cold, 
calculative means to–an–ends fight for survival. This is doomed to repeat itself in a historical 
cycle.
104
  
 
A central position is given to the sovereign state and its internal and external security. 
Another key aspect is the concept of international anarchy where states are not subject to any 
will other than their own because there is no power above the state.
105
 A more contemporary 
version of historical Realism of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes was formulated by E.H. 
Carr and Hans Morgenthau.  This was to counter the idealist ways of thinking which 
dominated the early part of the twentieth century following the end of the First World War.
106
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After the Second World War (henceforth WWII) a more scientific Realism started to take 
shape even though it was still in the very early phases of becoming a disciple. It can be said 
that the ‘The Twenty Year Crisis’ by E. H. Carr created the layout for Realism in IR and 
‘Politics among Nations’ by Hans Morgenthau pushed Realism finally to the forefront of 
IR.
107
 Moreover, the experiences of WWII and following Cold War cemented Realism in its 
different forms as the dominant school within the disciple of IR.  
 
The early version of Realism experienced a transformation of sorts after the acceptance of 
behaviorist methodologies after 1940s. This meant the supplementation of interpretative and 
historicist form of IR by a positivist look.
108
 Furthermore, it meant reliance on observable and 
measurable data of quantitative research instead of a more qualitative approach.
109
 Kenneth 
Waltz’s ‘Theory of International Politics’ gave form during the Cold War to some of the 
defining works of the time. Therefore, the positivist side with their explanatory view gained 
momentum inside the school of Realism.
110
  
 
Waltz’s structural realism (Neorealism) argued that ‘it is the anarchic nature of the 
international system’ that forces states into mutual power struggle.111 Consequently, Waltz 
and the Neorealist side broke free of the classical Realist outlook. They argued against the 
classical view that ‘all politics is an expression of the same human drives and subject to the 
same pathologies.’112 Hence, Waltz gave more weight to the systemic effect on the struggle 
for power among states instead of the more conventional outlook of human nature and 
statesmanship favored by the ‘political’ Realists.113  
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However, there are similarities between the schools of Realism and Neorealism that should be 
emphasized here. There are thee point highlighted by Cynthia Weber.  First, both schools 
accept international anarchy as a defining factor of the international system stemming from 
the sovereign nation–states.114 For classical Realists anarchy describes the environment where 
sovereign nation–states act, and for Neorealism the social relations among sovereign nation–
states. 
115
 Second, the absence of world government and higher order gives states freedom of 
action but leaves them vulnerable to aspiration of other states.
116
 Therefore, states are 
compelled to find a way to survive by increasing their power. Third, because there is no 
higher order above states, the international politics is anarchical by its very nature.
117
 
Moreover, in classical Realism the nature of man affects the chance for cooperation through 
uncertainty, consequently making world government impossible.
118
  
 
In Neorealism the nature of man might not affect cooperation since the nature of man is not a 
defining factor in explaining conflict.
119
 Weber uses these aforementioned three elements as 
common nominators from which both Realists and Neorealist predict the behavior of states. 
She continues this line of thought to point out that there are two major points were Realism 
and Neorealism agree. These are the ‘overriding goal of states to survive by maximizing their 
power’, and the continuity of international anarchy as the prevailing system.  This is because 
‘it is unrealistic to think a world government could be formed since states would never be 
secure enough to give up their power.’120 Both Realist and Neorealist consider great powers121 
to be the only ones to have significant ‘weight’ in the international system to have effect on 
international politics.
122
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This dominant position of great powers affect the way Realism can be used. It means that the 
explanatory power of Realism is severely limited to the great powers and loses viability when 
used to analyze other states. Furthermore, John Mearsheimer highlights some of the issues 
that divide Realists both within the school, as well as inside Neorealism. For Mearsheimer, 
the question of ‘why states want power?’ is the fundamental divide between Realists and 
Neorealists. He argues that Morgenthau and classical Realists call attention to the nature of 
man as a root of all evil. This analogy of the ‘original sin’ makes every man borne with a 
desire for power. Consequently, this results in great powers being led by people who desire 
more power constituting their state to threaten their neighbors.
123
  
 
On the other side of the realist coin, Neorealists argue that human nature is not really a 
significant variable. Instead, the structure of the system forces states in to the endless pursuit 
of power due to the lack of overarching authority. Therefore, each state should try to be as 
powerful as possible. Therefore, the great powers become ‘trapped’ in an endless competition 
because there is no guarantee of security.
124
 Hence, according to Fred Blombergs the 
‘defining and timeless elements’ of Realism are: 1) Centrality of sovereign states, as the most 
important actors in the international arena and 2) a somewhat pessimistic look on the nature of 
international politics.
125
 
  
However, he also points out that rationality, power, survival, and fear of others do not mean 
that states cannot work together. War is not inevitable, but situation dependent upon time and 
place.
126
 Thus, the main assumptions of Realism can be summed up as follows: First, states 
are the most important actors in international politics; second, the structure of the 
international system in anarchic; third, international politics is ultimately about power; fourth, 
military power plays significant part in international politics; fifth, states in international 
system act rationally in pursue of their own national interests.
127
 Consequently, Realism is 
very much tied to the scientific realism and positivism with a rationalist look on reality
128
 and 
this view is challenged by Constructivism and the relativist side. 
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Constructivism is a constitutive theory which has its origins in the social sciences. It is a 
relative broad view which has off–shoots resulting in several different ways of applying it. 
Hence, IR theory of Constructivism draws upon the contemporary theory of social 
constructivism.  Social constructivism is based upon wide selection of works. Most notably of 
those are mentioned by Vivien Burr as ‘key contributors’ such as K.J. and M.M. Gergen, 
Shotter, Sharpin, Foucalt, Potter, Wetherell, Parker, to name a few. This list of contributors 
extends from the 1970s to early 1990s. There are especially important works such as Michel 
Foucalt’s which emphasize the constructive power of language and Potter and Wetherell for 
action–oriented function of language.  
 
Furthermore, Burr sees the writings of Berger and Luckman ‘The Social Construction of 
Reality’ as significant, because of the processes of externalization, objectification and 
internalization.
129
 These are mentioned here as an example because of the importance of the 
language and its prominent use in the Securitization theory. The aforementioned process can 
also be seen as having familiarity to the securitization process. An example of the processes 
of externalization, objectification and internalization can be tied to the securitization of failing 
states. The process could be presented as one where FS are thought of by the policymakers of 
the U.S. as dens of terrorism and destruction.  
 
This idea is first externalized in the form of a policy document, such as the NSS.  The idea 
inside the policy then enters into a social realm of consecutive administrations and takes on a 
life of its own. Thus, it is objectified and has developed an existence that continues to live on 
as an accepted fact. As administrations change the previous policy document still retains its 
force and a new one is born into a world of the old one. This last was how the idea was finally 
internalized.
130
 This example was based loosely on the one described by Burr, but it 
nevertheless highlights the similarities of the processes.
131
 Burr also underlines the common 
tenets different facets of constructivism share: ‘A critical stance towards taken–for–granted 
knowledge, historical and cultural specificity, knowledge sustained through social processes 
and the link between knowledge and social action’.132 Therefore, a high emphasis is placed on 
how knowledge is accumulated and processed from the surrounding world.  
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Moreover, social constructivism underlines the weight of culture and history. It sees 
everything specifically tied to temporal and cultural context which is only valid for those who 
made the observation. Therefore, use of language and interaction as the motors of social 
process are in a significant role. This ties knowledge and social action together instead of just 
sustaining it. Hence, each social construction creates different reaction from humans.
133
 
 
Constructivism in the field of IR is often referred to Alexander Wendt. His famous article of 
‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,’ serves as a 
basis on for an ongoing debate.  It showed how the international system can be studied 
differently from the overtly imposing Neorealism of the Cold War period. According to K. M. 
Fierke, Wendt criticized Neorealism that it took the identities and interests of states as 
given.
134
 This was because Neorealism defined these through the structure and environment of 
international anarchy.
135
 Wendt himself argues that Neorealism and Neoliberalism are ‘under 
socialized’.136 He further continues that the three different main streams of Constructivist IR 
theory stand juxtaposed to them.
137
  
 
For Wendt, Constructivism in IR to draws upon various social science theories and he argues 
that most in the field accept two basic points: 1) Ideas rather than material forces determine 
the structures of human association. 2) Identities and interests are constructed by shared 
ideas.
138
 The former makes emphasis on an idealist approach and the latter on a holist, or 
structural approach, making Constructivism a form of structural idealism.
139
 This approach is 
sometimes referred to as reflectivist, as it stands juxtaposed to the rationalist school of 
thought. Thus Constructivism can be thought of as a middle ground between rationalist and 
poststructuralist theories.
140
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Vivien Burr raises some arguments that support the position taken by Wendt. She denies the 
realist position that ‘knowledge is a direct perception of reality’. For Burr, language 
constructs the world and ‘all forms of knowledge are historically and culturally specific’.141 
This is seen in how ‘language is a precondition to thought’, and how the ‘use of language can 
be thought of as a form of action’.142 In comparison rationalist theories such as Neorealism 
have individualist ontology.  This is possible as long as the basic unit of the analysis is the 
individual state or a human being. Hence, Neorealism draws the analogy of individual human 
survival to the survival of an individual state in international anarchy.  
 
On the other hand, Constructivism raises social issues as meaningful. This is because it 
considers both humans and states as social beings and thus inseparable of the normative 
context.
143
 Furthermore, Wendt positions Constructivism so that structures of human 
association are primarily cultural phenomenon instead of a materialist one. Furthermore, he 
also makes the point against rationalism in that ‘structures do more than regulate’, they 
‘construct identities and interests’.144 Consequently, Wendt argues that material forces depend 
on shared ideas and culture which in turn affect power and interest. This means that he puts 
culture first in an analysis, and power and interest follow in its footsteps.  
 
The main ontological differences of Neorealism and Constructivism are capitalized by Wendt 
in how these theories perceive the structure of the international system. For Constructivists 
ideas and their distribution are the things that matter, for Neorealists it is the distribution of 
material capabilities.
145
 This positioning in the ontological axis affects the answers that can be 
derived from a set of questions. Therefore empiricism depends on the chosen ontology and 
epistemology as well as the chosen method. Wendt points to a key difference between his 
view of Constructivism and Kenneth Waltz’s Neorealism in that they both have different 
ontological commitments. According to Wendt, Waltz has materialist and individualist 
commitments which are then formed as conclusions. These conclusions are that’ international 
anarchy is the reason behind the self–help world and conflictual international politics’.146 
However, his own commitments of idealist and holist perceptions put him to view anarchy as 
what states make of it.
147
 He argues that there are several ‘cultures of anarchy’ that operate 
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with different logic and tendencies and affect the outcomes in the systemic structure.
148
 
Hence, Wendt is juxtaposed to Neorealists position that makes anarchy prevalent regardless of 
the nature and policies of the state.
149
  
 
Consequently, Wendt criticizes Neorealism on the following points: First, Neorealism cannot 
explain structural change although it notes the possibility of it.
150
 The kind of change that 
Wendt emphasizes is related to social change and can be thought of as a transition from 
feudalism to modern states, or the end of the Cold War. In his view, Neorealists do not think 
these changes real due to the fact that they do not remove anarchy or change the distribution 
power between states.
 151
 Thus, for Neorealists the Cold War condition would eventually 
return on its own. Second, Wendt thinks the Neorealism’s theory of structure is’ too 
underspecified to generate falsifiable hypotheses’. He argues that’ balancing’ in Neorealism is 
an example of ‘how (almost) any kind of foreign policy’ can be interpreted as such, regardless 
of the situation.
152
 Finally, he confronts Neorealism on its explanatory power of the structural 
anarchy and self–help system. According to Wendt it is a Neorealist assumption that anarchy 
works this way. His own view is that sometimes states are egoists and sometimes not, and that 
this logic changes.
153
 
 
2.3 Securitization theory 
 
The previous section narrowed down the academic debate by a descent from the upper 
echelons of ontology and epistemology. It limited the scope of the discussion into the two 
schools of IR theories, that of Realist and Constructivist. Furthermore, it arrived to a debate 
between Neorealist and Constructivist views of the international system. It also provided the 
basis for the theoretical framework and paved way for the Securitization theory. The purpose 
of this section is to outline the basic use of the theory as defined by Buzan and Wæver
154
 as 
well as the problematic concept of security. The theoretical limitations and arguments of this 
research are presented with the adjoining counter arguments which stand juxtaposed against 
them. 
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Furthermore, this section binds the Securitization theory as part of the Constructivist camp in 
the field of IR theories. As with all theories, this theory is burdened with the fact that it can be 
seen as being formed for someone for some specific purpose.
155
 Securitizing theory was 
developed by the CS
156
 within the security studies. It is considered a part of the Constructivist 
family as one specific theoretical approach whereas a person with ‘significant social standing’ 
performs a securitizing speech–act.157 Securitizing can be also seen as a process where a 
threat is created of something specific, an issue or an object.
158
  
 
2.3.1 What is security? 
 
This sub–section outlines the problematic concept of security with a short historical 
background as a prequel of the Securitization theory. The point is not to go through all the 
possible analogies of security. What is essential is to create an idea of how the concept has 
been generally thought of and how it became the focus of the security studies. This will pave 
way for the Securitization theory in the following sub–section.  
 
Security as a concept penetrates society from the international level to the individual 
person.
159
According to Mohammed Ayoob, the classical dictionary definition of security ‘to 
be free from danger, anxiety and fear’ is understood with a particular emphasis in the IR.160 
Therefore the meaning ‘security’ is different for individuals and for International Relations. 
IR is concerned about states and their national security, whereas individuals are concerned of 
personal security. It is also possible for the security interests of states and individuals to 
overlap. However, to create a focus for this study, the chosen unit is the state and the level 
international system. Therefore, ‘security’ is here used in the context of IR and states. Hence, 
individual security and its analogies are left outside. Furthermore, security is defined in 
political terms ‘in relation to threats to state boundaries, state institutions and governing 
regimes’.161  
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The traditional look on security has been to relate it to both power and strength therefore 
associating it with the state.
162
 Moreover, the classical concept of security draws heavily from 
this connection with the state.
163
 This is because of historical links and the prerogative of 
national security over anything else
164
. The state, due to its unique capacity of providing both 
domestic and international security through sovereignty has been the pre–eminent security 
actor.
165
 Mohammed Ayoob argues that security in IR is ‘endowed with a particular meaning’. 
For him, the meaning draws upon IR literature.
166
  It defines itself based on the assumptions 
that threats to the state originate outside its borders, and that these are primarily of military 
nature. Furthermore, he stipulates that the national security of states is defined as ‘an ability to 
protect against threats’, as well as to ‘reduce them’.167  
 
National security can be seen to be divided into domestic and international components.
168
 
Domestic security is usually thought of as the state’s internal capacity to provide and exercise 
a monopoly on the use of force within the state. Its key elements can be seen to include 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens as well as sufficient strength and reach to control the 
entire area of the state. Conversely, for the population domestic security provides freedom 
from violence and persecution. It provides law and order as well as the structures of the 
society to pursue their interests without the need to fear for their lives.
 169
 International 
security is commonly thought of as state’s sovereignty and freedom from outside influence.170 
Traditionally, sovereignty has been the ability to decide both foreign and domestic policies 
without outside interference. It has also been about the ability to freely decide participation 
and membership in international organizations.
171
  
 
                                                 
162
 Buzan (1991), pp. 1–2, Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 21–23. Securitization can be seen as a process whereas ‘a 
threat is presented to be existential in nature to the referent object, for example the state’. Traditionally for a state 
the threat has been either from military sector (a physical attack) or from political sector (sovereignty–
ideological). 
163
 Buzan and Hansen (2009), pp. 9–10. ‘Political and normative decisions’ are involved in defining security. 
Therefore security is always tied to a ‘particular referent object’. 
164
 Ulrik Pram Gad and Karen Lund Petersen (2011), “Concepts of politics in securitization studies”, Security 
Dialogue 42, p. 319. Security and politics are contextually tied to modernity and the nation–state. 
165
 Hansen (2006), p. 34. Hansen refers to R.B.J. Walker in regards to the historical connection of security and 
the state.  Sovereign state represents 400 years of evolution of political societies.  
166
 Ayoob (1995), p. 5. 
167
 Ibid. 
168
 Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 21, 25. The dominant concept of security in International Security Studies has 
been the one of national and international security. Also, concepts of individual and state security are 
‘inextricably linked’. 
169
 Tom Campbell (1981), Seven Theories on Human Society, pp. 6–8. 
170
 Hedley Bull [1977] (2002), The Anarchical Society (3
rd
 ed.): A Study of Order in World Politics, pp. 32–33. 
171
 Ayoob (1995), p. 71, pp. 78–79. Sovereignty is the fundamental defining character of ‘modern system of 
states’ and it carries with it ‘sacrosanct borders, mutual recognition, and nonintervention’. 
32 
 
International security is tightly connected with state’s existence. Therefore, it has a very high 
security context. This can typically be seen in national security issues and foreign policy 
objectives. With foreign policy articulations states are protecting their vital interests and core 
values. These include not just external issues but internal ones as well.
172
 Foreign policy is 
connected to international security which has roots in the history of power politics and within 
the military–political context. This places security related issues as issues about survival.173  
 
The Copenhagen School (here on referred to as CS) looks at security as socially constructed. 
It is considered to be the founding father and main theoretical base for contemporary security 
studies. CS depicts in the Securitization theory how ‘security’ is not an objectively 
ascertainable thing or a place, but the result of a specific social process.
174
 Security as a 
concept is an enabler, it securitizes because it has discursive and political force.
175
 
Furthermore, both the classical concept of security and the one depicted by the CS are 
important for this study.
176
 There are several links to these concepts that can be drawn straight 
from the historical development of the state. From thereon it can be traced back to 
contemporary security studies and failing states.
177
  
 
This means that both the classical and CS security need to be understood IOT understand how 
and why state failure is such a difficult subject to tackle. Previously the discussion on security 
was heavily influenced by the Cold War and the related threat of nuclear annihilation.
178
 This 
resulted in overtly military–political context which in turn influenced the security 
discussion.
179
 However, this was acknowledged during the Cold War and resulted in a need 
for wide definition of security.
180
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The ‘traditional’ concept of security eroded as it was challenged by postmodernism and the 
focus shifted from Cold War issues to other aspects, such as individual security.
181
 However, 
the widening process did not remove the state from its central position in the context of 
security. The state was retained as the foremost institution with the necessary resources and 
power to respond to various threats.
182
  Hence, in this study it is important to remove 
individual level threats from international–state level. Although international developments 
might affect individuals through events like economic depression, market crash, war and 
international crime, they are not essential here. This does not mean an oversight of 
interdependence between the different sectors of security, but more of a choice in focus. 
Therefore, I will leave the individual aspect of security outside the discussion and focus on 
the state and international level. 
 
Even though the NSS document has references to individual security issues, it is first and 
foremost directed at the state level. Therefore the main attention about the views of 
Securitization theory should be directed there. The international aspect of security is 
highlighted by Barry Buzan, who argues that security is ‘foremost about the security of 
human societies’ and after that about ‘the security of individuals’.183 He also acknowledges 
the need to widen the conceptual basis and as such was pivotal in creating a sectoral approach 
to security.
184
  
 
The widening of the conceptual basis of security was formulated by Buzan et al. into five 
sectors of security (political, economic, military, social, and environmental).
185
 This was away 
from the plain military–political framework in what came to be the basis of Securitization 
theory. It combined wide security and securitization inside the CS.
186
 Contemporary wide 
security entails all sorts of issues from individual to international. It mixes the sectors together 
as well as creates links between them. An excellent example of this can be found in the 
Finnish National Security Strategy (YTS). The YTS addresses wide variety of threats from 
individual to state level.
187
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Needless to say, security remains a complicated concept and its usage as well as 
interpretations a subject of contest.
188
 Consequently, to retain analytical usefulness the 
concept of security in this study it is connected to the state. Subsequently, security is defined 
in the international context. In this study ‘security’ is the ability of the state to protect its 
territory and political independence as well as its core values from external threats, whether 
they originate from state or non–state actors.  
 
2.3.2 Security as a discourse, the threat of ‘Other’ 
 
The previous part suggested that the traditional view of security has had a tremendous 
influence on how security was perceived. The rationalist approach and the favor of material 
(military) factors had constituted a measurable way to respond to various threats.
189
 However, 
the widening of security to a more comprehensive approach had included other sectors than 
just the military. This widening created a chance to see security as something beyond 
military–political and added multiple links that overlap within and between levels of security. 
Threats were not reduced just to numbers of tanks and missiles, or political–ideological colors 
on a map. The widening provided a chance to address complex global issues that are difficult 
to measure such as environment and human rights.  
 
Even with the widening of security, the national security aspect was still the concern of the 
state as it had been with the classical view of security. Only the viewpoint had changed and a 
better understanding of how threats were identified and given meaning was been 
accomplished.
190
 Realism had presented the classical view of security and its self–help 
materialist–individualist view. Widened security presented the Constructivist–
Poststructuralist view, where ideas matter. Therefore, for this study ‘national security is a 
particular kind of identity construction tied to the sovereign state’.191 For problems to be 
presented themselves as questions of security, they need to be ‘successfully constructed as 
such within political discourse’.192  
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However, there is still something that has to be remembered from the classical view of 
security. That is the triangle of state, sovereignty and security. This is something that remains 
even when the viewpoint changes from classical to wide, and from Realist to Constructivist–
Poststructuralist. 
 
Lene Hansen argues that the connection of sovereignty, state, and security is a particularly 
strong one. This is because the state is the historically specific political community to which 
‘the meaning of security’ is tied to.193 Therefore, for her the classical concept of security is 
‘either explicitly defined as national security or implicitly drawn upon this connection with 
state’.194 She concludes that it is due to 400 years of state as the pre–eminent way of people to 
form up as community that makes ‘national security as the front runner for the concept of 
security’.195 There are other researchers who draw upon the same conceptual basis and use 
similar analogy
196
. It can be said that this commonly accepted conceptual connection is a key 
defining factor when dealing with the meaning of security. 
 
Moreover, the way in which security discourse and identity relate creates ontologically 
necessity for the state to define its identity through threats. This delineates from the 
materialistic and individualist view of Realism. In Realism the increase of power is a way to 
increase security against other states. The discursive conception of security in Constructivist–
Poststructuralist view emphasizes how state is constituted through a radical and threatening 
‘Other’.197  
 
Therefore, the national ‘Self’ knows what it is only in reference of the ‘Other’ against whom 
it is protecting itself. As an example, during the Cold War the West defined itself against the 
Communist bloc of the ‘East’. Democracy was referred to and constituted in reference to 
autocracy and dictatorship.
198
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Hence, the ‘Self’ was a mirror image of the ‘Other’ but with a threatening ‘cape’ as to 
underline the radical difference. Moreover, when this difference takes on a security aspect it 
means that the ‘Other’ is constructed as a threat to security by ‘mobilization of discursively 
important concepts’. These are usually referred to as ‘national– or strategic interests’ which 
gives them ‘particular rhetoric and political urgency’.199 Thus we are then dealing with a 
securitization to a specific referent object, which in the case of this research is the state. 
 
The Cold War juxtaposition of East and West is not the only significant one. When talking 
about failing states the dichotomy is also between developed and underdeveloped, North and 
South. Mohammed Ayoob argues that the distinction between ‘rich, powerful, developed’ 
industrialized nations of the North
200
 and the ‘poor, weak, underdeveloped’ nations of the 
South has grown. For him, it is bigger since the Cold War ended and the Communist ‘Second 
World’ has disappeared.201 This basic conceptual definition creates a very distinctive ‘Other’ 
in relation to Western ‘Self’. It reaffirms the previous paragraphs arguments about how the 
radically threatening ‘Other’ is created in reference to ‘Self’. Furthermore, there is an 
important point which is raised by Lene Hansen and it refers to how some threats are labeled 
national and others international.  
 
This dichotomy is between individual and collective threats which have changed to from 
classical definition of security to encompass areas such as pandemics and transnational 
crime.
202
 These kinds of collective threats are clearly outside the military focus, even though 
they also threaten the national ‘Self’. As discourses are social it does not matter whether the 
security issues are collective or individual. However, it matters how these issues are presented 
and what kind of meaning they achieve.
203
 This can be seen also to encompass issues such as 
normative needs. These needs act not as a response to threats, but are portrayed as moral 
responsibility to intervene for example ‘on behalf of the beleaguered to reduce the loss of 
life.’204 
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2.3.3 Positioning Securitization theory 
 
As previously stated theories together with ontological and epistemological choices form the 
framework for any research. A theory can be formulated and given shape by an attempt to join 
a previously collected empiric data within a specific field of science. Therefore, studies that 
might have been nominal by themselves can be given additional significance and a new kind 
of explanatory power. Hence, a theory which binds them together such as Securitization 
theory can combine various strategic, social, political, and economic studies to formulate a 
different kind of study.
205
 
 
Securitizing theory was introduced to international politics by Ole Wæver in mid–1990s. It 
finally broke through with a publication by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde of 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis.
206
 Securitization theory was originally intended to 
offer a possibility to conceptualize security outside the military framework.
207
 It took some 
time for the theory to gain popularity and it was in the early 2000s when it gained 
momentum.
208
 The slow progress was due to the heavy influence of traditional strategic and 
security studies. 
 
Securitization theory has its wider roots in the Constructivist constellation of IR theories. 
Within that constellation reality is socially constructed, relative, and emphasis is placed on the 
use of language and processes thereof. Therefore the main roots lie in the speech act theory, 
Schmittian understanding of security, and traditionalist security debates.
209
 Securitization 
theory has been applied to analysis of foreign policies between states, the structure and effect 
of international crime, pandemics, ‘war on terror’, and so on.210 It is an alternative to the 
classical security studies as it made possible to address issues beyond the scope of military–
political. Moreover, it can be seen as useful tool to analyze how threats are created within the 
political process. This way it is possible to see what is raised and why on the agenda by the 
decision makers. 
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Securitization theory is also often connected to Carl Schmitt. Schmitt’s views on politics were 
developed during the 1920s and 1930s and they give Securitization theory an authoritarian 
look.
211
 This is mostly because Schmitt is often considered to have been the supporter of 
authoritarian policy (radical realpolitik), and his thoughts can be seen in the background of 
Hans Morgenthau and classical Realism.
212
 However, Ole Wæver himself points out that the 
Securitization theory does not entail Schmitt’s concept of politics, but it does have Schmitt’s 
concept of security. Schmitt’s concept of security is defined through exception, emergency 
and decision making.
213
  
 
Ole Wæver’s point about exception, emergency, and decision making is significant in that it 
tears the theory away from a Realist world. It positions the Securitization theory somewhere 
between Realist, Constructivist and Poststructuralist perception of reality. However, Schmitt 
and his ‘realpolitik’ are not the only critical points directed towards the theory. There are a lot 
of criticism directed toward the pivotal role of speech act and how it is interpreted in the 
theory. Thierry Balzacq has argued against the CS that the basis for the success of 
securitization has to lie in some kind of reality. Attaching ‘security’ to an issue cannot 
automatically make the issue about security through self–referential practice. Thus, for him 
securitization speech act needs to have some base in reality and not only depend on 
constitutive act.
214
  
 
The criticism presented by Balzacq is also directed toward the question ‘can anything become 
a security issue through securitizing?’ Some arguments also point out that the theory cannot 
address new and modern threats outside the framework of the nation–state.215 Furthermore, it 
is interesting how much discussion securitization and its effects have brought up. On one 
hand it is linked to the ‘value’ of the word ‘security’, and on the other hand it is a fear of 
securitization been used as an excuse to justify any kind of political action.
216
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Furthermore, there are criticism directed that point to Securitization theory being tied to 
‘modern form of politics’. It also has normative and contextual problems of wide security and 
is tied to Western notions of ‘legitimacy and power’, which limit its use elsewhere.217 
Counterarguments by Buzan and Wæver remind that not all the speech acts are equally 
powerful due to the social status and cultural context of the performer of the act.
218
 Hence, 
limits to ‘security’ are provided internally. Not ‘any security’ can be ‘any speech act’ or social 
construction. It is a specific act and the nature of the existential threat to the survival of the 
referent object makes it a securitization act.
219
  
 
2.3.4 Securitization process 
 
The main argument of Securitization theory is to define something as an existential threat to a 
referent object (usually the state), as a precondition for securitization to be possible. Hence, 
when something is defined in such a radical format, it cannot escape reaction or otherwise it 
could prove fatal to the object being protected.
220
 Ole Wæver defines security as a speech act, 
thus making it ephemeral and not necessarily anything concrete in nature. By speech act he 
means that uttering ‘security’ a securitizing actor221 is giving the subject a security stamp.  
 
The securitizing actor moves the issue (subject) to a special zone by giving it priority and 
authorizes all means to address this threat.
222
 Therefore, when we look at how an existential 
threat is created with a conscious use of language, a different kind of approach can be used 
than the more conventional Realist or Liberalist theories.
223
 With a strategically significant 
document such as the NSS, it opens new interpretations.
224
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Moreover, the actions of the U.S. as the dominant great power in the contemporary world 
cannot be without an effect. Therefore, it provides good reason to look at how failing states 
were securitized as an existential threat. Furthermore, to understand the basic process of 
securitization a brief look into the theory is in order.
225
 The precondition for securitization 
process
226
 to be enacted is the speech act
227
. Hence, the speech act is the focal point in the 
Securitization theory around which everything else is built. The language and philosophy 
works of Austin and Searle contributed much to the speech act theory which accounts for the 
tight connection between Securitization theory and speech act.
228
  
 
Securitization and politization share a commonality. Securitization can be seen as an extreme 
version of politization where the utterance of ‘security’ lifts an issue above normal politics to 
a special status. Thus, when a special status and emergency procedures are approved it 
justifies going outside normal day–to–day political procedure. Circumstances, temporal 
placement and the state in question affect the process.
229
 Who securitizes what and for what 
reason is an open book. Moreover, for Finland securitization of culture (as a xenophobia) is 
more probable than for the U.S. Vice versa, the securitization of failing states is more likely 
for the U.S. than to Finland. This is due to great power interests of the former and a relative 
small effect of the phenomenon to the latter.
230
  
 
There are several points that Buzan and his colleges make on the use of the theory. Firstly, the 
meaning of the concept lies in its usage and not in how we would think it could be defined 
analytically. In case of security the emphasis is on that an issue can be argued to be important, 
and therefore it takes precedence over anything else.
231
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Moreover, this makes security a self–referential practice because, ‘it is in this practice that the 
issue becomes a security issue.’ No real threat is needed, just something that is presented as a 
threat.
232
 Therefore, securitization is taking place when an argument can be presented as a 
threat and is accepted as such by the audience for which it has been presented to. This places 
the issue above normal political procedure and breaks conduct. Moreover, the issue being 
securitized is presented to the audience in a way that if it is not addressed immediately the 
results will be disastrous.
233
  
 
However, there are dangers related to securitization. It raises important issues into the 
political agenda but at the same time it can polarize the field heavily. This is why 
securitization should be used with caution.
234
 A contemporary example of securitization can 
be drawn from the Europe in 2015. That year Europe saw enormous increase of asylum 
seekers and refugees pouring over the European Union (henceforth EU) outer borders. The 
issue was securitized in many member countries who directed the flow onward to their 
neighbors. This polarized it between the member states and paralyzed the Schengen 
Agreement. These events are an excellent example of what damage securitization can do. It 
echoes the creators of the theory as well as its critics in that securitization is not a desirable 
state of affairs.
235
  
 
Furthermore, the argumentative process of speech act can be thought of as an emergency 
vehicle running through red lights and against one way traffic. The vehicle is trying to get to 
the accident site as soon as possible and if this cannot be done something terrible will happen. 
The lights and the sound of the siren are the argumentative means by which it tries to 
persuade other vehicles to give way. Consequently, it breaks normal procedure, traffic laws 
and regulations with its actions. No real or visible threat is needed to be present for other 
vehicles to see, just something that is presented as a threat by the light and sound of the siren. 
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Secondly, there is a distinction between a securitization move
236
 and successful securitization. 
By presenting something as an existential threat and labeling ‘security’ on it does not by itself 
mean automatic securitization of the issue. There needs to be an acceptance of the audience to 
whom the issue is presented that the argument is valid. Audience does not need to conduct a 
comprehensive democratic discussion, but it needs someone with enough authority to apply 
the relevant policy change.
237
  
 
Herein lay a difficulty for a wider democratic process. Those who make the securitization 
move are usually part of the state structure (e.g. government and president) and the object is 
either parliament or the state’s highest decision maker. Therefore, it makes both the audience 
and the maker of the securitizing move part of the same structure. If the securitization move 
accounts for nothing (e.g. no policy change, course of action, or wider acceptance), then it has 
remained just a move.  
 
An analogy for unsuccessful securitization can be drawn from the medical field. New 
vaccines and vitamins are constantly being offered by pharmaceutical companies for various 
reasons. The securitization of diseases, pandemics, or nutritional values is ongoing all the 
time. Depending on the wider acceptance of organizations such as the World Health 
Organization (henceforth WHO), United Nations (henceforth UN) and national health 
officials of governments, this type securitization can account to a new policy or next to 
nothing. If there is no policy change in any of these key organizations, then securitization has 
remained just a move. 
 
Thirdly, securitization of anything is possible and the relevance is ambiguous at times. Hence, 
there is a need to look at the follow–on effects of securitization to see if it has been successful. 
Because securitization is very dramatic in nature it can cause mistrust. By overriding rules of 
normal procedure and conduct it can create uneasiness and even fear (such as fear in other 
states). Moreover, this ‘self–based violation of rules due to security act and fear of survival as 
a motivation for it’ creates a difficult situation. The one that feels threatened discards social 
resources and common rules (shared with others), and demands a right to action by its own 
priorities.
238
  
                                                 
236
 Sjöstedt (2013), p. 146. Sjöstedt defines securitization move as ‘framing of an issue as national threat added 
with a strategy for action’. 
237
 Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 29–31. Successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer, but by the audience 
of the ‘security speech act’.  
238
 Ibid., p. 26. 
43 
 
An excellent analogy can be drawn to the terrorist strikes against the U.S. on 9/11. After the 
attacks terrorism was heavily securitized. This led to mostly unilateral action by the U.S. 
against the Taleban and the al–Qaeda in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The securitization of 
terrorism and the interventions it caused were more or less widely accepted. A failed 
securitization can be seen in the case of Iraq in 2003 when the threat of Saddam Hussein to 
international security was not widely accepted.
239
 Invasion of Iraq occurred regardless of the 
sovereignty principle or the lack of UN Security Council resolutions. Moreover, states use 
security discourses in more ways than one to widen the concept of security to other areas of 
interest, such as ‘economics and drugs’.240 
 
Finally, there are three components to successful securitization as presented by Buzan and his 
associates: (1) existential threat, (2) emergency action, (3) effect on inter–unit relations by 
breaking free of the rules.
241
 These combine the speech act as part of the process of 
securitization. This is because of the ‘shared understanding of what is considered and 
collectively responded to as a threat’ thus making the ‘utterance itself the act’.242 However, 
the permission and responsibility for action are not always easily acquired. As noted before, 
securitization is always tightly bound in politics because security related issues are within the 
political decision making domain. 
 
For the securitization be effective, the security discourses have to succeed in giving a 
legitimate power for exceptional actions to those invoking the speech act. Simultaneously 
these discourses label them with a responsibility. Thus, when someone presents a threat and 
receives the power to skip conventional political procedure they are responsible for 
addressing it accordingly and without delay. Alexander Wendt presents the four interests of 
the state (physical survival, autonomy, economic well–being and collective self–esteem) that 
collectively make up the national interest of the state. These four must be met or the state will 
‘die out’.243 Moreover, it can be said that if any of these key interests would become 
threatened, it would constitute an existential threat to the state.  
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Therefore, securitization always reflects the normative and ethical views of the securitizing 
actor.
244
 Thierry Balzacq stipulates, that ‘for politicians to be able to counter a threat they 
need to seek both moral and formal support from the audience’.245 According to him, this 
makes securitization volatile for fluctuations if there’s a dichotomy between the moral and 
formal. If these are in harmony, the chance of a successful securitization is greatly 
increased.
246
 
 
Another problem for a successful securitization comes from the fact that the securitizing actor 
is often an expert in a specific and narrow field (e.g. military). This makes his or her case 
acceptable for the audience only in regards to that sector of security. It is difficult for the 
securitizing actors to act successfully over the ‘sectoral boundaries’ in trying to convince the 
audience of the validity of the existential threat.
247
 Therefore, the documents that have gone 
through the political process are a composite of several different securitizing actors. In them 
each actor aspires to influence a broad audience. Most national security strategy documents 
fall into this category as they are created together by various ministries and departments of 
governments.
248
 The documents are finally approved by the political leadership.  
 
Thierry Balzacq emphasizes the role of identification in the role of successful securitization. 
He argues that the one making the securitizing move needs to have ‘an ability to identify 
himself or herself with the audience’.249 This is a needed IOT successfully securitize an issue. 
Moreover, the securitizing message has to be structured in a way which is easily acceptable 
by the audience to gain the desired effect. Hence, identification is the perspective through 
which securitization is able to change the thinking of the audience.
250
 This is significant 
because the audience is the one that ultimately decides whether or not the securitization is 
successful.
251
 Balzacq’s view on importance of identification is echoed by Jarno Límnéll. He 
argues that in order for a threat to exist ‘it needs communal or societal phenomenon’. This 
phenomenon is bound among other things by ‘culture and the nature of those making the 
securitization’.252 
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2.4 Foreign Policy as a Discourse 
 
The main topics of the previous sections were theoretical choices, counter arguments and the 
framework of the research. Thus, what is left is the methodology of Discourse analysis and 
how it can be used as an analytical tool in the study of foreign policy discourses. The purpose 
of this section is to lay out the basic tenets of DA. It will show how it is used for analysis of 
foreign policy. Specifically, the section will present the idea how DA is applied to study the 
discourses of failing states in the NSS. Furthermore, it will present what kind of discourse the 
research is interested in and what is left out.  
 
2.4.1 Principles of Discourse analysis 
 
Discourse analysis is located in the realm of qualitative research methods and is used to study 
the use of language and sign related actions. It is a broad methodology consisting of several 
different analytical methods which vary depending on the theoretical orientation and 
ontological and epistemological choices. One way of defining DA would be to describe it as a 
study of language and signs which analyzes in detail how social reality is being 
constructed.
253
 Signs can be images, media and many other forms as language can be 
speeches, policy documents, academic writing etc. All of these create sign systems which 
depending on their relation, either support or contradict various discourses.  
 
Moreover, different sign systems are alternatively defined as discourses or interpretative 
repertoires. The difference between sign systems is not the issue rather it is how one defines 
them in a particular research. This is because both discourses and interpretative repertoires are 
constructed by social interaction and thus construct social reality.
254
 Therefore, discourses not 
only construct reality, but also describe it. They act both subjectively and objectively.
255
 Even 
though DA can be applied to various theoretical frameworks it leans heavily on social 
constructivism
256
. This ontological dependence affects as well as limits its use.  Social 
constructivism affects DA through language. Language constructs reality and creates meaning 
and in so doing constantly re–constructs different versions of reality.257 
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Consequently, this makes social constructivism as the broader framework for all discursive 
methods. Constructivism in IR is derived from the social theories and it has the process nature 
of knowledge. It also retains the social constructivism’s cultural and historical specificity as 
well as the importance of language.
258
 It emphasizes ideas over material facts and identities 
and interests as a product of shared ideas. In the foreign policy it is the national interests 
which need to be legitimized, and this is done through reference to identities. Furthermore, 
because of the process nature of Constructivism these ‘identities are simultaneously 
constituted and reproduced through formulations of foreign policy’.259  
 
2.4.2 Relational construction of identity 
 
Foreign policy outlines national interests and in doing so it reflects the identity of the state. 
Hence, it has a heavy cultural setting which is further amplified by the formal authority of 
those who proclaim it. Moreover, foreign policy discourses are always situated in a wider 
setting and conceptualized in reference something they are not. Thus, when speaking of 
failing states it is in reference of what the state is supposed to be when it is not failing.
260
  
 
For FS, this intersubjective context directs the discussion to the nature of statehood, 
sovereignty, and so forth. Therefore, it is necessary to ‘theorize foreign policy as a 
discourse’.261 This is done for the purpose of using DA to look at how failing states are 
securitized in the security discourses of the NSS policy documents. Furthermore, this also 
means that it is necessary to argue that ‘identity and policy stand in a constitutive, rather than 
causal, relationship’.262 Identity and policy form a multifaceted picture since policies depend 
on how various threats are depicted. 
263
This affects what kind of image is created by words as 
well as what kind of cultural dichotomies or juxtapositions are present. Foreign policies draw 
these different strands together to form a picture of the situation by assigning meaning to 
different objects. The conceptualization of ‘identity as discursive, political, relational and 
social differs from Constructivism’. 264 
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This conceptualization is drawn from Poststructuralism where the dependence of the foreign 
policy is somewhat different than the one portrayed by Wendt in his Constructivism.
265
 The 
main point of divergence is located in relation to identity. Lene Hansen argues that ‘there are 
no objective identities in some extra–discursive realm’ vis–á–vis Wendt who stipulates that 
‘identity need not be constructed as relational difference’.266 This means that Wendt accepts 
the possibility of pre–social identity and Hansen does not. Furthermore, Hansen considers 
identity to be a constructed through discourse where Wendt accepts both possibilities. 
 
This does not mean that the basic tenets of Constructivism are unusable in this study. 
However, I’ll discard ‘Wendtian intrinsic conception’ of identity and favor a Hansen’s 
Poststructural ‘relational conception’ of it.267 Furthermore, I’ll think of foreign policy as an 
intertextual thing where the authority and arguments draw strength through references to other 
texts. I’ll also deviate from Wendt in that identity could be considered to have potentially 
causal effect on policy. Instead I’ll adopt a poststructuralist view of ‘identity and policy as 
ontologically inseparable’.268 I’ll agree with Wendt in that states with their monopoly on 
violence create a situation where societies are formed top–down, and different policies act as 
a guiding principle. For Wendt, foreign policy is seen as a ‘guiding principle’ as it tries to 
guide how people see common threats emanating from ‘external Others’.269 
 
2.4.3 Analyzing foreign policy through discourses 
 
In this research discourse is the way social activity (decision making) presents itself in the 
context of the NSS through the use of language.
270
  A simplified example of this process is 
given by Hussein M. Adam. He argues that the president Clinton changed the U.S. policy on 
Somalia immediately after the death of 18 U.S. troops in Mogadishu on July 12
th
 1993. A 
political solution was pushed forwards instead of intervention and confrontation. Thus, the 
discourse surrounding the humiliation of dead soldiers affected foreign policymakers.
271
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Therefore, it matters how language is used to securitize failing states and how social reality is 
being structured accordingly. The use of language affects the way a securitized discourse is 
amplified. It forms intertextual and intersubjective links to create and sustain itself as an 
existential threat.
272
 This affects how FS are being perceived as a threat and thus affects 
foreign policy accordingly.  
 
Moreover, it places the discourses of the primary material (the NSS) in political context. In 
the analysis the focus is on how policy texts try to create stable arguments of FS as a threat to 
the U.S. Additionally, there is interest in if the stability of these arguments can be upheld even 
with a change in the administration. Moreover, there are always constraints in the policy 
making which affect the content of the document. Hence, the importance of the effect of 
securitization is significant. Examining this effect is seen as way of looking at how once 
established discourses are remobilized and re–enforced to retain the dominant discourse, or 
modify it to suit specific needs.
273
 There are significant convergence in how key subjects and 
points of interests, such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (from here on referred to as 
WMD’s), rogue states, and terrorists, are connected to different discourses including failing 
states. This intersubjective link is visible in the chosen temporal span of 1990 to 2010 where 
certain themes carry on, while others wane and disappear only to resurface later. 
 
This is done IOT ascertain sufficient empirical material and to look for how the discourses on 
FS surfaced, developed and evolved. Therefore, it covers the significant temporal nexus 
events such as the end of the Cold War, and the 9/11. These are focal points which are used to 
map the stability of the official discourse. Furthermore, these temporal nodes are used to 
analyze what happened to the discourse. How facts or events affected them either changing, 
amplifying or downplaying their importance. The temporal span specifically leaves out Arab 
Spring and the events after 2010 in an effort not to extend the research too much. There is 
significance in how facts are embedded and read into discourses as to have effect on the 
policy.  
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Official policy might use existing discursive framework to acknowledge facts (terrorists, 
rogue states and WMD’s are a threat) and combine them with a new situation (post–9/11 and 
the threat of failing states as harbors of terrorists). However, there are always counter 
discourses, criticism and failures. These might lead to further emphasis on the argumentations 
on behalf on the official discourse, or to complete silence.
274
  
 
The purpose of the DA in this research is to show how facts and related events are ‘dependent 
upon a particular discursive framing of the issue and that this framing has political effects’.275 
In the case of FS this is the securitization and creation of an existential threat. It also presents 
an interesting question of why certain categories, statistics and indicators are used in the 
definition of state failure, and others are not? This will be addressed in chapter 3. Some of the 
problems in DA are linked to the relational nature of Constructivism. If causality is 
abandoned, a conundrum of how to show the effects of discourse becomes evident. Therefore, 
it is a question of ‘how much discourse matters’ in the face of material and causal attack 
against it, and ‘what is the causal effect of identity on foreign policy’.276 
 
Also, discourses are constantly in a flux in trying to assert themselves against counter–
discourses that are trying to weaken or supplement them. This leads to a situation where it can 
be said that discourses never reach complete stability. Hence, it is only possible to analyze 
‘the relative ability of a discourse’.277 There are also several other points of attack against DA. 
Most them come from the positivist side and are directed towards the ability of the DA to 
attain sufficient empiricism. How does one decide which DA is the best? Can you acclaim all 
readings of a text equally valid? This criticism can be seen as directed towards 
Poststructuralism more than Constructivism. It is due to the juxtaposition of the question of 
identity mentioned earlier and so it is more in the nature of theoretical debate than a 
methodological question.  
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However, Lene Hansen points out this ‘attention to theoretical debate is misleading’. For her 
what really matters is the reading of the text and ‘the explicit discursive articulations of signs 
and identities’.278 Moreover, she argues that it is about the methodological rigor of the analyst 
and his or her ‘interpretation of the signs’ that matters.279 The stability of the discourse and 
the interpretation of the analyst affect how and in what way the link between identity and 
policy can be found. This is what makes the reading of a text a good one or a bad one. This 
reiterates the fact that there is no one reading to account for everything and that every text can 
be the subject of a multiple readings and interpretations.
280
 
 
2.4.5 Failing states as a discourse 
 
Security discourses are constructed by the references and juxtapositions of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. 
They create threats of those who in some way are different than us. Through speech act the 
label of security is attached initiating the process of securitization as the ‘Other’ is described 
as an existential threat.  Hence, power is acclaimed to step outside conventional procedure. At 
the same time responsibility to address the issue is required of those who invoke ‘security’. In 
this way language is used to structure reality giving form to policy and action.  
 
The same process as is described above happens in the NSS. It is usually connected to 
identities and interests as well as to culture and society. These create national interest which 
creates various security discourses. The discourses have intersubjective links into various key 
events and threats. The NSS also draws intertextual strength from other policy texts (other 
NSS documents) as possibly from the academic and scientific community. 
 
To see FS as a discourse in the context of foreign policy one needs to look at how the concept 
was first coined, and how it evolved and eventually was securitized.
281
 Moreover, failing 
states is far from a simple concept and it involves other concepts and discourses. Of these, the 
most important ones are sovereignty, state and security. These discourses also affect each 
other in one way or another. The concept of FS and its acronyms will be addressed in chapter 
three. The next part is a prequel to chapter three as it gives an idea of the FS as a discourse.  
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Tuomo Takala & Anna–Maija Lämsä presents an argument that the explicit definition of a 
concept is impossible. This is because ‘a concept is not defined by any object outside 
language but instead the definition is created through other concepts and definitions’.282 This 
argument hits in the epicenter of the paradigm of state failure discourse because it links three 
‘impossible’ concepts together: state, security and state failure. 
 
The origin of the FS discourse was tracked to the beginning of the 1990s when the concept of 
failing and failed states was coined
283
. Most sources refer to the article by Gerald B. Helman 
and Steven R. Ratner (1992/93) ”Saving Failed States”, in the Foreign Policy magazine as the 
source which brought the concept to prominence. It was adopted in the academic and policy 
debates during the 1990s.
284
 This was because of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and Soviet 
Union (from here on referred to as SU) into their constituent parts. Hence, the concept of state 
failure was born at the end of the Cold War, even though empires and states had risen and 
fallen well before that.
285
 Interestingly, during the Cold War several states ceased to exist but 
at the time the discourse was about a collapse or regime change.  
 
The 9/11 incident pushed the concept of state failure and its acronyms to the forefront of the 
academic community, and also into the awareness of foreign policy makers around the 
world.
286
  In order to study the securitization of failing states with DA methodology there 
needs to be a definition of what a ‘non–failing state’ is. In addition, there needs to be an 
understanding of the context in where the concept is used. If the discussion is about FS then 
one needs to know when a state is not failing. Likewise, if we are using Securitization theory 
the knowledge of the thoughts of Buzan and Wæver are essential to the research. An excellent 
analogy on the nature of the failing state discourse can be given by comparing it to how a 
person can be recognized to be insane.  
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Insanity can be defined according to person’s behavior by comparing it to one’s own. Because 
the person’s behavior differs from your own, they are deemed ‘insane’. By reading enough 
signs of ‘insanity’ a diagnosis can be created which proves the person to be insane, whether or 
not this is actually true.
287
 Likewise, a definition of a failing state is created by Western 
cultural context by using the Western sovereign state (an entity with 400–500 years of 
evolution) as a reference point.
288
 This context is then used to create various discourses and 
definitions of collapsing, failing, and weak states. This can lead to securitization, as these 
entities are considered a threat to the ‘non–failing’ states. Successful securitization can lead to 
action and intervention IOT repair the ‘damaged and dangerous’ states. However, as it was 
with the insanity example the failing state discourse can be the interpretation and diagnosis 
created out of one’s own cultural viewpoint, and not something that has a base in facts.  
 
Furthermore, voice of criticism is especially directed at the cultural–historical context. 
Branwen G. Jones argues that the entire state failure discourse is disputable and highly 
subjective. For him, the conceptual ‘language’ of state failure draws from pre–existing 
Western notions of specific locations (such as Africa) as ‘primordial and chaotic’.289 Thus, ‘an 
ahistorical and Eurocentric’ account is accepted as the starting point. This results in distorted 
conceptualizing of what state failure is about.
290
 The criticism is well placed, but it focuses 
primarily on the indicators or analyses which are created IOT assess the condition of various 
polities. Hence, it does not prevent analyzing foreign policy through discourses but it does 
create ‘warning signs’ in regard to the objectivity of the concept that should be remembered. 
 
2.5 Objectivity, reaching for the unattainable 
 
This part of the chapter 2 looks at how the objectivity of the research is affected by various 
issues. Hence, the section strives to interpret the voices of criticism, not in effort to silence 
them but rather to acknowledge the limitations we each bring with us. Social constructivism 
puts a lot of weight in the use of language. Language can be seen to construct reality and is in 
a very important role in how we define ourselves and our surroundings.
291
 This is why it is 
                                                 
287
 Jokinen & Juhila & Suoninen (1993), pp. 32–33. Jokinen, Juhila and Suoninen use Dorothy Smith’s (1990) 
example of an analysis of an insanity as an example how cultural context affects deductions and conclusions.  
288
 Ayoob (1995), pp. 29–30, Tilly (1990). 
289
 Jones (2013), pp. 49–52. 
290
Ibid., Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 244. Construction of the Western Self as superior, strong and civilized is 
typical. 
291
 Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 33. ‘Discursive approaches’ argue that security is not definable objectively. 
53 
 
considered to be ‘a key stone of social constructivism’.292 The power of language is seen in 
the concepts we use, the cultural background we exhibit, and in the norms of the society.
293
 
Because I am of Finnish background, I am also a product of that society. This means I have 
inherited all of its linguistics, concepts, and cultural implications. It positions me in a certain 
way when I’m reading literature in English and transcribe it into text. Moreover, it affects the 
concepts and texts without my knowledge. I am not a native speaker of English, nor have I the 
cultural and societal background of those who have written the material I study.
294
 This is 
something I cannot change but it is something I must take note of.  
 
Furthermore, the context in where concepts are used defines them. It leads to the fact that 
same concepts are found in different connections with different meanings. Therefore, the 
meaning of concepts varies due to ontological, theoretical, epistemological and 
methodological positioning. They are also affected by cultural and social context.
295
 This 
comes quite visible in the following chapter where the concept of failing state is defined. The 
DA methodology and intersubjective and intertextual interpretation can cause its own 
variance. This happens, since every time a text is read there’s a possibility that that reading 
differs from the previous one. Hence, the information can change with consecutive readings. 
This is something that one cannot change (for example compared to statistical empiricism), 
but it have to be taken into consideration. There are also several points that should be noted in 
regards to cultural views, norms and values.  
 
First, as a Finn I represent a Western cultural–normative background with the adjoining 
historical–ethical baggage. This applies also to the theoretical base of the study since the state 
system, IR, and the current concept of security originate from Western view.
296
 This puts me 
into a position where everything I see and experience is through a set of specific ‘glasses’. 
This is bound to affect both the analysis as well the conclusions of the research.
297
 A person 
with an Asian or African background would probably draw different conclusion and 
interpretation from the same material. This is something to be aware of and to accept the fact 
                                                 
292
 Burr (1995), pp. 32–33. 
293
Ayoob (1995), pp. 3–7. All of the concepts and definitions associated with state, security, international 
relations, state failure (with its analogies) are heavily colored by Western view due their origins. 
294
 Burr (1995), p. 37. Vivien Burr argues that, ’the concepts we operate with are tied in with the kind of society 
we live in’. Thus, they are not arbitrary and they do not exist ‘out there’ for us to attach arbitrary labels. 
Therefore our conceptualization is the product of our society.  
295
 Takala & Lämsä (2001), p. 383. 
296
 Ayoob (1995), pp. 6–11, Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 19. 
297
 Sipilä & Koivula (2013), p. 15. According to them, voiced and unvoiced theoretical assumptions create our 
subjectivity. Therefore, researcher’s cultural–normative background can be seen to create our subjectivity. 
54 
 
that there cannot be a completely value–free research.298 Second, this research does not have a 
hypothesis as such as. Instead it has a solid theoretical basis from which it strives to find new 
viewpoints on the chosen subject. Moreover, the lack of hypothesis can be seen to improve on 
the objectivity of the research. This is because there is no need to prove anything absolutely 
true or false, but to open new ways of looking at the phenomenon.
299
 This positioning makes 
the theory of the research as means to analyze primary and secondary material from a 
specific, explicit, viewpoint.
300
 This explicit viewpoint is created with Constructivism, 
Poststructuralism and Securitization theories, which leaves out other theories.  
 
Third, quantitative research can provide additional objectivity by providing supporting or 
critical empiric data. However, because of the chosen theories and methods its use should be 
carefully considered. Fourth, material of the research consists of official documents and 
academic source material. Official documents (the NSS’) have validity since they are 
prepared by a wide board of experts and politicians and are approved at the highest level of 
the government (president). However, the weaknesses of these documents are their heavy 
subjective nature which comes from the fact that they represent power (of the state). In them 
are embedded the motives and aspirations of those who have drafted them as well as the 
identity and interests of the state. Regardless, they are concrete decisions that have real world 
consequences and thus a valid source. Academic literature and articles strive by their very 
definition to be objective. Therefore, they retain a smaller amount of subjectivity than the 
official governmental documents but still have the same cultural–normative variance 
mentioned earlier. Peer review and cross–referencing in them also greatly increases the 
validity of a given study or article.  
 
Finally, it should be remembered that all observation and conclusion of a given research are 
tied to the theory being used. Therefore no research can ever uncover the ‘absolute truth’.  
As Aki–Mauri Huhtinen puts it, ‘absolute observation is possible only for a rock because it 
cannot choose the object of its action, environment, or create its own world.’ 301 
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3 THE PARADIGM OF FAILING STATES DISCOURSE 
 
–Ad fontes 
 
The previous chapter defined the theoretical and epistemological grounds of this research. It 
showed the process of securitization and the significance of the speech act. Addition to this, 
methodological issues where addressed and the use of DA was defined.  Moreover, the 
chapter also brought up counter arguments, criticism and the limitations of this research. This 
chapter takes a look in to the historical background of the modern state and ends in with 
conceptualizing and defining failing state. In order to analyze the securitization of failing 
states it is critical to understand the definition of what a state is. This is because concept and 
definition of the state affects the analysis of the primary material. 
 
Buzan and Hansen argue that ‘understanding the state is crucial if one is to debate about the 
state as the referent object of security’, since questions of security ‘evolve around the status of 
the state’302 Therefore, the concept of state has to be addressed, before analysis of the NSS. 
This is because the analysis of the NSS documents relies on understanding how the concept of 
the state affects the discourse on FS. Furthermore, Sonali Huria argues that ‘the concept of the 
state is central, since the discourse on the state failure is inescapably tied on the idea of 
statehood’.303  
 
Therefore, IOT adequately define and understand state failure one must take a look how the 
state was perceived in the West. This can be done by looking at sovereignty, identity and the 
system of states. Western norms are the dominant defining factor on the background of the 
whole international system and the recognition of other states has this normative element 
embedded to it.
304
 Conceptualizing and defining failing states through the origins of the 
Western state acts as a prelude for the analysis of the NSS in chapter 4. The Western view is 
ever present in the various definitions of state failure. Hence, it also affects the securitization 
of the failing states in the NSS documents.  
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3.1 Defining the sovereign state through Western view 
 
This section opens up the discussion on the paradigm of failing states discourse. Its purpose is 
to look at origins of the state and how the concept is affected by the Western view. It shows 
how the concepts of state, sovereignty and security are tightly bound by history. As these 
concepts affect the definition of failing states, the connection between them is important to 
understand. The first discussion is how the Western world
305
 sees state both historically and 
culturally and it will lay the basis for the next part and the discussion of states identity.  
 
The ‘Western view’ is a generalized term306 which can be seen to cover almost anything from 
geographical borders to culture and history. In this study it was regarded as the common 
conception of how the world is perceived by looking at it from a European and North 
American perspective. It is affected by cultural and societal factors developed over hundreds 
of years.
307
 The importance of the Western view comes to fore with the definition of the state 
and sovereignty.  
 
The concepts of state and sovereignty are more than anything a Western invention.
308
 
Therefore, the Western view affected the conceptualization of what a state should be and how 
sovereignty should be understood. Through these two concepts it contributed to how a failing 
state was defined and perceived.
309
 All of these key concepts are referred to or described by in 
reference to something they are not.
310
 Furthermore, to understand how the Western view was 
created it should be looked as knowledge constituted through culture. The process of how 
culture affects perception can be seen in the way common knowledge constitutes 
intersubjective understandings.
311
 Hence, common knowledge is a kind of a group belief. 
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According to Alexander Wendt, this kind of ‘group belief’ has ‘collective memory’ that 
affects the way the group views things. The cognitive resource of this sort helps policymakers 
to persuade people for action, and once created can be extreme difficult to shake.
312
 Collective 
memory can be seen in effect when something is successfully securitized as an existential 
threat. It makes it easier to support a particular security discourse and harder to de–securitize 
it back to the realm of normal politics.  
 
How this affects the discourse on failing states? Branwen G. Jones argues that the concept of 
state failure has over time become an integral part our thinking of what a state should be.
313
 
For Jones, ‘the conceptual language of state failure is tied to long standing Western ideas of 
chaos and anarchy in Third World regions like Africa’. Jones’ argument can be thought of as 
Wendt’s form of ‘group belief’. Similarly, the Western concept of security (of states) is tied to 
external threats and systemic security. This is different as posed to Third World concept of 
security which if connected to regime and state security.
314
 Moreover, the following history 
shows how the constitution of the identity of the state is significantly affected by the Western 
view.  It also links sovereignty and security as part of the state’s identity. 
 
The present identity and history of the state originated from ancient times in what is now 
known as Middle–East. There are similarity between these early polities and contemporary 
states.
315
 This similarity could be thought of through geographical borders of city–states or 
empires.
316
 There were also organized political groups and actors which had interaction with 
other polities such as theirs.
317
 After the breakdown and collapse of the Roman Empire the 
Christian world was divided into what became Orthodox and Catholic empires. This state of 
affairs existed until ‘the local rulers shed religious oversight of the Pope’.318  
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This event made warfare the main tool for settling grievances and arguments between rulers 
and defining borders.
319
 Moreover, the physical dominance of its area and monopoly on the 
use of force freed the state of foreign influence in its internal affairs. It made ‘modern states 
the successors of sovereigns’.320 This solidification of authority within borders would 
eventually become the sovereignty of modern states. It initiated contemporary state formation 
and created the basis for the international system. The sovereignty in the Westphalian sense 
gave rise to a worldwide definition of state.
321
 Therefore, the international system can be seen 
born in Europe with the peace of Westphalia in 1648. Against this historical background the 
idea of specific geographical area is understandably at the epicenter of statehood.  
 
However, Alexander Wendt argues that the social meaning of states borders can vary. He 
suggests that states can extend their ‘Self’ outside their borders and ‘define their interests in 
collective terms’.322 As an example, the U.S. extended its ‘Self’ to Europe after the WWII and 
made the effect permanent through allies and economic ties.  Therefore, a war in Europe 
during the Cold War (involving allies) would have presented an existential threat to the U.S. 
The extended ‘Self’ would have been threatened regardless of the geographical distance of the 
actual borders. Identity and extended ‘Self’ are key elements that are addressed in all of the 
NSS documents. That also locates them at the epicenter of why failing states evolved into an 
existential threat to the U.S.  
 
By a Weberian definition ‘states are an organization possessing sovereignty and territorial 
monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence’323. However, some commonalities 
should be emphasized to make the state something beyond the Weberian definition. 
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First, a state should have some sort of institutional–legal order to enforce laws and create 
governmental institutions. Second, it should have an organization successfully claiming the 
legitimate use of force. Third, the state should possess internal and external sovereignty. 
Fourth, there should be a society and territory.
324
 A state’s area may vary from an island to 
continental dimension. Its institutions can be democratic, autocratic or theocratic. Sovereignty 
may be implicit or weak, and state’s society may be homogenous or heterogeneous. 
Regardless of these, organized violence is always about the coordinated use of deadly force. 
Therefore, this control over force of violence as a means of destruction is ‘the ultimate and 
distinctive basis of state power and only thing essential to stateness’.325  
 
Even states which have no armies to speak of have police force and vice versa, a state can 
have an army but not an effective police force.
326
 However, both of these dimensions must be 
within the states control. This can be seen as how most Western states are constructed and it 
subsequently affects how Western states view other states in the system.
327
 Hence, it is also 
significant for defining the concept of failing states.
328
 Alexander Wendt’s Constructivist 
view of the essential state crystallizes the different aspects from above. He defines state as: 
“organizational actor embedded with institutional–legal order that constitutes it 
with sovereignty and has territory over which it has legitimate monopoly on 
organized violence”.329 
 
This can be tied to the prime responsibility that the state has for its citizens, which is the 
provider of the ‘political good of security.’330 Geographical territory and identity are 
embedded in the concept of sovereignty.
331
 This makes sovereignty central for both the 
definition of the state and the failing state.
332
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There are numerous reasons why sovereignty is a paradigm of modern times.
333
 Traditionally 
sovereignty was seen as the ability to decide both foreign and domestic policies without 
outside interference. It is also about the ability to freely decide participation and membership 
in international organizations.
334
 Therefore, sovereignty is the precondition for a state to exist 
and to be recognized by its peers. The widely accepted norms of reference are the 
Westphalian sovereignty and international legal sovereignty.
335
  
 
However, a contemporary Westphalian sovereignty is far from problematic as various cases 
(the Balkans in 1990s, Iraq and Libya in 2000s, and Syria and Ukraine in 2010s) have 
showed.
336
 There are also other reasons to question the validity of sovereignty. Pekka Visuri 
and Francis Fukuyama argue that for various reasons (e.g. economic development and 
transnational operations) the meaning of sovereignty has been eroded.   Hence, it does not 
have the same meaning it did during the Cold War.
337
 This view also binds Western 
conceptualization of ‘new threats’ into the development of globalization and makes threats 
transnational.
338
  
 
This conceptualization of ‘new threats’ can create intersubjective and intertextual links. These 
links can then connect existential threats to problems (like failing states), thus securitizing 
them heavily. This process can be seen in effect in chapter 4 where securitizing of FS is 
presented.  
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3.2 Identity of the state and the international system 
 
The previous section looked at the historical background of the state. It brought up the 
cultural–normative issues as well as how sovereignty and identity affect the definition of the 
concept. This section continues by focusing on the identity creation of the state and how the 
‘Self–Other’ dichotomy is created. Furthermore, it will provide the starting point for the 
definition of the failing state concept in the next section. 
 
The model of a Western state was transported to other parts of the world in many forms. Of 
these the best known is that of colonialism. Colonialism divided the entire world in to the 
European style states.
339
 By doing so, it made stateness the perquisite for any polity to act as 
legitimate actor in the system.
340
 Moreover, Hans–Henrik Holm argues that the dominant 
states created the normative basis from which the international system was built. Therefore, 
they provided the idea of what a state should be as well as the legal framework associated 
with it.
341
 Moreover, this relationship of states and the system is also capitalized in the 
Constructivist view of Alexander Wendt. He argues that the system cannot exist without 
states as the units (states) make the system possible.
342
  
 
Wendt’s thoughts put Robert Rotberg’s (and others like him) in a new light. Rotberg and 
many others argue that ‘a state’s violent disintegration and weakness constitutes a threat to the 
states system’.343 These ideas reflect the fears of the established states system that if its 
constituent parts fail, the whole system will fall like dominoes with them.
344
 It also highlights 
the fact that a domestic acceptance is less important than international. Hence, what ultimately 
matters is the ability to force your existence into being.  
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Holm’s view, the threat to the states system comes failing states because failure undermines the normative 
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 See, for example Rotberg (2004), p. 1, and Ayoob (1995), p. 196.  
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 Stohl, (2011), p. 2. 
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This relationship of states and the system provides a view on how failing states could also be 
perceived as an existential threat.  It extends the threat of state failure beyond any singular 
polity or region and creates a systemic threat of FS. States exist as part of the system and they 
define their identities in relation to other states. Hence, they create various threats through 
these identities. Threats to state (and to its identity) are often depicted through national 
interests. Alexander Wendt argues that states identities and interests contribute for the state as 
national interests, which define its existence.  
 
For him, states identity ‘generates motivational and behavioral dispositions’.345 These are 
subjective qualities are somewhat dependent on how others see the state in question.
346
 This 
intersubjective reference causes traffic both ways in the formation of the identity. Therefore, it 
affects how state sees itself internally and how it is seen externally.
347
 This can be seen as a 
process in which Western developed states compare themselves to undeveloped states. It can 
also be a comparison of welfare and prosperity within the collective of Western states (e.g. 
European Union [EU] or G–8 and G–20 nations).  
 
This way intersubjective links work as a way to define ‘Self’ by comparing it to the ‘Other’. 
Furthermore, it makes the ‘Other’ to create its identity by looking through ‘Self’. Because of 
this reference and comparison, the ‘Other’ might not create a distinct identity of its own. This 
can be seen in how failing states are defined by Western democracies by comparing these 
states to their ‘Self’. Subsequently they define the ‘Other’ as something they are not. 
Therefore, a non–failing state creates the failing state and vice versa. There are also numerous 
other ‘identities’ that affect how the identity of the state is formed.348 These bind together the 
collective ‘Self’ to form up the identity of the state.349 In addition, Hans–Henrik Holm argues 
that there exists ‘an interaction between power of the state and the international norms’. For 
him, the identity of the state is constituted by a combination of international norms and state’s 
own norms.
350
 This adds a transnational normative element to the identity formation. 
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 Wendt (1999), pp. 225–229. 
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 Holm, (1998), p. 4. 
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Holm emphasizes more than Wendt the influence between the state and the system as a factor 
for identity construction. On the other hand Wendt sees the identity construction as an 
intersubjective process, where the state’s ‘Self’ creates its identity through ‘Other’ (other 
states, not the system of states).
351
 The differences aside, both Wendt and Holm regard the 
state’s own norms as a factor in defining its identity. By doing this they give weight to the 
argument that the Western view is inseparably presented in the model of the state. In this 
study the argument of Wendt and Holm can be seen in the way the U.S. identity is created in 
the NSS documents. It displays the ‘Self–Other’ relation through national interests and 
existential threats. There is also the international normative element through NATO and EU. 
 
Furthermore, for Wendt interests define what states want and exhibit some of the same 
cultural properties as identities. They give light to some of the actions that are not explained 
by identities alone.
352
 This connection between identity and interest is described by Wendt:  
“The US cannot be a state without its monopoly on organized violence 
(corporate), a capitalist state without enforcing property rights (type), a 
hegemon without its clients (role), and a member of the West without the 
solidarity with other Western states (collective).”353 
 
It is interesting how Wendt sees this connection of identity and interest where the interests of 
the state motivate it through the aforementioned four identities. He also argues that this 
combination is what generates ‘national interest’. National interest is a very important factor 
when we look at how state defines threats and securitizes various issues.
354
 Moreover, 
national interests also build threats to other nations as a byproduct. This is because they are 
portrayed in the national security strategies of the great powers and therefore have world–
wide effect.
355
 Essentially, national interests are the discourses that give clues to what the 
state thinks are its vital interests. Existential threats can be derived either straight from these 
or by looking at the intersubjective links created between various threats and issues. For all 
the states these include sovereignty and physical safety, but for great powers there are also 
issues such as critical energy resources and free access to transport routes.  
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 Ibid., This connection is mutually important. Without interests there is no motivation, and without identities 
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 Ibid., p. 232. 
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 William J. Foltz, “Reconstructing the State of Chad”, in Zartman (1995), p. 25. Foltz describes how in Chad 
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 Limnéll and Raitasalo (2008), p. 6.  
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However, it is important to take note of Wendt’s own argument of how ‘states are not 
inherently self–interested’ and as such not by nature Realist.356 For Wendt sovereignty has 
special meaning as the recognition of other states carries with itself the label of nominal 
equality in front of ‘Other’s’. According to him this makes the state less keen on securing 
itself by destroying other states.
357
 This can be seen as a stabilizing effect on the fear of being 
conquered, or being left without notice or prestige.
358
 Consequently, there is a connection 
between identities and interest’s which is mutually constitutive. Interests are presented to have 
objective and subjective properties which are always balancing against one another. This 
balancing of subjective and objective interests can end unsuccessfully (in disharmony) 
causing state failure.
359
  
 
3.3 Conceptualizing and defining failing states 
 
The previous sections dealt with how state became to be the preferred political entity in the 
West. It also showed how the concept of sovereignty is tightly bound with the Western 
concept of what constitutes a state.
360
 Furthermore, it showed how the identity of the state 
forms and what are the discourses on the nature of the state. This section uses that premise to 
conceptualize and define what constitutes a failing state. States have collapsed throughout the 
history but the more contemporary state failure can be divided into two periods.
361
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Rotberg (2004), p. 13, describes destructive leadership as the predominant explanation of how a state can fail 
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 Manjikian (2008), p. 342. According to Manjikian, ‘current thinking about failed states rests on Realist 
assumptions’. This is characterized by the Realist notion of power and how it defines the existence of the state. 
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 For a look on collapse of complex societies, see Tainter (1988). For detailed historical account of states, see 
Tilly (1990) and Hall (ed.) (1986). Robert Rotberg (ed.) (2004), p. 2, 20, localizes the explosion in the number of 
polities to the year 1914. First World War and the disintegration of Austro–Hungarian and Ottoman empires 
were the first wave. The second wave was WWII and it would lead to the explosion in the number of states as a 
result of de–colonization. 
65 
 
In the first period are states that experienced failure and collapse during the Cold War
362
. At 
that time state failure was already a recurring event in many parts of the world. Failures 
resulted from de–colonialization and they were the legacy of colonial borders and an attempt 
by the local populations to emulate their former masters.
363
 These collapses and failures were 
mitigated by superpower support which made them less catastrophic.
364
  In the second period 
are those states that failed after the Cold War ended and the interests of the West moved into a 
different direction.
365
 Hence, the interests of this research lie not in the former, but with the 
latter period. The Cold War period is used as necessary for conceptualization purposes. 
 
After the Cold War, rise of the U.S. and the disintegration of the Soviet empire heralded a 
new era. This era saw states (such as Yugoslavia) failing all around.
366
 The concept of state 
failure was first coined in the early 1990s by Gerald B. Hellman and Steven R. Ratner in the 
famous article of “Saving Failed States” in the Foreign Policy Magazine.367 The post–Cold 
War concept of state failure was tied to the break–up of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia, but 
it had its conceptual roots in the context of the Cold War. Moreover, it served as a catalyst 
and a reference point from which the current security discourse on failing states originated.  
Hence, the contemporary periods of state failure needs to be situated for the analysis of FS 
and their securitization in the NSS documents. Therefore, there should be a definition of what 
constituted failure in the post–Cold War period. The following discussion represents a 
(mostly) Western view of what constituted failure and what did not. As such, it does not 
necessarily coincide with the views of the rest of the world.
368
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3.3.1 Strong and ‘non–failing’ states 
 
Most definitions of state failure and subsequent concepts in the source material break down 
into the question of how strong a state is.  Hence, failure is about the dichotomy between 
strong and weak states.  This basic issue of strength has transformed into a wide variety of 
categories for state failure. These include strong, weak, collapsed, failed and failing states, as 
well as many which are somewhere along the spectrum.
369
 Robert Rotberg has argued that all 
of these different categories have the same basic demands. They ‘buffer external forces and 
mediate challenges of the international arena as well as internal economic, political, and social 
realities’.370 Therefore, these functions and demands are the same regardless of the category 
(or strength) of the state in question.  
 
Alexander Wendt stipulates that ‘strong state structures enable state actors to mobilize 
significant resources from society’.371 Conversely, a weak or a failing state would be ‘a polity 
which has weak or non–existent state structures’. This would make it ‘unable to mobilize 
resources form within society’.372 These generalizations coincided well with the NSS 
documents as we see in chapter 4 where the ‘Self–Other’ dichotomy of the U.S is presented. 
For Robert Rotberg, a strong state is one which delivers various political goods. These 
include (among many others) security, law, property rights, effective judicial system and 
political freedom, medical and health care, and working infrastructure. This list exhibits the 
comprehensive government structures and is an example of how Western states see 
themselves.
373
 The strength of states could also be defined through the four interests of the 
state (physical survival, autonomy, economic well–being and collective self–esteem).374   
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These four are in the NSS and can be seen to relate to Wendt’s four identities.  These 
collectively make up the national interest of the state and must be met, or the state will ‘die 
out’. Moreover, an existential threat to the state would be constituted if any of these key 
interests became threatened.
375
 These four points of Alexander Wendt’s described the basic 
tenets of a Western state which have been the standard model for other polities around the 
world. They are also typical for democratic states with a high respect for human rights. The 
four interests thus lay the basis for a stable structure from which the state can continue to 
develop. Consequently, strong states have set the standards by which other states evaluate 
themselves, and by what they strive to become.
376
  
 
3.3.2 Weak, failed and collapsed states 
 
The concepts of weak, failed and collapsed states are significant since they are used 
interchangeably with the concept of failing states. These conceptual analogies applied to 
primary and secondary source material, including the NSS documents. The strength and 
identity of the (Western) state was derived from industrialized and effective democratic 
society. How the weak ‘Other’ was transformed and got defined as threatening based on this?  
According to William Zartman, the ‘state project’ should not have been thought to work 
everywhere. In the places it didn’t take hold it was ‘spatially and temporally insufficient’.377 
Moreover, the borders that were drawn by colonial powers were a factor, as was the culturally 
specific nature and structure of local politics. This created a condition where locals were 
unable to create systems to match European states and their long development.
378
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 Christopher Clapham, “The Global–Local Politics of State Decay”, in Rotberg (2004), pp. 84–86. Clapham 
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Even the modern European states system continued its evolution in the 20
th
 century. In 
Europe the SU collapsed 70 years after its conception. After the collapse some of its 
constituent parts were categorized as ‘developing countries’ by the World Bank (henceforth 
WB). Moreover, this created division of poor and rich on Western terms and named those 
states something less than their Western European counterparts.
379
 William Zartman’s work 
gave a temporal starting point for the failing state concept by being situated at mid–1990s. He 
presented a thought that important transitions were followed by ‘waves of collapse’.380 
Furthermore, Barry Buzan (like Zartman) did not contribute de–colonization as the pre–
eminent cause of state collapse. Instead, he emphasizes the combined effect of internal and 
external factors.
381
  
 
There is a similarity with the Third World states and their characteristics that resembles the 
later definitions of various forms of failure. According to Mohammed Ayoob, ‘the 
prototypical Third World state’ usually presented the following characteristics: Lack of 
internal cohesion, unconditioned legitimacy of borders, weak institutions, vulnerability to 
internal and interstate conflicts with external actors, distorted economic and social 
development, and marginalization in regards to international economic and security 
concerns.
382
 These account for a number of humanitarian issues that draw attention from 
international community. Furthermore, these characteristics have also been one major 
indicator in different studies of what constituted state failure (and what constituted a state for 
that matter). Moreover, these humanitarian issues have been the source of Western 
intervention discourse (and justification).
383
 Humanitarian reasons have also been used to 
breach the established norms of sovereignty in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya.  
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Consequently, this has opened a way of defining failing states in Western terms.
384
 Rotberg’s 
categories of political goods coincided well with Ayoob’s definition of a ‘Third World state’. 
Through evaluation of the performance of the state in these categories, a further definition 
could be applied. Hence, states were defined weak or failed depending on how much deficit is 
evaluated to accumulate within the categories.
385
 There are also institutional approaches to 
failure and collapse of states. With these the different dimensions of stateness
386
 were 
evaluated for various degrees of weaknesses. The discourse is then related to the concept of 
‘good governance’. Good governance has been one of the major elements for state strength 
looked at by Western governments, including the International Monetary Fund (henceforth 
IMF) and the WB. It has been the pre–condition for support to the developing countries.387 
Good governance has also been generally associated with the effectiveness of the state. 
Mohammed Ayoob argues that ‘the lack of effective statehood’ created quasi–states which in 
turn were the ‘precursors of failed states.’ 388  The end of the Cold War then helped to evolve 
some of these quasi–states into failed states.  
 
It can be said that quasi–states were an analogue for weak, failing, failed and collapsed states.  
Therefore, the concept of quasi–states created a conceptual point of departure for the state 
failure discourse. Furthermore, the concepts of quasi–states and weak states were frequently 
used interchangeably. Both concepts described the same conditions that prevailed at the 
closing days of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Weak states (like quasi–states) had 
problems in various categories of effective statehood. The more difficulties they had, the more 
they leaned towards failure. Weak states could be seen as ‘lacking social cohesion, 
institutional core and organizational capacities’389. This extended the definition of the weak 
state beyond security, territorial sovereignty and political system. Moreover, the weakness of 
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the state presented itself through the very nature of the state.
390
 This meant that the nature of 
the regime (ideology) was also a factor in the creation of the ‘Self–Other’ dichotomy. Hence, 
it affected the creation of identities and can be seen through intersubjective links.
391
  
 
Juxtaposed to strong states, the concepts of failed and collapsed states reside with weak states 
in the utmost end of the spectrum. The state could be considered failed when it was deemed to 
have disqualified in most, or all of the criteria mentioned above. This makes a failed state 
‘conflicted, dangerous, and contested by warring factions’.392 The most significant factor is 
the ‘enduring character of the violence’.393 Violence has led to a loss of control in various 
regions and the polity is no longer ‘able or willing’ to act as a state. Moreover, this condition 
has degenerated into a situation where the state has lost its international legitimacy.
394
  
 
These descriptions of failure reflect also on the definition of the state itself. To be effectively 
named a state, the polity should have retained internal control and monopoly on the use of 
force within its borders. It also needs the recognition of other states in the system. Without 
these preconditions, the state is considered to be a threat to the system and to other states. The 
systemic threat is related to the (partial or complete) un–ability of the state to control what 
happens inside its area.
395
 Furthermore, if the loss of the control leads to a situation where 
failing and failed states are completely consumed by anarchy, they become collapsed states.  
Collapse of the state is a situation where the institutions of the state vanish, and it cannot meet 
the requirements of a state anymore. Hence, the ‘purposeful entity disappears’ and ‘the 
regulative and penetrative capacity’ of the state broke down.396  
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 Rotberg (2004), pp. 5–6 
393
 Ibid., p. 9. 
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Therefore, a collapsed state transforms into an ‘extreme version’ of a failed state.  In a 
collapsed state there are no structures to provide any of the political goods (security, 
infrastructure etc.), authority is absent and everywhere chaos and anarchy is rampant.
397
 Most 
sources mentioned Somalia and Liberia starting early 1990s as an example of a complete and 
utter collapse of a state.
398
 Hence, strong or non–failing states performed well in all of the 
functions of a state. Weak states performed well in some, but poorly in others. Failed states 
were deeply conflicted, dangerous and bitterly contested. Collapsed states became the more 
extreme version of failure exhibiting a complete vacuum of authority. Furthermore, in the 
source literature the subcategory of ‘failing’ was reserved for the states that hang between 
weakness and failure.
399
  
 
Consequently, inability to meet the demands of their populations constituted as failure of the 
state which was seen by Rotberg as what ‘failure was ultimately about’.400 Based on this it 
was relatively easy to separate the opposite ends of the spectrum. On one hand there was a 
fully functioning (Western) state, and on the other end a Somalia–type entity where complete 
chaos and anarchy rule. This conceptualization on the scale of failure was important for the 
identity creation and related dichotomy between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. However, Sonali Huria 
has criticized the discourse on state failure. She has argued that it juxtaposes ‘successful’ and 
‘failed’ and seems to highlight the latter either by design or chance.401 This cannot be without 
an influence on the discourse itself, and therefore it has probably affected how we perceive 
the issue of state failure.
402
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3.3.3 Failing states and perceived threats prior to 9/11 
 
In the previous parts of this section, state failure was conceptualized and different aspects and 
angles were pointed out. This laid the basis for the conceptualizing state failure in post–Cold 
War context and paved the way for the effort to define failing states.
403
 The parallel concepts 
of weak, failed and collapsed were shown to be integral part of the FS concept. These other 
concepts constituted a model of the failing state concept by intersubjective and intertextual 
links.
404
 In this part the concept of FS is finalized and linked to various threats prior to 9/11.  
 
Severe failure and collapse of a state usually cause a wide range of problems from internal 
and regional conflict to mass refugee flows and humanitarian catastrophe.
405
 The same effect 
is seen presently in the ongoing civil war in Syria with refugees flooding into adjacent 
countries and Europe.  The current situation in Europe and on its borders echoes Francis 
Mading Deng who described a post–Cold War global strategy in dealing with state failure and 
resulting afflictions. Deng referred to the statements of the former U.S. assistant secretary of 
state for African affairs, Chester Crocker (1992). Crocker’s statements highlighted the effect 
of the Soviet disintegration had on the stability of the international system.
406
 Crocker 
acknowledged that the collapse of the Soviets had ‘profoundly destabilized the previously 
existing order without replacing it with anything’.407 This process created vacuums that set off 
new conflicts elsewhere.
408
 A contemporary example of this can be seen with the cases of Iraq 
and Libya. The collapse of authoritarian regimes created conditions that spread chaos and war 
to the whole region.
409
 One of the more serious results is the ongoing civil war in Syria. 
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73 
 
Moreover, state failure was also one factor in causing security dilemmas between states that 
neighbor one another. This was because the security interests of the polities bordering failing 
states were heightened due to unpredictability of the situation.
410
 If the situation was left to 
develop on its own, it might cause a wider regional un–stability that eventually threatens 
international security.
411
 Furthermore, the regional instability issue was seen as one factor in 
the weakening of the principles of non–intervention and sovereignty.412 Therefore, weakening 
of non–intervention and sovereignty principles affected to how much weight humanitarian 
issues received. These had previously been a low–key area in the time of the Cold War due to 
the overriding superpower geostrategic interests.
413
  
 
However, humanitarian issues had always been part of the Western agenda in international 
politics. This was because they were seen to be a fundamental building block of a democratic 
state and society and as such, important for identity creation of the Western ‘Self’.414 Human 
rights rose to international prominence during 1970s and 1980s and established individual 
security as an international issue. According to Barry Buzan, this was to address the 
relationship between the state and its citizens.
415
 Moreover, the humanitarian discourse was 
notable since it highlighted the change that occurred after Cold War in Western predisposition 
toward state failure.
416
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However, the reasons for supplementing previous concepts and definitions or ‘updating them’ 
for contemporary use were at times somewhat dubious.
417
 Therefore, what has made the 
humanitarian discourse difficult in its own right is the way in which other issues are tied to it. 
It creates a complex web where the interests of states and normative ideals mix.
418
 An 
example of this was seen in the case of Liberia in the 1990s where numerous ‘players’ acted 
all according to their own design while veiling their actions as humanitarian intervention.
419
 
In Liberia the U.S. first supported its Cold War ally against Libya and then withdrew to 
‘neutrality’. Finally, it gave a major role to the UN and the Economic Community of West 
African States (henceforth ECOWAS). Simultaneously, the French intervened to protect their 
economic interest and tried to reduce U.S. influence in the region. Consequently, Liberia was 
defined by the UN as and international security threat due to enormous flows of refugees and 
the collapse of the state structures.
420
  
 
The aforementioned description portrayed the elements of a securitization of a discourse. It 
showed how the individual interests and normative concerns created a package which could 
be ‘sold’ to the international community. Securitization gave a good reason to act as well as 
tools to overcome restrictions like sovereignty.
421
 Thus, it can be said that Liberia was 
successfully securitized by the international community as a threat. Extraordinary measures 
were approved by the United Nations Security Council (henceforth UNSC) to deal with the 
threat, or face consequences. Similar situations were seen throughout the 1990s (e.g. Bosnia, 
Somalia, Kosovo) where state failure and the threats they presented were defined through the 
humanitarian discourse.  
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The ‘insanity example’ from chapter 2 should be reiterated here.  The concepts of state failure 
were created in the context of Cold War and Western culture. This was done by using a 
‘successful’ (Western) state as a reference point. Therefore, the failing state discourse was an 
interpretation (and diagnosis) created out of one’s own cultural viewpoint, and not something 
that necessarily had any factual basis.
422
  
 
For the purpose of this research I used my own composite model which took elements from 
the other definitions of failure, including collapse. This was done IOT see why the U.S. sees a 
failing state as an existential threat. In my view, the other models or definitions were not 
suitable for this task. They represented either state building– or peacebuilding views, or 
disregarded possible great power interests.  
 
Therefore, based on the discussion so far I defined a failing state to be:  
“A failing state is no longer able or willing to act as a state and has lost 
international legitimacy. It has none–existent sovereignty and the institutions of 
the state cannot meet the requirements of a state anymore. Consequently, 
authority is partially or completely absent. Therefore, the state has no control 
over what happens inside its borders, and is considered a threat both regionally 
and internationally.”423 
 
It should be emphasized that Francis Fukuyama and many others highlighted two key events 
in regards to state failure debate. One of these was the end of the Cold War and the second 
one the 9/11 terrorist attacks. These two have affected to the ongoing discussion about state 
failure.
424
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To illustrate this, Edward Newman argued that failing states were initially understood as 
Somalia –type disintegration. The meaning of FS was transformed by 9/11 and caused it to be 
understood as an existential threat. This brought the issue of stat failure worldwide 
attention.
425
 This described well the discursive transformation of the concept of FS. It showed 
that the discursive realm is never stable, but in constant flux.
426
 However, it has been argued 
that sometimes threats such as FS were created if there was need for them.
427
 Hence, the 
significance of the 9/11 has been debated in the International Security Studies (henceforth 
ISS).  In the ISS some saw 9/11 as a revolution (e.g. the end of the Cold war) but others just 
one event amongst more important ones (e.g. the rise of China).
428
 
 
To sum up the points discussed in chapter 3.  Sovereignty, state and security were strongly 
linked because ‘the meaning of security’ was tied to the state. Security was previously 
explicitly defined as national security, or implicitly drawn from this connection. Furthermore, 
states constituted their identity and interests in reference to the threatening ‘Other’. This 
formed national interest which defined threats and securitized issues. The lack of statehood 
created quasi–states that evolved into failing and failed states. This led to fears that if states 
fail, the system of states would fail with them. Moreover, majority of definitions of state 
failure were about the dichotomy between strong and weak states. Therefore, the discourse on 
state failure juxtaposed ‘successful’ to ‘failed’.429 Also, the various concepts were tied to the 
context and conditions under which they developed and as such could not be used without 
taking these factors into account.
430
 As Barry Schutz accurately described it:  
“It is unlikely that much international concern would manifest itself if 
Mozambique fell apart”431  
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4  SECURITIZING FAILING STATES 
 
–Casus belli 
 
Chapter four is dedicated to the discussion of why a superpower like the U.S. sees failing 
states as an existential threat and how this is portrayed in the NSS document. It is built upon 
chapters two and three for theoretical and conceptual basis. Chapter three begun the analysis 
by defining threats from FS and located the discourses related thereof. Chapter four continues 
the process and analyzes the primary material (NSS’) to see how FS were securitized in the 
official discourses of the United States. It further shows the intertextual effect of the NSS’. 
 
The analysis also looked if the effect of securitizing was shown throughout the policy 
documents of different administrations. Hence, it looked for intersubjective links between 
different security discourses and threats. These links either amplified and supported the 
existing discourses, or created new ones. They were also essential for securitizing FS when 
they drew together multiple threats and thus amplified them. Furthermore, as security in this 
study was considered a discourse, the analysis of NSS was not about concrete threats as such. 
It was about the nation’s identity production and reproduction that made threats discursive. 
This process made the NSS about the radically different and threatening ‘Other’.432  
 
This research discussed about the importance of sovereignty in chapter three, section 3.1. 
Here that discussion is connected to state’s identity and its place as a referent object in the 
Securitization theory. The distinction between referent object (the state) and the securitizing 
actors (the NSS document policymakers)
433
 should be noted. For the state to have been 
thought of as a referent object, the survival of the state would have been about sovereignty 
and identity. Therefore, any attacks against the state counted as a threat to sovereignty and 
identity and through that link also as a threat to the existence of to the state.
434
 This is because 
sovereignty was one of the preconditions for a Western state to exist, even though its meaning 
had diminished in the post–Cold War era.435  
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Furthermore, Barry Buzan has pointed out that the state has official ‘speakers’ on its behalf.436 
This is usually the government as the legitimate representatives of the state. He has also 
argued that this meant that the referent object spoke for itself through the government.
437
 In 
the U.S., government and administrations are pointed by the president who verifies the NSS. 
Therefore, in the case of the U.S., it is the president which needs to accept the securitizing 
speech act made by the administration and the government. Moreover, in the NSS various 
security issues are usually presented as threats to sovereignty, identity, or both. 
 
How did the dichotomy between ‘Self’ and ‘Other got ‘manifested as existential threats? This 
happened because contemporary sovereignty is more broadly located and threats that might 
have been perceived affecting the state were not limited to military.  These threats were also 
focused against the people who constituted the state and its government.
438
 Hence, national 
interests and identity issues had to be addressed if the state wanted to exist. How these 
presented themselves varied. For example for Wendt, parts of a state can secede or be 
conquered without it losing its ‘life’. In his mind, autonomy was equaled to internal and 
external sovereignty and economic well–being was referred to a capability to acquire 
resources and maintain production. Furthermore, collective self–esteem referred to how the 
state saw the ‘Self’ in relation to the ‘Other’ and how it created its collective self–image.439 
This was seen in the NSS how various existential threats were linked in the similar way.  
 
In the NSS existential threats were linked to physical, sovereignty, economic, and identity 
issues. Physical issues were such as WMD’s or invasion.  Sovereignty issues were blended 
with the physical and in addition covered ideology and freedom of action. Economic issues 
were such as vital resources or regions, freedom of navigation in sea, air, space and 
cyberspace. Identity issues were values, sense of security and order of the international 
system.
440
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Consequently, existential threats were discursively created by intersubjective links from these 
issues to actors (such as states and non–state actors), and further linked these actors to each 
other. This is how the radical and threatening ‘Other’ was constituted and as such it was not a 
about concrete threats but producing and reproducing the national identity. This not denying 
that there might have been concrete missiles, WMD’s and terrorists somewhere.  Instead the 
argument was that an existence of a concrete threat (or the lack of it) is not the ultimate cause 
for the threat manifestation. 
 
4.1 National Security Strategy of the U.S. 
 
The first part of this chapter looked how dichotomy between ‘Self’ and ‘Other got 
‘manifested as existential threats. It also recapped on the importance of sovereignty and how 
it was connected to identity.  Finally, it ended with significance of the national interests and 
identity issues and gave an example how these are portrayed in the NSS. In this section the 
NSS documents were analyzed for the securitization of FS. Moreover, the section also created 
understanding of why failing states were eventually seen as a threat to the U.S. This 
understanding and the discourses on FS provided the material for the conclusions in chapter 5.  
 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet Union
441
 changed the international 
security environment. It constituted the emergence of a new world order, one with a single 
superpower
442
 (the U.S.) as the pre–eminent actor.443 The argument for the supremacy of the 
U.S. is not meant to an absolute statement.
444
 However, it would be naïve to dismiss the 
military, economic, cultural, and political power of the U.S. in regard to any other actor or 
group of actors. Therefore, the U.S. can be placed in a leading role in the absence of a 
similarly inclined opponent.
445
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The period of the Cold War had suppressed effectively the security discourse in regard to 
failing states.
446
 It had directed the discourse towards political rivalry and to the support of the 
superpower proxies. This changed when a more humanitarian look took place in the foreign 
policy of the U.S. in the 1990s. Humanitarian reasons, national interest and the weakening of 
the sovereignty principle resulted in interventions in Iraq, Somalia, and the Balkans.
447
  
 
This was seen in the way the Bush and Clinton administrations focused the NATO and U.S. 
military to a new direction in the absence of the Warsaw Pact.
448
 This led to the emergence of 
the concept of FS in the 1990s by Gerald B. Hellman and Steven R. Ratner in the article of 
“Saving Failed States” in the Foreign Policy Magazine.449 This coined the concept but left it 
‘floating’ with the other subsequent concepts. 
 
The academic literature used different concepts for state failure and was focused more on 
Africa than other parts of the globe.
450
 Hence, part of the dilemma surrounding FS was the 
question of why were they being seen as threat? Or were they consciously being presented as 
a threat?  
 
The most obvious answer would be to look at the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
451
 But as discussed, 
the whole concept of state failure is tied to the Western notion of the state. Therefore, 
sovereignty, identity and national interest created threats or made Western states perceive 
issues as such. Depending on one’s position and viewpoint anything and everything could 
have been drawn under the umbrella of state failure.
452
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 Deng, in Zartman (1995), pp. 208–210. Deng presents Chester Crocker’s thoughts how the international 
system should be renewed. This would create ‘a new set of norms’ that would ‘direct the actions and discussion’. 
For him, ‘the lack of institutions to address security problems’ emanates from the global norm deficit. Crocker 
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In this section the primary material of National Security Strategy documents was divided by 
various administrations. The analysis started with Georg Bush (NSS 1990–1991) and 
continued to Bill Clinton (NSS 1993–2000). These two presidents and their respective 
administrations presented the end of the Cold War and the 1990s widening of security. Georg 
W. Bush (NSS 2002 & 2006) and Barack Obama (2010) presented 9/11 and the ‘global war 
on terror’, as well as the change that followed in its wake.  
 
The analysis highlighted the dominant security discourses and existential threats present 
during each administration. This made comparison of discourses possible and provided the 
possibility to see if there were intertextual connections between administrations. As a result 
there was an image created of how the failing states discourse entered into the NSS and how it 
was securitized.  
 
The NSS gives broad lines of the U.S. national security presenting important issues both 
domestic and international.
453
 The document is ‘a mix of normative statements and strategic 
analysis’.454 It is drawn together by the Whitehouse and signed by the president which gives it 
a high level of executive power and credibility.
 455
 There were several continuous themes 
which carried throughout the years. These were such as security of the U.S. (in face of an 
attack), WMD’s and nuclear proliferation, economy, international stability and transnational 
threats (environment, crime, terrorism etc.), to name a few.
456
  
 
The interest here was not in the full context of the NSS documents but in the concept of 
‘failing states’ and its analogies. The first read of the NSS tracked the appearance of the 
concept of FS as well as the context where it presented itself. This was done IOT create a base 
line from which the securitization of the concept can be analyzed. The more detailed second 
read of the NSS documents traced the intersubjective and intertextual links. This created an 
image of how the FS concept entered the NSS documents and what threats were linked to it. 
Consequently, this provided the information on how the securitization process happened.  
 
                                                 
453
 William W. Newmann (2004), “The Structures of National Security Decision Making: Leadership, 
Institutions, and Politics in the Carter, Reagan, and G. H. W. Bush Years”, Presidential Studies Quarterly 34 no. 
2 (June), Center for the Study of the Presidency, pp. 274–275. 
454
 J. Brian Hehir (2003), “The New Security Strategy”, America, April 7 2003, Vol. 188, No. 12, p. 8. 
455
 Roe (2012), p. 252. Sovereign is the one who decides whether there is ‘an extreme emergency’ and if 
extraordinary measures can be implemented. 
456
 Ibid., p. 255. Roe quotes Juha Vuori (2010) in that ‘specific words such as terrorism automatically bring the 
logic of danger and as such don’t need to be argued every time’. Buzan (1991), p. 166. 
82 
 
4.1.1 George Bush (NSS 1990–1991) 
 
In the early 1990s SU neared its collapse and many of the Cold War threats and interests 
remained prominently present in the NSS.
457
 Therefore, majority of the national interests and 
threats were tied in one way or the other to the Soviets. SU was still considered to be the most 
prominent threat to the U.S. due to strategic nuclear forces and superpower rivalry.
458
  
Because of this premise, the survival of the U.S. with its sovereignty (political–physical) 
intact and its population secure was at the very top on the list of both NSS’ national 
interests.
459
  
 
The category of ‘biggest threats’ to national interests covered several issues and threats from 
strategic to minor. These were such as military attack, terrorism, strategic arms control, 
human rights and the spread of ‘military critical technologies’ & WMD’s to hostile countries 
or groups.
460
 The ‘biggest threats category’ contained mostly issues that could be accounted to 
present a threat to the very existence of the U.S. Therefore, these threats can be said to have 
been existential by the classification of the Securitization theory.  
 
However, there were some existential threats located elsewhere within the context of other 
interests. It was because of the global nature of U.S. interests included issues such as free 
access to energy resources in vital regions. This particular interest was further connected to 
the freedom of seas.  Moreover, energy resources and strategic geographical locations 
(regions) enabled the projection of power as well as international commerce and energy 
shipments.
461
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Therefore, regional instability and denial of access to critical resources (such as oil) presented 
an existential threat to the U.S. Furthermore, the regions of Europe and the Middle East were 
presented from all the regions of the world to be of vital importance to the U.S. security. 
Europe was vital because it was the strategic heartland of industrialized world and main arena 
of East–West competition462. Middle East was deemed critical because of oil, allies (Israel), 
WMD’s, and state sponsored terrorism.463  
 
Regional threats gained prominence in 1990 as the superpower competition waned. They 
became the main context to which the WMD’s and proliferation issues were tied to. There 
were signs of a securitization move being made to present WMD’s (of regional actors) as a 
new and ‘ever greater danger’ due to proliferation. Importantly, this threat was presented to be 
directed not just against U.S. military forces abroad, but possibly to the U.S. itself.
464
 This 
intersubjective link made regional threats existential in nature. Moreover, in the following 
NSS of 1991 (a post–Gulf War document) securitization of WMD’s in a regional context was 
clearly visible. In the NSS of 1991 Iraq’s WMD’s and ballistic missiles were demanded to be 
demolished according to UNSC resolutions.  
 
Subsequently, Iran was accused of being a state that supports terrorism and Libya was 
connected to both terrorism and WMD’s.465 Consequently, the end of the Cold War was 
visible in these two documents as they portrayed both old and new threats. National interests 
were somewhat categorized but threats were spread and embedded all along the documents 
without clear categorization. The most prominent securitization was the case of WMD’s, 
ballistic missiles, and their proliferation.  It cut across the various sections and was tied to 
different interests and issues. State failure or the concept of FS was not present at this point on 
either document. 
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4.1.2 Bill Clinton (NSS 1993–2000) 
 
The Clinton administration inherited a post–Cold War world where security discourses had 
begun to change from the old ‘geopolitical necessities’ of superpower rivalry.466 Moreover, 
the Soviet threat of conventional arms had disappeared and the nuclear threat had greatly 
reduced. This had ‘fundamentally changed the strategic environment’.467 The discourses on 
regional crisis and the (potentially existential) threats to the U.S. was kept form the NSS’ of 
1990–1991. Same applied to the threat of WMD’s, transnational drug trafficking, terrorism 
and to the importance of critical regions.  
 
Retaining old threats portrayed an intertextual effect between the NSS documents. This trend 
would continue and strengthen toward the end of the century.
468
 As the threat of SU 
disappeared, a more diverse set of issues was put forth.
469
 Implementation of ‘new threats’ 
coincided with the general widening of security from the Cold War context and included areas 
such as environment, international crime, disease and humanitarian concerns.
470
 Furthermore, 
what was visible was a strengthening of the securitization of specific threats. As a result, this 
securitization affected the dominant security discourses.  
 
The Balkan civil wars of 1992–1995 and the Gulf War of 1990–1991 were prominently 
presented. They formed a nexus around which many of the new security discourses started to 
take shape. In addition to this, physical security and sovereignty of the U.S remained as the 
primary national interests. Only the source and gravity of the threat changed. 
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In the NSS of 1997 the process of designating clear categories for national interests and 
threats was finally achieved. Prequel to this was the NSS’ of 1995–1996 where national 
interest were categorized as vital, important and humanitarian. The context was the limits of 
the use of military force in defense of these interests.
471
 Vital interests were of overriding 
importance to the survival and security of the U.S. Therefore, the threats to them were of 
existential in nature (e.g. Gulf War, WMD’s). Important interests were those which connected 
to values and national well–being, but did not affect national survival (e.g. intervention in 
Bosnia). Humanitarian interests comprised the third category and were not primary concern 
of the military, but possible in case of immense catastrophes (e.g. Somalia and Rwanda).
472
  
 
The NSS of 1997 intertextually retained the previous categorization of national interest. It 
added categories that presented threats to those interests. These were labeled regional or 
state–centered threats, transnational threats and threats from WMD’s. These were not unitary 
categories and were intertwined between each other. Most importantly for this research, 
regional threats were created by states, failed states, terrorists, ‘outlaw or rogue states’, 
criminals and humanitarian issues.
473
 Therefore, this intertextual linking of threats from 
previous NSS’ to the NSS of 1997 created the framework for the securitization of failing 
states. It also used intersubjective links to create connection between different categories of 
threats that would later become significant.   
 
Furthermore, the categorization of threats was modified in the NSS of 1998 when the section 
of failed states was added.
474
 Hence, the NSS of 1997 was the first document where state 
failure was mentioned. In the NSS of 1998 it had for the first time its own category. Hence, 
there was a clear case of the concept entering the security discourse at those temporal 
moments. Simultaneously, connections begun to be formed between different types of threats 
and these started to link up to FS.
475
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There were several prominent existential threats which carried through the Clinton 
administration. The most prominent one was the threat of WMD’s and proliferation. It was 
presented throughout the eight documents and received increasing space and visibility from 
just seven (7) pages of NSS of 1993 to twenty–nine (29) pages in NSS of 2000.476 This threat 
originally emanated from the disintegration of the SU. It transformed into regional context 
and was specifically connected to those regions vital to the U.S. interests (Europe, Middle 
East and Korean peninsula).
477
 Moreover, WMD’s were originally a state–centered threat (as 
Saddam’s Iraq demonstrated)478 that developed to include non–state actors, such as terrorists 
and criminals
479
. They replaced SU as the priority one threat to the U.S. which accounts for 
the heavy securitization.
 480
  Therefore, this successful securitization kept WMD’s as the 
prevalent security discourse throughout the Clinton administration NSS documents.  
 
The second one was regional conflicts and their threat to the U.S. vital interests. From the 
original critical regions of George Bush (Europe and the Gulf) the list was broadened to 
include East Asia and Southwest Asia.
481
 The common theme between these areas is that they 
had either significant energy resources (oil) or states with WMD’s (or aspirations to acquire 
them)
482
. Moreover, some areas were located along vital transport routes like the Gulf, and 
sections of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.
483
 Other regions were connected to values and 
allies, such as Europe. Regional conflicts were prominently displayed as being caused by 
‘rogue states’ which were also designated as ‘hostile nations. The list included Yugoslavia, 
Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Sudan.
 484
 This identity creation securitized them further. 
At first, the threat that was the spread of instability because of ethnic violence, refugee flows, 
and control of vital regions.
485
 Towards the end of the 1990s the emphasis changed to WMD’s 
as well as harboring and supporting terrorism. 
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As an example, for Bosnia (NSS’ of 1994–1996) the securitization of ethnic violence was not 
as prominent as was in case of Kosovo (NSS’s of 1998–2000). It reiterates the slow change 
from Cold War geopolitical priorities to post–Cold War widened security. Moreover, in the 
case of Kosovo there was a direct violation of Serbian sovereignty by the U.S. and NATO 
without UNSC approval.
486
 This breach of international law further emphasized the 1990s 
normative change and the problems of defining state, sovereignty and state failure. The 
normative effect was also present and visible in the security discourses of the Clinton 
administration NSS documents.
487
 The humanitarian argument of the 1990s reached its climax 
in the NSS of 2000 where ‘ethnic cleansing and genocide’ were more strongly tied to regional 
stability via national security. In the case of Kosovo, ethnic cleansing was created as an 
existential threat by intersubjective securitization. This happened by combining values, 
national interests and vital (critical) region, hence making it ‘imperative to take action’.488  
 
Herein under the regional threats were the first connections to the state failure and with the 
concepts of failing and failed states. Moreover, here the conceptualization of failing states 
becomes very important. In the previous NSS documents there were definitions of rogue 
states, rogue nations and outlaw states. These definitions were connected to specific states, 
most frequently to Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. However, this same definition was also 
applied to Yugoslavia.  So, as to reiterate the composite definition of a failing state created in 
section 3.3 (shortened): 
“A failing state is no longer able to act as a state and has lost international 
legitimacy. It has none–existent sovereignty and institutions. Consequently, 
authority is absent and the state has no control over what happens inside its 
borders, and thus is considered a threat.” 
 
The NSS of 1997 placed ‘failed and unstable states’ in the category of regional and state 
centric threats. The context was a possibility to ‘further destabilize regions of interests’.489 
This coincides with the conceptual definition above. Therefore, ‘failed and unstable states’ 
could have presented a threat or an existential threat to the U.S., depending on the location 
and significance of the region.  
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Within the span of 1993–2000 Yugoslavia was not only a rogue or an outlaw state, but by 
definition also a failing or a failed state.
490
 This was because of the disintegration of the 
federal Yugoslavia into its constituent parts. Furthermore, at this junction the securitization of 
failing states was not completely successful. However, it can be said that the first 
securitization move was done here in relation to the failure of the Yugoslav state on both sides 
of the mid–1990s. This created a conceptual definition of sorts for failing and failed states in 
the NSS documents.
491
 At the same time different threats were linked to each other. 
Consequently, intersubjective and intertextual effect had started to show in the concept. This 
reiterates the complex nature of the concept and underlines the need for a broad understanding 
of state failure, as discussed in chapter 3.
492
 
 
The third prominent threat was different. Previous two were state centric threats but this one 
was non–state, asymmetrical493 and it penetrated through all the categories because of its 
transnational nature. Terrorism continually gained prominence in the threat categorization 
during NSS of 1993–2000. It was first mentioned as part of other transnational threats494 and 
one of ‘potential threats’.495 However, that stared to change when terrorism was first attached 
to the regional context of ‘states that support terrorism’ and especially coupled with 
WMD’s.496 Iran and Libya were most frequently connected to state sponsored terrorism in the 
early NSS documents. Additional securitization of terrorism originated from the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing and the plotted assassination by the Iraq of former president George 
Bush.
497
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Moreover, there was a significant shift in the security discourse on terrorism in the NSS of 
1996. In 1996 intersubjective connection of terrorism in the mainland U.S. to rogue states was 
established. Rogue states were described to ‘breed and harbor terrorists’.498 This in turn 
securitized both terrorism and these states. Part of the securitization move also drew 
intertextual power from the previous NSS’. In those documents the security discourses had 
been established of WMD terrorism as well as state sponsors of conventional terrorism.  
 
Another clear securitization move was done in the NSS of 1998. There the severity, 
destructiveness and immediacy of the terrorist threat were emphasized. Terrorism was 
strongly tied together with WMD’s and inserted into the categories of transnational and 
WMD threats. Furthermore, this type of terrorism was depicted of being able to ‘inflict 
terrible damage to the U.S. and it was ‘increasingly likely’ that the attack on U.S. soil will be 
done by WMD’s and the target will specifically be ‘civilians, cities, and gatherings in 
events’.499 Thus the need to ‘deny safe havens’ and to ‘strike terrorist bases’, was 
underlined.
500
 This major shift was clearly visible in the section on terrorism. It clearly stated 
that the U.S. ‘will seek to uncover and eliminate foreign terrorists and their sanctuaries’, both 
by law enforcement and by force. Furthermore, a significant articulation of an existential 
threat was presented:  
“..when our very national security is challenged, and when we must take 
extraordinary steps to protect the safety of our citizens.. ..we reserve the right to 
act in self–defense by striking at their [terrorist] bases and those who sponsor, 
assist or actively support them.”501 
 
This had all of the elements of a securitization act as presented by Buzan et al.
502
 It 
emphasized the existential nature of the threat, the need for immediate action, and underlined 
the fact that special circumstances exist where normal process is considered too slow or 
inadequate.
503
 Moreover, the NSS of 1998 created a specific security discourse by this 
securitization act which carried onto become a major factor in securitizing failing states. 
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Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan were here tied to the terror attacks against American 
embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The former was the organizer and financer and the 
latter (with Sudan)
504
 was the harbor and supporter of terrorism. This securitization was 
further amplified by the ‘Self–Other’ dichotomy created between the U.S. and the terrorists. 
These terrorist groups were presented as sharing: 
“..hatred for democracy, a fanatical glorification of violence and a horrible 
distortion of religion to justify the murder of innocents. They have made the 
United States their adversary precisely because of what we stand for and what 
we stand against.”505   
 
The case of Osama bin Laden demonstrated how the question of terrorism could be very 
easily made also about identity, instead of just physical security.  
 
Furthermore, an intersubjective element was added to the security discourse by connecting 
WMD’s to bin Laden and his network. This was done by stipulating that a military attack by 
U.S. forces was not just against Afghanistan, but also against Sudan where chemical weapon 
components had been produced for bin Laden’s network.506 These issues were somewhat de–
securitized in 1999 but the NSS of 2000 brought back the hard line arguments. This further 
securitization was because of terrorist attacks against the USS Cole in Yemen and Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the U.S. Moreover, because of these attacks the right of 
retaliation in self–defense was emphasized.507 Subsequently, there was also an additional 
strengthening of the ‘Self–Other’ dichotomy between the U.S. and Afghanistan. This was 
done by labeling Afghanistan as ‘a serious threat and primary save haven for terrorists who 
threaten to the U.S.’, including Osama bin Laden.508 
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 The White House (1998), p. 55. Libya and Sudan are depicted as posing a ‘threat to regional stability and the 
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Sudan, since ‘they had been warned for years to stop supporting terrorist’.  
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 The White House (2000), p. 25. There was rhetoric about how terrorist attacks had been prevented in the 
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example the complexity is given in relation to 9/11. The idea for 9/11 was created in Afghanistan, but the 
logistical planning was conducted in Germany and Spain. Hence, both views are partially correct. 
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Consequently, the most significant points of the Clinton administration security discourses 
were: 1) Intersubjective connection of terrorism, WMD’s, and rogues states with the clear 
example of a securitization it presented.  This would later become a major factor in 
securitizing failing states.  2) Creation of the state failure discourse and the broadening of its 
definition to include those states which also qualified the category of ‘rogue states’. This 
created an intersubjective ‘bridge’ between these separate concepts.509  
 
Moreover, the intersubjective linking of threats and the intertextual effect between the NSS’ 
created a mix. In this mix anything from any of the separate categories could be combined to 
either create a new securitization or amplify an existing one. This came apparent in 2002. 
 
4.1.3 George W. Bush (NSS 2002 & 2006) 
 
The administration of George W. Bush received from Bill Clinton a set of security discourses 
which had been created in a globalizing and increasingly interdependent post–Cold War 
world. A lot of threats were de–securitized510 during the closing years of Clinton 
administration. On one hand, this positive trend had reached even to such old state–centered 
threats as Libya and Iran. On the other hand, numerous threats had been amplified and the 
connections between them had grown increasingly complex.
511
  
 
These interconnected threats included (amongst others) terrorism, WMD’s, rogue states, state 
failure, and information network attacks.
512
 Moreover, the normative change in the post–Cold 
War world had created a situation where sovereignty of states was eroding and humanitarian 
interventions were being conducted without UNSC resolutions. The U.S. as the lone 
superpower had immensely more freedom of action to project its power and to protect its 
interests.
513
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 Balzacq (2005), pp. 172–174. According to Balzacq, securitizing actor can ‘induce or increase’ the 
susceptibility of the audience. This is related to what the audience ‘knows about the world’ and what is the 
context. Therefore, the culture of the audience and the role of the political agency affect the outcome. 
510
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 Waltz (2008), p. 88. Waltz argues, that ’in light of the structural theory’ unipolar system ’appears as the least 
stable of international configurations’. 
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To this framework came the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and an enormous shift in the dominant 
security discourses happened.
514
 The NSS of 2002 was created nearly a year after 9/11 and it 
displays very concretely how the primary threat changed.  The prime position of WMD’s and 
rogue states changed to terrorism. The ‘task of defending the nation had dramatically 
changed’ and a ‘war against terrorism’, was declared.515 The previous administrations 
categories of threats and national interests were replaced by a somewhat vague categorization 
of goals. It did not clearly define which of these threats were considered vital (or existential) 
and which not. This structure described well the effect 9/11 had for the 2002 document. 
 
Terrorism was presented as the main threat to the world from the very beginning of the NSS 
of 2002. The ‘allies of terror’ were the ‘enemies of civilization’ and all the great powers were 
allied against terrorism.
516
 This articulation created a powerful amplification of identity. It 
affected the ‘Self–Other’ dichotomy created during the Clinton administration by 
strengthening it.
517
 An argument for action was presented that supported this securitization 
and drew strength from it. It was a simple statement that appealed to ‘a common sense for 
self–defense and preemptive action’ before threats became a reality’.518 The core idea was 
taken intertextually from previous NSS documents.  Therefore, there was no need for 
additional argument or justification as this was in line with vital interests and survival of the 
nation.  
 
The NSS of 2006 reiterated the severity of the situation: 
 “America is at war”.519 
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Most importantly, failing states were securitized as an existential threat and tied tightly to 
terrorism by a widely quoted part of NSS 2002:  
“America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing 
ones.”520 
 
With this one sentence an image was created that any state torn by unrest, war, bad 
governance, radicalism, poverty, and other problems associated with state failure, is more of a 
threat to the only superpower in the world than great powers such as Russia and China. 
Hence, a new extended dichotomy was cemented for the ‘Self–Other’ and a new identity for 
FS was created. This new identity was a composite of the old rogue state of regional threats 
and aspirations of WMD’s. It was a supporter and harbor of terrorism, a place of ethnic and 
religious violence and persecution.  
 
Moreover, it was something that threatened the very survival of the U.S. and was the gravest 
threat to international security.
521
 Whether intentional or not, Afghanistan had become the 
‘model’ of a failing and failed states. Because of Taleban, Afghanistan and al–Qaeda, the 
concept of a failing state was associated after 9/11 with every evil imaginable.
522
 Therefore, 
Afghanistan and 9/11 had created the ‘Sammy Doe factor’ for failing states.523  
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Furthermore, a significant articulation of an existential threat was presented:  
“The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and 
technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of 
mass destruction. The United States is fighting a war against terrorists of global 
reach....The enemy is terrorism… ...We make no distinction between terrorists 
and those who knowingly harbor them…”524 
 
The separately securitized threats of rogue state, WMD’s, terrorism, and regional instability 
had been ‘spilling over’ from their respective categories in the NSS’ of 1993–2000.525 A 
powerful securitization was made when the NSS of 2002 created intersubjective and 
intertextual connection of failing states and the 9/11 attacks.
526
 Moreover, this type of 
devastating terrorism was conceptually placed with ‘slavery, piracy and genocide’. With the 
articulation of ‘freedom and fear were at war’ it was designated as an enemy of the U.S. 
cultural–normative identity. This further amplified the identity dichotomy and thus further 
affected to the securitization of FS.
527
  
 
Furthermore, there was another issue which tied terrorism, failing states, WMD’s and rogue 
states strongly together. Chapter V of the NSS of 2002 was about WMD’s and the threat they 
posed to the U.S. and its friends and allies.
528
 The entire chapter was a major securitization 
move. It drew intertextually upon previous discourses starting from Cold War era of 
deterrence. As part of the securitizing act, the chapter included the 1990s rogue states, the 
Gulf War and terrorism.
529
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In the chapter V an extensive definition of a rogue state was presented, and Iraq and North 
Korea were named with qualities fitting to the description.
530
 Great emphasis was placed on 
stopping the ‘rogue states and their terrorist clients’. These arguments were based on the 
devastation capabilities of WMD’s in the hands of these ‘hostile’ actors.531 This not only 
attached terrorism to rogue states, but created an intersubjective link (by chance or by 
purpose) between rogue states, terrorism and FS.
532
  
 
Majority of the threats and vital interests in the NSS 2002 were in one way or other connected 
with terrorism.
533
 The following NSS of 2006 depicted itself as ‘a wartime security strategy’ 
which gave it very high security content.
534
 The existential threat of terrorism was already 
successfully securitized in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2002. Hence, in the NSS of 2006 
there were additional emphasis placed on the “the legitimation of preemption on the existence 
of an imminent threat”535  
 
Furthermore, the 9/11 attacks were referred to as ‘violated international norms and laws of 
warfare’. The subsequent civilian casualties of the attacks were seen as the prime objective of 
the terrorists. Therefore, attacks with WMD’s would be exponentially worse.536 The link 
between rogue states, terrorism and WMD’s was reiterated to drive home this point. In 2006, 
FS were not specifically named as a threat in context of the WMD’s. However, the 
intertextual power of the previous NSS’ and intersubjective links created between threats 
made them appear so also in this context.
537
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96 
 
In the NSS of 2006 the Cold War ‘long struggle’ was compared to the ‘War on terror’. 
Importantly, it emphasized the similarities of these two such as the opponents ‘intolerance, 
murder, terror, enslavement and repression’.538 During the Cold War, Communism and the 
SU were the overriding threat to the U.S. Therefore, placing terrorism to the same threat level 
as the Soviets was a significant articulation. The significance of this is amplified by the fact 
that the Soviet threat was intertextually drawn from several decades of nuclear deterrence and 
imminent worldwide annihilation.
539
 This comparison also placed FS within the same context. 
Consequently, it continued to strengthen an already strong dichotomy between the ‘Self’ and 
‘Other’ and further solidified the identity of the ‘Other’ as the existential threat to ‘Self’.540  
 
There was an effort in the NSS of 2006 to support the discourse on securitization of Iraq and 
WMD’s in the wake of the invasion of 2003 by arguing on behalf of a credible threat.541  
Subsequently, the importance was placed on the ‘fundamental character of regimes’ and the 
goal of ending tyranny. In 2006 tyranny was listed as regional and international security issue 
using the same arguments that previously were made by the Clinton administration about 
FS.
542
 Moreover, all tyrannies were tied together as a list of ideologically opposed states. 
These were presented as trying to acquire WMD’s which made them an existential threat and 
a national security issue for the U.S. Hence, these states were linked intertextually to the NSS 
of 2002 and an intersubjective connection was made to the securitization of Iraq.
543
 The 
definition of tyranny presented many of the characteristics formerly associated with failing or 
failed states as well as with rogue states. This formulation mixed values, ideology, stateness, 
terrorism, WMD’s, state failure and rogue states. In this complex web basically everything 
could be connected to anything. Therefore it made securitization (of any issue) easier and de–
securitization harder.
544
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The FS discourse was kept stable in the NSS’ through the multiple links attached to it. It was 
connected to Taleban, Afghanistan, terrorism and to the notion of how state failure could 
become an existential threat. In the NSS of 2006 the WMD’s section reiterated this equation. 
It continued to contextually associate state failure to WMD’s through other threats such as 
rogue states.  This argues on behalf of the intertextual and intersubjective effect. There was 
also significant effort placed in strengthening the dominant security discourses and countering 
de–stabilizing effects that could lead to de–securitization. Moreover, there was effort to 
counter de–stabilization of the dominant discourse by separating Islam as a religion from the 
concept of terrorism. This was done by giving a detailed account of the reasons behind 
terrorism and it supported the initial securitization made in the earlier NSS documents.
545
  
 
With these action and articulations Islam was de–securitized and the dichotomy between 
Islam and Western democracies, de–stabilized. At the same time the ongoing securitization of 
terrorism was strengthening the prevalent identity dichotomy. The problem here was that this 
process created a very complex web of intertextual and intersubjective moves of securitization 
and de–securitization. The original structure of the different security discourses was created 
over a length of time in the NSS documents leading up to 9/11. Therefore, it made the 
changes and de–securitization harder to accept. Also, because of intersubjective links between 
different threats any de–securitizing attempt affected adversely to securitizing acts and vice 
versa.
546
 
 
In the NSS of 2002 a number of security issues were left unaddressed due to the 
overpowering terrorism agenda. In 2006 there was a clear effort to return to these themes and 
use them to strengthen the prevalent security discourse.  Regional threats were addressed, but 
the connection was far from being as equivocal in relation to FS as it was in 1997.
547
 The NSS 
of 2006 stipulated that regional conflicts form conditions that create FS and ungoverned areas 
(a synonym for FS) which then ‘spawn’ terrorism.548 Furthermore, rogue states and FS then 
cause instability in these regions which affects the availability of critical resources. This 
argument was also the core idea of several NSS documents before 9/11.  
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This discourse changed with the NSS of 2006. Regions of strategic importance remained but 
now the terrorism discourse modified the resource discourse to include ‘funding terrorist 
activities through oil revenues’ and the use of plutonium from nuclear reactors to build 
nuclear weapons.
549
 The development discourse was now also connected to terrorism. It 
previously had a distinct emphasis on humanitarian, health and democracy issues. Now the 
discourse underlined the danger of abuse of ‘weak and impoverished states and ungoverned 
areas’ by tyrants, criminals and terrorists.550 This definition of ‘weak and impoverished states 
and ungoverned areas’ matched that of the FS.551 Therefore, it strengthened the connection 
between FS and ‘war on terror’. Moreover, it contributed in keeping up the FS discourse and 
hence stabilized the securitizing of it further. 
 
Finally, the NSS of 2006 provided a new categorization of threats at very end of the document 
tied to the section of National Security Institutions. These new threats were labeled 
‘challenges’ and divided into four: Traditional, which included conventional militaries of 
states. Irregular, that included state and non–state actors using terrorism, insurgency, and 
criminal activity. Catastrophic, that included WMD acquisition, possession and use, by state 
and non–state actors. Disruptive, that included technologies and capabilities used by state and 
non–state actors to counter U.S. military advantage.552  
 
Consequently, the two NSS documents of George W. Bush administration created failing 
states as a strategic threat by associating it with terrorism (9/11, al–Qaeda, Osama bin Laden 
and Afghanistan). This intersubjective link provided ‘why’. The documents also amplified the 
‘Self–Other’ dichotomy of the U.S. in relation to terrorism and tyrants. This created an 
identity for FS that associated it with the ‘evil’ ideology of terrorism and rogue states. 
Therefore, it made the threat of FS to the U.S. not just physical, but also ideological. 
Moreover, the existential threat of WMD’s was strongly linked to FS through terrorism and 
rogue states providing the ‘how’ to ‘why’. Nearly all segments of the two documents were 
tied to terrorism, ‘rogue states’ and WMD’s in some way. This further contributed in 
securitizing FS and kept up its discourse of as an existential threat.  
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4.1.4 Barack Obama (NSS 2010) 
 
Barack Obama’s administration took over after a decade of ‘global war on terror’. The U.S. 
prestige and identity had suffered a global decline because of occupation of Iraq. The 
prevalent message that the NSS of 2010 carried was change. This was an effort to distance 
itself from the identity created by the NSS of 2002 and 2006. Threats of terrorism, state, non–
state and failed state still remained, but there was a return to the themes of the Clinton 
administration. The Clinton NSS’ had also presented other important issues as significant 
threats, such as climate change and cyber.
553
 In the NSS of 2010, national interests were in 
four major categories which described enduring interests that all linked to one another. This 
subsequently connected threats to categories with same logic. These categories were security, 
prosperity, values, and international order.
554
 This division was not used in 2002 and 2006, 
or in the same format in the NSS’ of 1995–2000 (then vital, important and humanitarian).  
 
The fact that security was a category of its own placed a significant linguistic power to all of 
the subjects under its heading by the premises of the Securitization theory. Moreover, 
international order was tightly linked to security due to its nature. Importantly, both 
aforementioned categories are tied to values through the creation of identity and the ‘Self–
Other’ dichotomy. The category of international order covered the old segment of regional 
issues and retained many of the discourses of 2006. The NSS of 2002 and the ‘global war on 
terror’ had skipped over many these discourses or combined them under FS. Some of the old 
discourses returned with the NSS of 2006 but were still linked to terrorism in some way. NSS 
of 2010 changed this with the category of international order. It highlighted multilateral 
cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism and proliferation and once more widened the 
scope to include a broader range of issues.
555
  
 
A significant shift happened in that regions were no longer categorized as vital or critical. 
They were now strategic (e.g. Middle East), and defined through nations (e.g. Mexico and 
Canada), or through access to resources and transport routes (e.g. sea lanes and air corridors). 
Therefore, a specific region (e.g. Europe) was not what mattered but various segments and 
actors within that region.  
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Therefore, it was the interaction within the region and the interdependence of the world that 
linked these actors to existential threats like WMD’s, terrorism. This was seen in NSS in the 
way international norms, law and order, sovereignty, and ‘responsibility to protect’ was 
promoted.  New structure was created to address global and local threats from states, non–
state actors, or ‘fragile states such as Afghanistan and Haiti’.556 
 
From the very beginning of the document the security discourse of WMD’s was presented as 
the one which carried the most significance. There was a ‘determination to prevent 
proliferation of the deadliest weapons.’ WMD’s were described to be ‘the greatest threat to 
the American people’, especially if obtained by ‘violent extremists’.557 This articulation draws 
intertextually from the previous NSS documents. WMD’s and proliferation was categorized 
as the number one threat to the U.S. The concern was shifted toward nuclear weapons. Hence, 
this choice in focus returned the discourse to its roots. In the 1990s states acquiring nuclear 
weapons were the major concern, not non–state actors. Interestingly, the label and definition 
of a rogue state is completely absent from this and other contexts. This can be seen as a wider 
effort to de–securitize and distance the issues put forward by the NSS of 2002 and 2006.  
 
For the NSS of 2010 terrorism remained important was now focused again to ‘al–Qaeda and 
its affiliates’. They were described as a network of ‘hatred and violence’ with and agenda of 
‘murder and extremism’. However, there was still a clear presentation of the link between 
WMD’s and terrorism. ‘U.S. citizens have no greater or more urgent threat’ than terrorist 
attack by nuclear weapon.
558
  
 
Therefore, this argument kept up the intersubjective link between these threats which was 
established in the previous NSS documents. The discourse about WMD’s (in general) existed 
intertextually for a long time and was kept up or slightly modified over the years. As such the 
only significance made in 2010 was the reversal of the prime position of terrorism by the 
WMD threat. This was because during the Obama administration the U.S. engagement in the 
world was not ‘defined by terrorism’ anymore.559  
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Regardless, the identity dichotomy of ‘Self–Other’ between the U.S. and the terrorists was 
kept up. A clear articulation of this was the statement about the general nature of war. War 
was seen not as one of ideology but a one of identity.
560
 This point is underlined by a strong 
effort to distance the ‘Obama administration’s identity’ from the ‘G.W. Bush’s’. Moreover, it 
was emphasized that the U.S. will not ‘impose its values by force’, or ‘narrowly pursue its 
interest’. The U.S. will be an example and use the rule of law and international norms as the 
basis for its actions.
561
 Hence, the changed nature of the situation is iterated. The U.S. was not 
waging a global war against terrorist [tactic] or Islam [religion]. The war was directed 
towards a specific network of al–Qaeda and its affiliates.562  
 
For the NSS of 2010, FS part of threat definition was created by the G.W. Bush documents, 
specifically the NSS of 2002. Additionally, in the NSS of 2006 regional conflicts with reasons 
such as poor governance, internal revolt etc. created conditions for state failure. These 
conditions of state failure produced ungoverned areas which spawned terrorism.
563
 
Furthermore, in 2006 the development discourse traditionally tied with state failure, was 
connected to terrorism.  
 
Abuse of ‘weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas’ by tyrants, criminals and 
terrorists was the source of threat.
564
 The NSS of 2010 still had majority of those previous 
links and analogies of state failure. It connected them (as the previous NSS’) either directly or 
indirectly to the existential threats of WMD’s and terrorism.  In the NSS of 2010 9/11 was 
considered a ‘transformative event’565. This still tied FS through intertextual reference as a 
direct threat to the U.S.
566
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Furthermore, the global and regional nature of the FS threat was reiterated and a need to 
address this issue was emphasized by the U.S., but also ‘by the international system’.567 The 
FS discourse was strengthened and tied to the same context of extremists and hostile states by 
placing it in the security category of national interest.
568
.  
 
There is also an additional term of ‘At–Risk States’ (henceforth ARS) which combined a 
majority of the definitions of FS. This blurred even more the difference between ordinary 
developing Third World states, and those harboring terrorists. ARS’ were described as places 
where a–Qaeda and its ‘terrorist affiliates’ are trying to establish safe havens. Therefore, no 
real situation like ‘case Afghanistan’ had to exist.  Even potential safe haven was considered 
an ARS as well.
569
 The ‘Self–Other’ dichotomy was used here through measuring the quality 
of governance (a typical issue in the development discourses). This was done to establish the 
need for assistance and thus to ‘avoid these states becoming a terrorist safe havens’.570 The 
ARS were also defined by effectiveness of sovereignty (external–internal), promotion of 
human rights, rule of law, civilian society, and the effect of the ARS to the regional 
security.
571
  
 
These definitions of ARS are again connected to the questions of ‘how a strong state is 
defined?’ and ‘what is the nature of the state?’ This reiterates the connection of state, 
sovereignty, and security and creates difficulties when failing states are defined by Western 
standards. Furthermore, Western standards of ‘strong state’ and the images created of ARS 
and FS in the NSS documents further amplify the existential threat of ‘Other’.572There was 
also a creation of a new identity for the ‘Self’. The Obama administration emphasized the 
difference between them and the G.W. Bush’s administration. This new identity was used to 
de–securitized the U.S. and it re–structured its identity to appear less aggressive and 
unilateral. It was created by acknowledging other centers of influence such as China, Russia, 
and India.
573
  International laws and norms were promoted in a system based on rights and 
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responsibilities.
574
 The U.S. advocated rule of law, power of an example, understanding 
cultural difference, and acceptance that ‘not everyone agreed with the U.S. view’.575  
 
This was a de–securitization of the ‘Self’ created during the Iraq invasion and ‘war on 
terror’.576  
“America will not impose any system of government on another country, but our 
long–term security and prosperity depends on our steady support of universal 
values, which set us apart from our enemies...”577 
 
However, the re–structured identity still portrayed the Western state’s basic idea of universal 
values and democracy. It described other models of statehood and governance either as 
enemies, adversaries, competitors or FS. Consequently, the problem was in the relationship 
between ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. ‘Self’ was created through the radical threatening ‘Other’ by 
emphasizing the difference.  Simultaneously the ‘Other’ was created through ‘Self‘. Hence, 
the identity of the U.S. was created through enemies (e.g. Iraq, Iran, North Korea etc.) and 
threats (regional conflicts, terrorism etc.).  
 
FS were created based on qualities of strong Western states and other measurable indicators. 
For the concept of FS there was no escape from the shifting definitions. These were drawn 
from the identity dichotomy and also constantly adjusted through intersubjective links. 
Intertextual effect between the NSS’ kept up, solidified and stabilized these discourses. 
Therefore, regardless of the change in administration FS continued to be associated with 
terrorism, WMD’s, rogues states, regional conflicts etc.  
 
This subsequently securitized the FS as an existential threat and kept up the securitization. 
The securitization of FS first started to take shape during Clinton administration. It was 
completed and became effective during G.W. Bush administration, and was still present and 
effective during the Obama administration. 
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4.2 Summary of the securitizing discourses 
 
In the previous section the discourses were spread out within and between the NSS documents 
for the reason of focusing on the specific administrations. The purpose of this section is to 
draw together and sum up the failing state discourses as well as subsequent explanations of 
why failing states were seen a threat to the U.S. Furthermore, it strives to show how the 
securitization of the FS in the NSS’ eventually became a reality. Identity and policy form a 
multifaceted picture when foreign policy is seen as a discourse.  Policies depend on how 
various threats are depicted and what kind of cultural dichotomies or juxtapositions are 
present.
578
 Therefore, foreign policy is an intertextual and intersubjective thing where the 
authority and arguments draw strength through references to other texts.  
 
During the Cold War the logic of security and the normative idea of a ‘strong state’ had 
created an understanding between the competing superpowers.  Weak states needed to be 
upheld because otherwise the underlying structure of the system would be at risk.
579
 In the 
post–Cold War world there was no single all–consuming threat for which to direct national 
security interests. Therefore, there was no plausible way to define ‘Self’ through the 
juxtaposition of the ‘Other’. If there was nothing for the U.S. to fear, how could it define itself 
and continue to be presented as the vanguard of Western civilization and democracy?
580
 The 
disintegration of SU and related events in the Balkans and the Gulf created the appropriate 
atmosphere for this re–definition. The widening of security gave rise to a new kind of security 
problematic.
581
 In the early 1990s there were discussions about ‘new global threats’ of 
collapsing states, disease, mass migration and regional wars turning into global problems.
582
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Moreover, this widening of the security from military to other sectors constituted in part the 
re–focus of the U.S. perception of threats.583 Threats became interdependent and 
transnational. However, regional instability (in vital areas), denial of access to critical 
resources (such as oil), and direct attack as to the U.S., remained as existential threats. The 
first appearance and distant analogies to failing states in the NSS documents was that of rogue 
nations and ‘mad men’. These appeared after the Gulf War (1990–1991) in 1993 in the part 
dealing with the proliferation of WMD’s.584 The following two NSS documents from 1994 
and 1995 exhibited a similarity in that they both mentioned the threat posed by rogue states. 
This was the first time a state was presented as the source of threat.
585
 Furthermore, the 
context where this was presented carried a sense of widening of security.  
 
However, it still emphasized the regional nature of the threats.
586
 It can be said that the first 
securitization move of FS was done in relation to the failure of the Yugoslav state on both 
sides of the mid–1990s. This created a conceptual definition of sorts for failing and failed 
states in the NSS’.587 Subsequently, the wars in the first half of the 1990s together with the 
Cold War legacy constituted the discourses of WMD’s and regional conflicts. These 
discourses started to link up with the FS discourse. After the midway of the decade the 
terrorism discourse became also a part of this family. 
 
The connection between terrorism and rogue states surfaced first time in 1996. The points 
mentioned above were still valid but a new formulation was added. The section ‘Enhancing 
our security’ contained a very descriptive phrase:  
“the destructive forces we face inside our borders often have their origins 
overseas in rogue nations that breed and harbor terrorists”588  
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This marked a clear shift in the articulation from solely regional issues into a threat to the 
mainland U.S. It also connected the ‘rogue’ label into many different sections of the NSS 
document. Furthermore, the concept of ‘failing states’ made it first appearance in the 
following year in the NSS of 1997. Failing state partly supplemented the rogue –label but 
restricted the term solely to a regional context. However it attached a state–centric meaning to 
it and connected it to a threat of a more military in nature. Therefore, it can be said that at that 
point in the 1990s the discourses on regional conflicts, humanitarian issues, and a multitude of 
other transnational threats (such as terrorism) had finally solidified in the NSS documents. 
Hence, in 1997 the intersubjective and intertextual linking was well on its way.
589
  
 
It was in the next three NSS documents from 1998 to 2000 where state failure took its place 
along the rogue state in the list of issues threatening the U.S. However, in the structure of the 
NSS document the issue remained low in the priorities compared to more serious threats.
590
 
Threats from rogue states and terrorism became more prominent and FS finally supplemented 
rogue states in 2000. The context remained tied to regional conflicts that could spread and 
affect vital areas of interest. The NSS of 2000 was the last document published before events 
of the 9/11 created a stronger connection between terrorism and various other threats 
throughout the spectrum.
591
  
 
In 2001 a significant shift happened in the security discourse. The magnitude was almost at 
the same level as the one that had happened with the fall of the Soviets.
592
 It partially re–
structured a large part of the security environment.
593
 Before the attacks of 9/11 the problem 
of state failure was localized and regional. It suddenly evolved into a one where ‘states that 
could not perform’ were a threat to all the others. Failing states presented dangers beyond 
their borders and ‘should be delisted and their sovereignty stripped of them.’594 9/11 was such 
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a powerful event that little argument was needed to present FS (such as Afghanistan) as 
harbors of terrorists and their organizations.
595
 It shifted the basis of the definition on how 
failing states were conceived in the U.S., and showed how a localized problem could cause 
damage regardless of the geographical distance.
596
 Moreover, the interests of the U.S. in 
Afghanistan after 9/11 were also related to the enormous hit its sovereignty and identity 
suffered as a result of the terrorist attacks.
597
  
 
Consequently, the U.S. identified Afghanistan (for one) to be a ‘safe haven’ (of sorts) for 
terrorism because of ‘failed and failing state’ status derived from various indicators. Most 
significant of those was the lack of control of territory and population.
598
 Previously both 
Cold War and post–Cold War situations had exhibited similarities in regard that they did not 
for the most part account the failure of states to present an international security issue.
599
 State 
failure had displaced the nuclear war and the Soviet armies as the key threat to the existence 
of the U.S.
600
 The concept of FS drew other transnational and global threats under it and 
created new intersubjective links.
601
 Therefore, the most definite turning point in the 
discourses was the 9/11.
602
 Furthermore, this event brought the problem of FS to international 
awareness because of acknowledgement by the U.S. and hence turned a localized problem 
into a global one.
603
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5 COMBINING ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 “Politics of unease can create contexts for securitization within which there is no clear 
discursive framing of threat”.604 
–Paul Roe 
 
The previous chapters went through the conceptual origins of FS. They searched for the 
appearance of ‘failing states’ in different forms and connections.  It is the task of this final 
chapter to pick the parts which have meaning and to provide an explanation on how the 
concept was securitized. Moreover, the final goal here is to present the analytical results and 
conclusions as well as provide incentive and thought for further research.  
 
The process of securitization needs the speech act, the utterance of ‘security’, and the relevant 
audience which accepts this argument. Therefore, ‘security’ should be attached to an issue 
that is presented as an existential threat. This special label makes the case much stronger than 
conventional argument. This study used a discursive conception of security.
605
 Security was 
seen as ‘a discourse through which identities and threats were constituted, rather than an 
objective material condition.’606  
 
Threats were securitized according to the Securitization theory where existential threat is 
created with a conscious use of language. Based on these theoretical and methodological 
guidelines, FS were not seen as actors and objective threats in the classical material sense of 
security. Instead, they were seen as discursively constituted radical and threatening ‘Others’. 
FS were gradually created as an existential threat through intersubjective and intertextual 
links between various threats and discourses.  
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The intersubjective links between dominant security discourses 
 
There were several discourses over the temporal span of 1990–2010 that eventually 
constituted failing states as existential threat and securitized it. The First of these was the 
WMD discourse which originated from the Cold War deterrence and Mutual Assured 
Destruction (henceforth MAD) with the Soviet Union. It gradually changed when the concept 
of security widened and included regional actors (namely states) as well non–state and 
transnational actors (e.g. criminals and terrorists). Furthermore, it was simultaneously linked 
to technological progress, globalization and to fear of proliferation. This created a global 
proliferation discourse where WMD’s was everything from components and precursors to 
actual weapons and ballistic missiles. Within this discourse, those who sought these weapons 
and abilities to create them were deemed rogue states, irrational, tyrants, dictators, 
demagogues and a danger to both regional and international security. It created the radical and 
threatening ‘Other’ while presenting ‘Self’ as a stable and responsible actor that was a 
vanguard of democracy and human rights. 
 
The second discourse was the regional conflict discourse. This was similar to the WMD 
discourse because it was also a legacy from the Cold War. The discourse was originally 
situated outside the industrialized heartland of Europe. It was prominent in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America. In these regions the superpower competition had at times escalated into proxy 
wars and regional (inter– and intrastate) conflicts. This discourse evolved after the Cold War 
in the 1990s due to unipolar world of U.S. global dominance and widening of security. It was 
embedded with humanitarian and development discourses that had been suppressed during the 
superpower rivalry. Moreover, during the Cold War regional conflicts had not presented much 
of an international security threat. The widening of security, a general normative shift in the 
West and various conflicts in critical regions (e.g. Balkans and Gulf) later constituted regional 
conflicts as an existential threat (of sorts) to the U.S.  
 
Furthermore, the WMD discourse was linked to the regional conflict discourse through the 
concept of rogue states. Hence, it was used as an intersubjective nexus. It amplified the ‘Self–
Other’ dichotomy and conceptually linked both dominant discourses. Regional conflicts 
created instability that could spread and become larger problems. Conflicts were being 
originated by weak, fragile, failing and failed states, as well as rogue states and autocracies. 
All of these had severe problems. They oppressed their populations, could not govern or 
control territory, were corrupt, and involved in ethnic cleansing or genocide.  
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Consequently, this resulted in creating the threatening radical ’Other’ through a successful, 
strong, democratic and industrialized Western ‘Self’. Therefore the ‘Other’ was constituted in 
a reflection of a Western model of a sovereign state. 
 
The third discourse one was the terrorism discourse which was originally a marginal threat. 
After the Cold War it rose steadily in significance toward the end of the 1990s and reached 
the culmination point with the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Like the previous two, the terrorism 
discourse evolved with the widening of security and was embedded with technological 
elements such as WMD’s. The threat was originally mostly to U.S. service personnel and 
civilians abroad but widened and strengthened from regional to global, and from marginal to 
existential. Furthermore, WMD terrorism was portrayed as a particularly great danger. The 
discursive shift of combining terrorism to WMD’s coincided with the changes in the other 
two major discourses. In those two similar intersubjective links were established. 
Consequently, near the end of the century WMD’s ‘were spreading globally’ and connected in 
almost all of the threat categories. Non–state actors and rogue states supported terrorism, 
whereas regional weak and failing states provided bases of operation. 
 
Furthermore, in 1998 a significant shift in discourses happened when the terrorist ‘Other’ was 
strongly constituted in the aftermath of strikes on the U.S. embassies in Africa. Not only was 
the threat named severe enough to warrant extraordinary measures, it was articulated very 
strongly. The ‘Other’ was described as fanatical and hateful that glorified violence and 
murdered innocents. Therefore its identity was placed against the identity of the virtuous, 
moral, civilized and benign ‘Self’. At this point the intersubjective and intertextual links 
between the discourses of WMD’s, rogue states, failing states and regional conflicts were 
connected to terrorism. Consequently, 9/11 acted as a catalyst.  The event strengthened and 
speeded up
607
 the intersubjective constitution of various threats. It also drew the other 
dominant discourses under the ‘failing state’ discourse. 
 
Consequently, the FS discourse was a composite of the three dominant discourses (WMD’s, 
regional conflicts and terrorism) and it developed gradually over time. The conceptual base 
was located in the Western definition of state, sovereignty and security. This was because the 
discourse on the state failure was tied to the idea of statehood and failing states were referred, 
defined and described in reference to something they were not. Existential threats needed for 
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the securitization drew from this connection of state and security because of historical links. 
They were discursively created by forming intersubjective links from issues (e.g. WMD’s) to 
actors (such as states and non–state actors). These existential threats (e.g. rogue states or 
terrorists) constituted dominant security discourses that were linked intertextually between 
NSS’ documents. The dominant security discourses (e.g. terrorists) were further connected by 
intersubjective links to other discourses (e.g. FS) as well with each other. This was how the 
radical and threatening ‘Other’ was constituted. Therefore, it was not necessarily about 
concrete threats but about producing and reproducing the national identity. 
 
The securitization of failing states in the NSS documents 
 
I would argue that the securitization of failing states happened first in the NSS of 1997. Its 
roots were in the disintegration of Yugoslavia as well as in the general strategic–normative 
shift created by the end of the Cold War. This is supported by an argument of Branwen G. 
Jones, which states that the colonialism discourse was modified into a development discourse 
during the Cold War. This created the conditions for post–Cold War state failure discourse. 
Hence, state failure discourse was used to justify intervention in ‘non–Western regions’ the 
same way as colonialism discourse had been in the 1800s.
608
  
 
The first part of the securitization was completed in the NSS of 1997 when the intertextually 
drawn security discourse from NSS 1994–1996 was combined in the threat categorization 
mentioning ‘failed and unstable states’. Therefore, the discourse in the NSS of 1997 can be 
seen as a starting point of the state failure discourse (with its analogues) within the NSS 
documents. This discourse was further strengthened and kept up by creating a threat category 
of its own for ‘failed states’ in the NSS’ of 1998 and 1999.609 The second part of the 
securitization happened between 1998–2000 when terrorism gained prominence and was 
linked to WMD’s and rogue states. Within this period the intersubjective and intertextual 
links between WMD’s, rogue states, failing states, regional conflicts and terrorism were 
formed. This created the framework for the final securitization.  
 
The third and final phase of the securitization happened after 9/11 when failing states were 
acknowledged as one of the key existential threats in the 2002 NSS document. This was done 
with a powerful framing on the first chapter: “America is now threatened less by conquering 
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states than we are by failing ones”610 This was in itself an enormous securitizing move as it 
created a link with the old Soviet nuclear and ideological threat to the contemporary one of 
terrorism and state failure. Devastating terrorism was placed as a threat which resided in the 
ruins of failing and failed states.  
 
Moreover, FS drew under it all the dominant security discourses from the previous NSS 
documents. These included rogue states and WMD’s. In 2002 the securitization of FS was 
successful to an extent that for a time it suppressed all other discussion on state failure. The 
FS theme continued in the NSS’s of 2006 and 2010 in a way that shows its effectiveness. It 
also proved the success of the securitizing act done in the 2002 document and showed the 
stability of the discourse.
611
 Consequently, failing states were securitized as an existential 
threat to the U.S. by presenting them as the place where devastating and catastrophic 
terrorism (e.g. 9/11) originated from. 9/11 had violated heavily the identity and sovereignty of 
the U.S. It created the feeling of shock and vulnerability that also affected the reaction that 
followed. The outrage at a massive attack on civilian population on the mainland of the U.S. 
amplified the already strong dichotomy between ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. This tied sovereignty 
and the Western notion of state as part of the discourse.  Therefore, 9/11 was the nexus that 
connected the previous descriptions, definitions and analogies of state failure (and that of 
rogue states) present in the various NSS documents. It also brought together all the dominant 
security discourses and linked them with FS. This strengthened and stabilized the discourse 
and made the securitization successful.  
 
The research process 
 
The aim of this research was to analyze the securitization of failing states as part of the U.S. 
national security discourse. This was done by looking at how the failing state discourse 
entered into the NSS as well as how it was framed. The NSS documents and the material on 
state failure provided information on why FS were seen as a threat. Primary material was 
analyzed using Securitization theory and DA methodology. As a result, it could be shown 
how FS were securitized as a threat to the U.S. Moreover, I argued that the interaction 
between various NSS documents presented itself through securitization. Hence, the effect of 
securitizing would be shown throughout the policy documents of different administrations. I 
found out that the official discourse of the NSS created a threat of FS gradually. 
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I also discovered the significance of the primary material on state failure. Without it, the 
analysis of the NSS would have been possible, but very superficial. The material provided 
critical information on the Western view of what state is (or should be) as well as how the 
identity of the state is created. This information on states and state failure made possible to 
understand why states see threats and how the securitization process gets initiated. Therefore, 
I learned that there is great value in thorough background information and looking at the 
research subject from different angles. However, at the same time there was the conundrum of 
what is enough? How much theoretical and academic source material is sufficient? Should I 
devote more time for a detailed description of how state was formed and how theories develop 
etc.? The more you read, the more information is available with links yet again to more 
information. This produces huge amounts of text in the process and can lead to endless loop. 
 
Therefore, the re–examining of my own text and taking out ‘excess’ was probably one of the 
hardest, but most instructive things of this research process. Furthermore, the DA 
methodology was proven to be excellent for this type of research regardless of the criticism 
directed against it. The NSS was structured in a way that it was not always clear what threats 
are existential and what less important. Even with the categorizations given by the document 
significant effort was needed in finding and examining the different intersubjective and 
intertextual links. For this very reason the chosen methodology proved to be suitable for the 
task. Constructivism, Poststructuralism and Securitization theories provided the necessary 
theoretical framework and ‘glasses’ for the methodology.  
 
It could be shown that throughout the NSS documents previous threats were externalized, 
objectified and internalized in a way which is consistent with Constructivism.
612
 This 
processes happened when FS were thought of by the policymakers of the U.S. as dens of 
terrorism and destruction. Originally this idea was discursively created by intertextual and 
intersubjective linking of threats during the 1990s and externalized in the form of a policy in 
the NSS. The separate security discourses entered into a social realm of consecutive 
administrations and took on a life of their own. Therefore, the security discourses were 
objectified and developed a factual existence. These continued to live on as an accepted fact 
and culminated after the 9/11. In the NSS of 2002 failing states became ‘the ground zero’ of 
the dominant discourses.  
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Consequently, as administrations changed the previous policy documents still retained their 
effect and new ones were born into a world of the old. Hence, the security discourses retained 
much from the old NSS documents. The new NSS’ shifted the discourse accordingly by 
providing additional securitization. This happened through support for dominant discourses or 
creating new intersubjective and intertextual links. However, this was not always without 
problems.  The opposition in the West (and elsewhere) towards the war in Iraq (no WMD’s 
were found) demonstrated this concretely.
613
  
 
Criticism and debate 
 
The theoretical and methodological framework and the results of this study leave room for 
criticism. Social constructivism puts a lot of weight in the use of language. I am of Finnish 
background with all of its linguistics, concepts and cultural implications. This positions me in 
a certain way when reading English literature and transcribing it in a form of an English text. 
For a constructivist–relativist (ontology) language creates social and concrete reality but for a 
realist (ontology) language presents a picture of reality as it is. Therefore, a realist could 
would view all the source material ‘as it is’ without considering the cultural–normative issues 
and draw different conclusions from it.  
 
Moreover, both the researcher and the source material of this study are from Western 
origins.
614
 This creates ‘a set of lenses’ which is vastly different than if it were to be looked at 
by Russian or Chinese or African researcher. Culture, society, and previously accumulated 
knowledge affect the premises of the study as well as the interpretation of the results.
615
 
Hence, there is a no way to ascertain that the material of this study (primary, secondary and 
general) would be understood in similar way by other researchers. During re–reading of the 
same material the context and meaning can vary depending on the cumulative information and 
intertextual and intersubjective links. Furthermore, even though official documents have high 
validity the weaknesses of these (NSS) documents are their heavy subjective nature. This 
comes from the fact that they represent the power of various administrations. Therefore, the 
way threats are described and presented either existential or not, is not just a matter of 
interpretation of the researcher.  
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It is also part of the motives and interests of those who draft the documents.
616
 Hence, it is 
nigh impossible to ascertain for a fact whether (any) securitization is done on purpose.  The 
process could be just happening through a constitutive effect of different events creating 
discourses which converge and link up, eventually constructing something new.
617
As an 
example, a threat from the wars in the Balkans affected the security discourse in the NSS’ 
because Europe had been articulated as a ‘vital’ region to the security of the U.S. However, it 
was pointed out in some of the NSS’ that the situation in the ‘former Yugoslavia does not 
pose a direct threat to the security of the U.S.’618  
 
Even with this controversial stipulation it warrants sufficient emphasis to interpret the 
document the way that the Balkan wars were a sort of existential threat to the U.S. This is 
because a threat to the stability of the strategic region of Europe was a very high priority for 
the U.S. This was further underlined by the fact that Europe was presented as a ‘vital’ region 
in all of the NSS documents. This presents a problem for the researcher as how to interpret the 
conflict. The intertextual effect of discourses draws support from other NSS documents as 
well as within them. This makes the conclusion dependent upon the interpretation of the 
reader as well as that of the policymakers who wrote it. This makes securitization sometimes 
difficult to pinpoint as it does not always present itself as clearly as is dictated in the 
theoretical principles.
619
  
 
The criticism towards Securitizing theory is more within the post–positivists camp than 
outside it.  The common accusations towards non–causal theories have been that they are not 
valid theories since they do not produce hypothesis to prove either true or false. Thierry 
Balzacq has pointed out that the CS is ‘extensively relativist’ and does not understand ‘non–
discursive power’.  Therefore, they make assumptions of the speech act that contradict the 
theoretical principles presented in the Securitization theory.
620
 This criticism is directed at 
how the theory should be interpreted and also to the usability of the theory in regards to the 
use of language. This could affect the analysis and results and should be noted. However, the 
chosen ontological, epistemological and methodological limitations always give out 
conclusion limited to those premises. 
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Furthermore, methodological critics have expressed concern of the ‘silent security 
dilemma’.621 This happens when something important is not securitized just because the 
potential securitizing actor has no means of speaking out their concern. Therefore, it is about 
the ability to interpret ‘security issues’.622 Because this interpretation is a cultural thing it can 
lead to a situation where cultural aspects affect whether or not something is considered a valid 
security issue. The second similar problem lies in the de–securitization of securitized issues as 
they are moved from the realm of security to the realm of the political. This should be done so 
that the securitized issue does not ‘fade away in silence’, but is (possibly) politicized and thus 
put into context, hence ‘returning its normative status’.623 
 
This is a valid point also in regard to the NSS documents as those who draft them choose 
what kind of threats are presented and what is the severity and context. Moreover, if threats 
are left without de–securitization even though changed circumstances would have warranted 
it, it distorts the analysis of the discourse thus affecting conclusions of the study. Also, the 
lack of empirical facts and the Schmittian understanding of security as the foundation of the 
CS place some restraints on the theory. The exceptional nature of security politics is a 
‘political and normative’ assumption which is challenged for the implications it holds.624 
There is a valid question posed by Buzan and Hansen which states: ‘Are state identities 
dependent upon threats and enemies for keeping up their identities and can this logic 
change?
625
  
 
According to them, the end of the Cold War was ‘problematic for Poststructuralism’ because 
it put into question whether states were dependent upon threats to maintain their identities. 
The formation of ‘Other’ was deemed so pressing that even if state’s identity could be 
constructed by ‘relations of difference’626.  It would eventually be not enough and these would 
be turned into ‘radical and threatening Otherness’. Hence, if state would always define their 
identities through enemies it would align Poststructuralism with Realism which thinks states 
as being circled by hostile actors.
627
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These arguments raise a good point since the formation of the U.S. identity and its 
interpretation are key elements for this study. They also point out weaknesses for implicitly 
adapting certain theoretical standpoint and point towards the benefits of theoretical hybrids. 
By constructing a combined theoretical approach for a study, both objectivity and validity 
would be served. For this study, a combined approach provided the needed perspective and 
adaptive capability. 
 
Possibility for further study 
 
There are several avenues of approach which could supplement and widen the research done 
in this thesis. One of those would be to include the academic and scientific community into 
the analysis and look for a constitutive effect of the securitization of failing states concept in 
the articles written during the same temporal period. This way selected journals and studies 
could be analyzed in an effort to determine whether the securitization of the FS concept in the 
NSS affected to the securitization of the concept in the wider academic community. 
Moreover, did this securitization reflect back to the NSS in some way? This could be 
supplemented with a more detailed historical analysis of the concepts of state, sovereignty and 
security and their mutual links.  
 
This way the Western state’s identity creation and its underlying paradigms could provide 
additional information for the conceptualizing of state failure. A Realist theoretical view with 
a classical view on security could be used to create a parallel analysis using the same material. 
This would create a thesis–antithesis that could be used to further broaden the research and its 
results. Moreover, the temporal period of the analysis could include the Arab Spring and wars 
in Ukraine and Syria to see how or if the securitization of the failing state continued or not. 
 
The overall ambition of a wider and in–depth research would be to see if the securitization of 
the failing states had lasting effect on the foreign policy of the U.S. and if this affected 
academic and scientific community as well as policies elsewhere. Consequently, this research 
provides an opening for further study of this subject and one theoretical–methodological 
viewpoint. 
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Conclusions 
 
The conceptual base of the FS discourse was located in the Western definition of state, 
sovereignty and security. State failure was defined and described in reference to a strong 
(Western) state. The existential threats needed for the securitization of FS drew from the 
definition and identity of the Western state. This historical–cultural background and identity 
formation provided the answer to the question of how state failure was conceptualized in the 
academic literature.  
 
Failing states were gradually created a threat in the NSS documents with the widening of 
security in the 1990s. During this process intersubjective and intertextual links formed 
between different threats. These threats were externalized to the policy documents as security 
discourses. Failing states discourse evolved from the security discourses of WMD’s, regional 
conflicts and terrorism.  These discourses were objectified and developed an existence of their 
own with consecutive administrations. The securitization of FS happened in phases through 
the different discourses. A regional instability issue associated with Third World ultimately 
received existential qualities. After 9/11 all state failure was defined as a strategic threat equal 
to former Soviet Union. This together with the conceptualization part provided the answer to 
the question of why failing were securitized as a threat to the U.S.  
 
In the NSS of 2002 failing states were completely securitized. It drew under it all the 
dominant security discourses. The following NSS documents kept up this securitization by 
retaining the intersubjective and intertextual links. The securitization of FS begun in the 
1990s was completed in 2002, and remained effective to 2010. By combining ‘what?’ and 
‘why?’ this research was able to provide answer to the question of ‘how?’ As a result it could 
be shown, how the official discourse of the U.S. (the NSS) created threats through 
securitizing failing states. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
9/11   September 11
th
 2001 
ARS   At–Risk States 
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency 
CS   Copenhagen School 
DA   Discourse analysis / Discourse analytical 
G–8 / G–20   Group–8 / Group–20 
GPI   Global Peace Index 
ECOWAS   Economic Community of West African States 
EU   European Union 
FS   Failing States 
FSI   Failed State Index 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
IOT   In order to 
IR   International Relations 
ISS   International Security Studies 
MAD   Mutual Assured Destruction 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NSS   National Security Strategy 
SU   Soviet Union 
UN   United Nations 
UNSC   United Nations Security Council 
U.S.   United States 
WB   World Bank 
WHO   World Health Organization 
WMD   Weapon of Mass Destruction 
WWII   The Second World War 
YTS   Yhteiskunnan turvallisuusstrategia 
   (Finnish National Security Strategy) 
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RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
Picture 1. Research framework of the study. 
 
 
Picture 2. Research design of the study. 
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SECURITY AND THE ADJACENT CONCEPTS 
 
 
Picture 3. Buzan and Hansen (2009) p.14, figure 1.1, security and the adjacent 
concepts (re–drawn from the original). 
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EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS OF SECURITY 
 
 
Picture 4. Buzan and Hansen (2009) p. 34, figure 2.1. 
Epistemological distinctions of security (re–drawn from the original). 
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THE SECURITIZATION PROCESS 
 
 
Picture 5. Wæver (2011), p. 477, figure I. Action, event and effects in Securitization 
theory. 
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DISCOURSE ANALYTICAL RESEARCH DESIGN FOR THE SECURITIZATION OF 
FAILING STATES IN THE NSS 
 
 
Picture 6. Discourse analytical research design, modeled after Hansen (2006). 
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ISS PERSPECTIVES  
 
 
Picture 7. Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 38, table 2.2. ISS perspectives in relation to the five questions (re–drawn from the original). 
